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', This thesis reports a series of experiments conducted to e lucid ate 
the nature of the relationship Qetween attribution and depression. 
. . 
After an extended review of the literature on attributjon and 
depression it was concluded that further research is needed to 
... 
evaluate the aetiological importance of depressogenic attributions, 
and also to elucidate the nature of the relationship they may 
entertain with depression. 
A series of experiments .and studies .were performed to address 
these and other issues. In experiments l-3 subjects' attribution~ 
for success and failure were manipulated and their effects on 
subsequent mood, expectations and psychomotor performance were ·,:,~· 
assessed. The results showed that depression and its _correlates 
are causally influenced by negative self-attributions. A further 
study, in which depressed and non-depressed patients' attributions 
were assessed, also provided evidence in support of the 
aetiological importance of these kinds of attributions. 
Experiments 5 and 6 were designed to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between· attributions and depressed mood. Experimen~ 
6 showed that mood can affect attributions,~uggesting that the 
relationship between these two variables is at least reciprocal. 
The implications of this finding for cognitive formula~iqns of 
depression were discussed. 
Another part of the programme was concerned with the determinq~ts 
of depressogenic attributions. Two studies,investigated ways~~ 
which depressed and non-depressed subjects used information to 
formulate attributions. The results suggest that depressed 
subjects' maladaptive attributions may develop as a result of a 
tendency to use perso·na l rather than en vi ronmenta l information. 
Finally, a multifactorial model was proposed, and its 
implications for the understanding of the aetiology and 
development of depression were discussed. 
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CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION AND DEPRESSION, BY A IKHLEF 
, ), This thesis reports a series of experiments conducted to 
'elucidate the nature of the relationship between attr(i-bution 
and depression. ! 
t:>_ 
A review of the literature bearing on the issues of diagnosis, 
nosology, and aetiology of depression showed that such issues 
are still unsettled. After a subsequent review of the more 
relevant attribution~depression literature it was c6ncluded 
that further research is needed to evaluate the aetiological 
importance of the so-called depressogenic attributions, and 
also to elucidate the nature of the relationship they may 
entertain with depression. 
A series of experiments, in which'':fhei"e and other issues were 
addressect...~.were performed. Experimenls l-4 support the claim-
by learned helplessness theoreticians that negative self- ~ 
attributions have an aetiological status in depression. Both 
experimental and clinical evidence were obtained in support of 
the aetiological importance of these kind of attributions. In 
addition to producing some informative findings concerning the 
theoretical status of attribution, the present work also r\ 
shed light on the nature of the relationship between attribut,ion 
and depression. The results from experiments l-6 indicated 
that the relationship between _,t);lese two variables is at least 
reciprocal. The implications ~f these findings for cognitive 
formulations of depression (i'hcluding learned helrlessness '-~ 
theory) were discussed. ,~ 
r' ·'' 
' -
Another part of this research programme was directed towards a 
detailed examination of the antecedent conditions of 
depressogenic attributions. These were found to develop asr.> 
a result of the tendency to use certain types of information. 
In the third part of this thesis, a model that fits the data 
generated by both the present work and that of others was 
proposed. The central claim of this model is that-depression 
develops as a result of continuous interplay among\~arious 
factors. The implications of this multifactorial view for the 
understanding of the aetiology and development of depres~ion 
were discussed. · 
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PART l 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
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'. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER. ONE 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
1.2 EARLY AETIOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS 
1.3 . THE NOSOLOGICAL DEBATE 
2. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Depression may be one of the few psychiatric disorders that has 
seriously threatened man's well being and joie de vivre throughout 
his long and hazardous history. It has been known since biblical 
and homeric times - vivid descriptions of depressive symptoms and 
episodes may be found in the Bible as well as in some of Homer's 
epic poems. But the first clinical description of manifestations 
and symptoms characteristic of the depressive syndrome can only be 
traced back to the classical greek era. In fact the initial step 
towards the delineation of this clinical syndrome was made when 
Hippocrates introduced for the first time the term melancholia in 
the medical terminology. 
Hippocrates wrongly believed that melancholia was caused by an 
accumulation of black bile in the brain. This aetiological view 
remained unchallenged for a long period of time.': It was not until 
Aretaeus, who is said to have lived in the second century A.D., 
provided a more exhaustive clinical description of this syndrome that 
a new conception concerning both the nature and the aetiology of 
depressive illness evolved. In addition to revealing that manic 
and depressive states can alternate in the same indiv1dual, perhaps 
the most valuable contribution to the field of psychopathology at 
that time, Aretaeus recognized the importance of psychological 
factors in the genesis and development of this syndrome: 
''The characteristic appearances, then, are not obscure; 
for the patients are dull or stern, dejected or unreasonably 
3. 
torpid, without any manifest cause: such is the commencement 
of melancholy. And they also become dispirited, sleepless 
and start up from a disturbed sleep •.. They are prone to 
change their minds readily; to become bossy, mean spirited, 
illeberal, and in a little time, perhaps, simple, extravagant, 
munificent, not from any virtue of soul, but from the change-
ableness of the disease. But if the illness becomes more 
urgent, hatred, avoidance of the haunts of men, vain lamenta-
tions are seen; they complain of life and desire to die.'' 
(Quoted in Lewis, 1934) 
Aretaeus's notion that mania and depression constitute a single 
clinical entity was embraced by most psychiatric investigators of 
the nineteenth century. His psychological approach was also revived 
and adopted after the renaissance by reformers such as Esquirol and 
Pinel. In his book Trait~ m~dico-philosophique sur l'alienation 
mentale, Pinel (1801) clearly revealed his psychological orientation 
when he refuted organicism and reaffirmed his humane approach to the 
mentally ill patients. 
Once again depression became the focus of the debate when Bail lager 
(1854) introduced the concept of 'folie a double form' and at the 
same time Falret (1854) coined the term 'folie circulaire'. But 
the credit went to Kraepelin who soon after elaborated and refined 
this diagnostic entity that he called manic depressive psychosis. 
1. 2 EARLY AETIOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS 
Although the nineteenth century has seen a scientific revolution, 
the state of knowledge in psychiatric circles remained at the pre-
scientific stage for a long period of time. It was not unti 1 
Kraepelin, the founder of modern psychiatry, published his Lehrbuch 
der Psychiatrie in 1896 that a renewed interest was shown to the 
study of the aetiology and nosology of psychiatric disorders in 
general, and depressive ones in particular. 
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Kraepelin subdivided mental illnesses into three major categories: 
dementia praecox, manic-depressive psychosis, and paraphrenia. 
By introducing this classification, Kraepelin had established a 
nosological system that gave psychiatry its much needed scientific 
basis and respect in the medical community. 
In his subsequent publications, Kraepelin elaborated his views on 
both the nosology and the genesis of depressive disorders: 
''Manic depressive insanity •.•• includes on the one hand 
the whole domain of so-called periodic and circular insanity, 
on the other hand simple mania, the greater part of the morbid 
states termed melancholia and also a not inconsiderable 
case of amentia •••. all the above-mentioned states only 
represent manifestations of a single morbid process." (1902) 
Kraepelin believed that manic-depressive psychosis and indeed all 
mental illnesses are due to organic causes, although he later con-
ceded that external factors (exogenous) may exert a substantial 
influence on the prognosis as well as the genesis of certain dis-
orders. In addition to maintaining an organogenesis conception 
of depressive illness, Kraepelin developed and adopted a classi-
fication model whose rigidity and lack of clarity impeded the 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying most diagnostic entities. 
·Although Kraepelin's approach won a widespread popularity for its 
clinical objectivity and nosological innovations, it was also 
criticised for its lack of flexibility. Theoreticians and 
clinicians dissatisfied with Kraepelin's system questioned both 
the underlying theoretical conception and the clinical considera-
tions on which it rests. For Kraepelin did not only maintain his 
organogenesis conception of mental illness in spite of contrary 
evidence, he also relied exclusively on the prognosis to define 
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his 'disease entity'. 
While European investigators such as Lange (1928) restricted 
themselves to making cosmetic changes in Kraepelin's original model, 
a new school of thought (in America) headed by Adolf Meyer offered 
a radical view of mental illness in general and of depressive 
illness in particular. Meyer contested Kraepelin's concept of 
'disease entity' and proposed that psychiatric disorders should be 
viewed as 'reaction types' displayed by an individual to adapt to 
environmental changes and constraints. Meyer's theory of 
'psychobiology', in contrast to the cartesian dualism of mind and 
body adopted by traditional psychiatry, strongly emphasised the 
unity of both the psychological and biological structures: 
''The apparent disorder of individual organs is merely 
an incident in a development which we could not understand 
correctly except by comparing it with the normal and 
efficient reaction of the individual as a whole, ~nd for that 
we must use terms of psychology- not of mysterious events, 
but actions and reactions of which we know they do things, 
a truly dynamic psychology. There. we find the irrepressible 
instincts and habits at work, and finally the characteristic 
mental reaction type constituting the obviously pathological 
aberrations •..• by dropping some unnecessary she 11 s and 
traditions, we can see a psychopathology develop without 
absurd contrast between mental and physical •••. " (Meyer, 1908) 
Meyer's concept of 'psychobiological unit' was enthusiastically 
embraced and used to approach both the aetiology and nosology of 
depressive disorders. Those who espoused Meyer's views stressed 
the importance of personal and social factors in the genesis of 
depression, thus depression ceased to be a correlate of brain 
pathology. The Meyerians also rejected the endogenous-reactive 
(exogenous) dichotomy advocated by Kraepel in and his followers, 
instead they proposed that depression should be viewed as a single 
6. 
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illness differing not in nature but in severity and chronicity. 
The Meyerian framework was undoubtedly reflecting the growing in-
fluence that psychoanalysis was beginning to have on psychiatric 
thought since its formulation by Freud. 
1.3 THE NOSOLOGICAL DEBATE 
Kraepelin's and Meyer's divergent views regarding both the nature 
and classification of depressive disorders gave rise to a long but 
fruitless debate centred exclusively around the nosological issue, 
relatively neglecting important questions about the aetiology and 
treatment of depression. According to Kendell (1976), the reason 
for this state of affairs is that: 
''they (depressions) provide a convenient arena for 
several disputes about the nature and classification of 
mental illness as a whole: whether mental illnesses 
are diseases or reaction types, whether they are 
independent entities or arbitrary concepts; whether 
they should be classified on the basis of their sympto-
matology, their aetiology or their pathogenesis; and 
whether they should be portrayed by a typology or by 
dimensions.'' (p.l5) 
Whatever the reason for this controversial debate, there is no 
doubt that the nosological status of depression was at the heart 
of the dispute. While some have argued for the existence of dis-
tinct categories of depressive illnesses (e.g., Gi11espie, 1929), 
others, however, maintained that a 11 depressive i 11 ne ss was the 
same, and the differences observed in symptomatology were merely 
quantitative (e.g., Lewis, 1934). Although some ar€as of agreement 
have since emerged (cf. Kendell, 1975, 1976), nevertheless the 
literature on classification of depressive disorders is still con-
fusing. Table 1 illustrates this point. 
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TABLE 1. Proposed classifications of depression (adapted from 
Kendell, 1976) 
One ea tegory 
Two categories 
Three categories 
Four categories 
One dimension 
Two dimensions 
A. Simple typologies 
Lewis (1934) 
Depressive illness 
Roth (1965) 
Endogenous depression 
Neurotic depression 
Van Praag ( 1965) 
Vital depression 
Personal depression 
Over a 11 ( 1966) 
Anxious-tense depression 
Hostile depression 
Retarded depression 
Paykell ( 1971) 
Psychotic depression 
Anxious depression 
Hostile depression 
Young depressives with personality disorder 
B. Dimensional systems 
Ken de 11 ( 1968) 
Psychotic-neurotic 
Eysenck (1970) 
Psychoticism and Neuroticism 
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In this second part of the present chapter, a brief review of the 
arguments that animated the debate on the nosological status of 
depression is made, and attempts at evaluating some newly proposed 
classifications are also made. And finally, the question of 
whether depressive disorders should be portrayed by a typology 
or dimensions is asked and a tentative answer is proposed. 
1.3.1 The unitary conception 
The unitary conception of depressive disorders was proposed by 
Meyer following his sharp criticism of Kraepelin's nosological 
and aetiological formulations. But it was Lewis (1934) who actively 
defended and finally established this nosological scheme in modern 
clinical psychiatry. Clinicians and researchers who subscribe to 
the unitary view of depressive disorders, argue for their homogeniety, 
although they recognize that substantial differences may exist in 
phenomenology, severity, and chronicity of some depressive states • 
. 
The monists, as they are now known, regard depression as a single 
illness that occurs in various degrees of severity and chronicity. 
They argue that the endogenous (psychotic) - reactive (neurotic) 
dichotomy advocated by Kraepelin and later reiterated by Gillespie 
(1929) and many others, is neither supported by aetiological studies 
nor justified by treatment purposes. 
While the separatists, those who favour the dichotomy, were actively 
searching for evidence to substantiate their claim, the monists 
limited themselves to refuting such evidence. Repeated clinical 
observations and follow-up studies were soon to reveal that 
psychotic and neurotic depressive patients exhibit differences not 
only in clinical symptomatology but also in premorbid personality. 
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Lewis (1938) was unconvinced by the arguments presented in favour 
of the discontinuity. He pointed out that the diagnostic cate-
gories of psychotic and neurotic depressions: 
" .•.• are nothing more than attempts to distinguish 
between acute and chronic, mild and severe; and where 
two categories only are presented,-the one manic-
depressive - gives the characteristics of acute, severe 
depression, the other of chronic mild depression.'' 
Lewis's unitary approach to the classification of depressive dis-
orders remained unpopular in psychiatric quarters for many years. 
His views on the nosology and nature of depressive illnesses were 
not shared by his continental colleagues, although they were 
eventually espoused and promoted by Henri Ey (1954), a leading 
French psychiatrist. 
1.3.2 The endogenous-reactive distinction 
Two fundamentally different views of the nature of depression 
exerted a great influence on discussions about the relationship 
between endogenous and reactive depressions that started some 
fifty years ago between the Kraepe 1 in i ans and the Meyerians. 
Those loyal to the Kraepelinian tradition adopted a dualistic 
approach and therefore argued strongly in favour of the distinc-
tion between endogenous (psychotic) and reactive (neurotic) forms 
of depression. In an important paper entitled "The Clinical 
Differentiation of Types of Depression'' Gil1espie (1929) reiterated 
and elaborated on Kraepelin's dichotomy. After a careful study 
of a group of clinically depressed patients, Gillespie concluded 
that reactive and autonomous or endogenous depressions are two 
distinct types of depressi~e illness. Gillespie's decision to 
1 0. 
view endogenous and reactive forms as two distinct disease entities 
_, 
was based on symptomatic data. The results of his study showed 
that patients diagnosed as reactive depressives were characterised 
by mood fluctuations and reactivity to environmental changes. 
Those diagnosed as endogenous depressives, however, displayed a 
different type of symptomatology whose major characteristic is 
non-responsiv~ness to external or environmental influences. 
Although Gillespie's notion, that endogenous and reactive depres-
sions can be separated on the basis of reactivity to the environment, 
may be (theoretically) sound, when applied it failed to discrimi-
nate adequately between the two clinical conditions. Despite 
lack of evidence supporting this symptomatic approach, clinicians 
and researchers continued to use Gillespie's 'reactivity' as 
their major diagnostic criterion. 
Until some twenty years ago the decision to classify depressive 
illnesses into endogenous or reactive was based either on clincial 
symptomatology or on treatment response. However, the refinement 
of psychometric techniques and the application of sophisticated 
statistical methods in recent years has offered a sound scientific 
basis for such nosological classification. Indeed, researchers 
on both sides of the Atlantic have enthusiastically applied 
multivariate analytic techniques to all sorts of data (including 
epidemiological data) to test the classification model inherited 
from Kraepelin and Gillespie. Although some of their attempts 
may have been hindered by obvious methodological constraints, 
their results have not been inconclusive. 
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In what is now known as the Newcastle school, Roth and his colleagues 
devoted most of their time to investigating the endogenous/ 
reactive or neurotic issue. In their major study, Carney, Roth, 
and Garside (1965) subjected a set of data, obtained from a sample 
of 129 clinically depressed patients diagnosed as endogenous or 
neurotic, to multiple regression analysis and found evidence 
supporting the endogenous-neurotic dichotomy. The results of 
their study clearly showed that the distribution of sympton 
scores was bimodal, although subsequent attempts to replicate 
their results have apparently failed, (Kendell, 1968; Post, 1972). 
A series of factor analytic studies (Killoh and Garside, 1963; 
Rosenthal and Klerman, 1966; Hamilton and White, 1958; Rosenthal 
and Gudeman, 1967; Mendels and Cochrane, 1970; Carney, Roth, 
and Garside, 1965; Hordern, 1965) reviewed by Mendels and Cochrane 
(1970) have also reported evidence supporting the distinction 
between the endogenous and neurotic types of depression. Their 
review showed that the following symptoms or items loaded positively 
on the endogenous factor: (a) depth of depression, (b) retardation, 
(c) loss of interest in life, (d) non-responsiveness to environ-
mental changes, (e) visceral symptoms, (f) absence of precipitating 
stress, (g) weight loss, and (h) insomnia. It is evident that 
the clinical picture suggested by the symptoms listed above is 
that of endogenous depression. 
In sum, most factor analytic studies found evidence for the 
existence of a boundary between 'endogenous' and 'neurotic' 
depressions. The studies also appeared to have clearly described 
and positively identified a specific endogenous state. However, 
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as Costello (1970) and Kendell (1976) noted, relatively a few 
studies produced factors corresponding to the ill-defined 
'neurotic' type of depression. In short, agreement has been 
reached on the endogenous-neurotic distinction and the existence 
of an endogenous type of depression. But the definition and 
classification of 'neurotic' depression is open to debate. 
1.3.3 The unipolar-bipolar classification 
The unipolar-bipolar classification was originally proposed by 
Leonhard (1959) to reduce the ambiguities and semantic confusion 
generated by Kraepelin's concept of manic-depressive psychosis. 
The diagnosis label of bipolar depression is essentially given 
to patients who have experienced both manic and depressive 
episodes (alternating mania and depression), and that of unipolar 
is given to patients who have had successive episodes of either 
mania or depression (recurrent mania or recurrent depression). 
Unlike the previous classifications, which are based either on 
aetiological considerations (endogenous/psychogenic) or on 
clinical symptomatology (e.g., reactivity to environmental changes 
and constraints), the unipolar-bipolar classification is made on 
the basis of anamnetic data. In one of the studies supporting 
the unipolar-bipolar distinction, Perris (1976) found significant 
personality and epidimeological differences. The results of this 
study showed that bipolar depressive patients tend to display a 
'syntonic personality pattern', an extrovert type of personality; 
in contrast, the unipolars were found to be characterised by an 
'asthenic personality pattern', an introvert and anxious type of 
personality. Perris also found that bipolar depression starts 
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ten years earlier than the unipolar one. 
Another important finding reported by Angst (1966) in support 
of the unipolar-bipolar classification, concerns the incidence 
and frequency of affective disorders amongst relatives of 
unipolar and bipolar depressive patients. The results of his 
study revealed that the risk of developing unipolar depression 
is higher amongst close relatives of bipolar patients than those 
of unipolar depressive patients. More recent studies, however, 
failed to replicate this finding (Reich, Clayton, and Vinokur, 
1969; Helzer and Vinokur, 1974). Instead, the studies showed 
that relatives of bipolar patients are more likely to develop 
unipolar illness than bipolar illness. 
Although significant differences were found in premorbid personality 
and familial history, more evidence regarding both clinical 
symptomatology and pharmacological response should be provided 
if the unipolar and bipolar depressions are to be regarded as 
separate clinical entities and Leonhard's classification be 
useful and acceptable. 
1.3.4 The primary-secondary· classification 
The primary-secondary classification may be said to be a refinement 
of that of Leonhard. Unlike the previous one, it makes a useful 
distinction between those depressive illnesses preceded by 
psychiatric disorders and personality disturbances (secondary 
depression) and those depressions which are not preceded by any 
known psychiatric or personality disorder (primary depressions). 
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Table 2 illustrates this classification. 
TABLE 2. The primary-secondary classification (adapted from 
Kendell, 1976) 
Affective 
disorder 
Primary 
(depression) 
Secondary 
(depressions) 
Bipolar 
i 11 ne ss 
Depression spectrum 
isease 
Pure depressive 
disease 
As can be seen in Table 2, the primary-secondary nosological 
model disregards all those depressions contaminated by or asso-
ciated with physical illnesses and major personality disorders. 
Having separated primary and secondary affective disorders, Robins 
and his colleagues (1972) then subdivided the former ones into 
bipolar (consisting of both depression and mania) and unipolar 
depressions (consisting of depressive illnesses only). By further 
considering the unipolar type, the authors made a very useful 
distinction between what they called 'depression spectrum disease' 
and 'pure depressive disease' . 
. The distinction between these two sub-types is supported by 
anamnetic studies. Winokur (1974) found that patients of the 
'depression spectrum disease' category experience their first 
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depressive episode before the age of 40, those of 'pure depressive 
disease' category develop a depressive illness before the age of 
forty. 
An important feature of this classification model is its clarity 
and flexibility. More importantly, the model allows precise 
operational definitions and as such it provides a useful nosological 
framework for both clinicians and researchers of depression: 
1.3.5 The dimensional cla~sification 
In his initial study on "The Classification of Depressive Illnesses" 
Kendell (1968) employed a series of multivariate analytic techniques 
in an attempt to differentiate between the psychotic and neurotic 
forms of depression. The data obtained from 1 ,080 patients 
diagnosed as psychotic, involutional, or neurotic depressives, was 
subjected first to discriminant function analysis then to factor 
analysis. The results showed that, although there was a tendency 
for psychotic depressives to obtain high scores and neurotic 
depressives to obtain low scores, the distribution of symptom 
scores was unimodal. Accordingly Kendell concluded: 
''Discriminant function analysis provides no support 
either for the hypothesis that neurotic and psychotic 
depressions are qualitatively distinct or for the hypo-
thesis that involutional melancholia is an independent 
entity''. (p.31) 
Following his first unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate bimodality 
between psychotic and neurotic depressions, Kendell subjected his 
clinical ratings to factor analysis. Once again he failed to 
produce any evidence for the psychotic-neurotic. dichotomy. In 
his final attempt to solve the issue, Kendell employed, in the 
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same study, Eysenck's criterion analysis method to a set of his 
data. Here again the analysis showed no clear cut boundaries 
between the two types of depression. 
In spite of repeated failures to separate the psychotic and neurotic 
depressions, Kendell maintained that 'a valid boundary' between 
the two types can be demonstrated if only the diagnostic techniques 
were refined and their reliability enhanced. However, when a 
subsequent study by Kendell and Gourlay (1970) yielded similar 
results to the previous one, Kendell (1976) abandoned his arguments 
for a dichotomy and adopted a continuum view of depressive illness. 
Kendell's model offers a sort of compromise (Fowles & Gersh, 1980) 
in that it relatively satisfies both the separatists and non-
separatists: 
"Regarding depressive illness as a psychotic/neurotic 
continuum is a convenient way of acknowledging the 
apparent lack of any valid boundary between type A 
(psychotic) and type B (neurotic) illness, yet at 
the same time acknowledges that the differences - in 
symptomatology, premorbid personality, treatment 
response and lifetime course - between the two extremes 
are too extensive to be regarded as differences in 
severity and chronicity.'' (p.l9, 1976) 
But as Kendell later conceded, a two-dimensional with one dimension 
expressing psychoticism and the other representing neuroticism 
(Eysenck, 1970), may even 'do more justice' to the diversity 
and complexity of depressive symptomatology than one-dimensional 
model. 
1.3.6 Concluding remarks 
Research on the nature and classification of depressive disorders 
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has been the battle-ground for Kraepelinians and Meyerians since 
the early days of modern psychiatry. This selective review of 
the relevant literature showed that the disputes between researchers 
and clinicians of rival schools were more about how depressive 
disorders should be classified than on how they should be 
approached or treated. While some based their classification 
on aetiological considerations, others used clinical symptoma-
tology as their main nosological criterion. These differences 
in both theoretical orientation and empirical consideration 
promoted a long debate ,which confused and at times obscured the 
nosological status of depression. But despite the early con-
fusion, agreement has been reached that depressive disorders 
should be classified on the basis of symptoms and history. 
Agreement has also emerged on the existence of an endogenous 
type of depression. 
With regard to the issue of whether depressive disorders should 
be portrayed by a typology or dimensions, there seems to be an 
emerging consensus that the former classification ~ystem should 
be adopted despite its obvious limitations (cf. Kendel1, 1976). 
Part of the reason is that the typological system fits better 
with most systems adopted in other allied medical and scientific 
disciplines than the dimensional one. In addition to its 
familiarity, the typological or categorical classification is 
easy to understand and use. And as such it facilitates communi-
cation between researchers and clinicians of different theoretical 
persuasions. 
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2. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Diagnosing depression is recognized to be almost as problematic 
as classifying it. It is, thus, surprising that clinicians and 
researchers should devote sufficient attention to the nosological 
problem but not to the assessment problem. Indeed, the literature 
on depression is almost devoid of theoretical discussions of the 
issues relevant to the diagnosis and assessment of depression. 
The present chapter is concerned with the important problem of 
the assessment of depression. Specifically, this chapter focuses 
on the major assessment instruments utilised in measuring depres-
sive disorders and symptomatology. 
2.2 RATING SCALES AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPRESSION 
In recent years a large number of rating scales have been developed 
and used by clinicians and researchers in the clinical assessment 
of depression. The construction of these and their introduction 
to the clinical practice is seen as an attempt to satisfy an urgent 
need in clinical psychiatry for objective and standard measures 
of depressive symptomatology and psychopathology. Indeed, the 
poor reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses caused 
considerable concern and attracted sharp criticism from different 
quarters (cf. Kendell, 1975). The development of instruments 
capable of measuring validly and reliably the intensity and severity 
of disorders is regarded as essential for adequate therapy and 
research. 
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Generally, depression rating scalesconsistof several items covering 
a wide range of symptoms commonly associated with depression. 
A common feature to all these scales is that depression is defined 
and conceptualised in terms of its clinical, phenomenological, 
and behavioural components. Although depression rating scales 
may have some limitations, overall they may be said to be 
psychometrically sound measures of depressive symptoms. Their 
extensive use in both research and treatment programmes attests 
to their utility and popularity as assessment instruments for 
depressive phenomena. 
2. 3 RATING SCALES AS DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS 
Although some of these scales were originally designed to assess 
the degree of severity or intensity of depressive disorders, 
they were later modified and refined to perform additional 
functions. For instance, both the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mende1son, Mock, and Erbaugh, 1961) and the 
Zung Self Rating Depression Scale (SO) (Zung, 1965) are being 
used as screening tools in a systematic manner in most research 
studies (e.g., human helplessness and depression studies). In 
spite of the criticism voiced against this use (e.g_., Dupue 
and Monro, 1978), researchers continue to use these scales 
both for diagnosing depression and measuring the 1evel of its 
severity and intensity. Authorities such as Beck, Lewinsohn, 
and Seligman are only a few amongst those who defied such 
criticism and continued to use these scales •s screening tools. 
While classifying depressive disorders may still be problematic, 
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diagnosing depression appears to be less so, for a diagnostic 
decision is based on information which, if not elicit~d by 
the traditional interviewing methods, is conveyed by rating 
scales. Most rating scales describe depression in terms of 
its cognitive, affective, behavioural, and somatic features. 
The presence of this cluster of symptoms is interpreted-by 
most clinicians and diagnosticians as an indication that the 
patient is suffering from a depressive illness of clinical 
proportions. Although some scales provide a fairly good des-
cription of the patient's clinical condition (i.e., detection 
of symptoms), others, however, fall short of their mission. 
In an article entitled 'Depression Rating Scales', Carroll, 
Fielding, and Blashki (1973) listed five reasons that may 
account for the poor performances of these scales: lack 
of sensitivity, biased orientation, 1 imited uti1 ity, 1 imited 
specificity, and limited information access. 
(a) The sensitivity of a scale refers to its ability to 
discriminate between varying degrees of severity· of 
illness i.e., from severe to symptom free. The scales 
that lack sensitivity often fail to distinguish between 
adjacent degrees of severity (i.e., between mild, moderate, 
severe, very severe). Scales lacking this property 
are not recommended for outcome studies, since they 
fail to register effectively the changes that may occur 
following the administration of treatment. 
(b) Orientation is another characteristic of a rating scale 
that may affect its performance. Some scales have a 
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biased orientation in that they emphasize one aspect of 
the illness at the expense of another. For instance, 
the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) 
(Hamilton, 1960) stresses the somatic aspect of 
depression, whereas the Zung Self-Rating Depression 
Scale (SOS) (Zung, 1965) emphasizes the subjective 
component of this illness. 
(c) Information access concerns the amount of information 
that a scale may convey. More specifically it refers 
to the inability of a scale to assess some features 
of an illness. For instance, the items making up 
some (self) rating scales do not cover the wide range 
of somatic symptoms. 
(d) The utility of a scale refers to the ease with which 
the patient (for self-assessment scales) or the clini-
cian (for observer rating scales) uses it. For 
instance, Carroll and his colleagues (1973) reported 
that their group of severely depressed patients took 
between 15 to 20 minutes to complete the SOS. Utility 
is an important feature that is closely rel.ated to 
information access. Improving the former (utility) 
may reflect negatively on the latter. 
(e) The specificity of a scale refers to its power to 
differentiate between two psychiatric or personality 
disorders. This property is essential for scales 
that are usually used as screening or diagnostic 
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instruments. The BDI is reported to have effectively 
distinguished between anxiety and depressive states 
(Beck, 1969). 
2.4 TYPES OF DEPRESSION RATING SCALE 
The importance of diagnosis in clinical practice has been recog-
nized since the early stages of the medical discipline. An 
adequate diagnosis is still considered by most, although not all, 
clinicians and investigators as an essential pre-requisite to 
both treatment and research. Although some may persist in 
claiming objectivity and validity of their clinical judgements 
and diagnostic evaluations, evidence amassed in the last twenty 
years tends to refute such claim (cf. Kendell, 1975). The 
subsequent development and use of different rating scales was 
an attempt to remedy to this situation. Two types of rating 
scale have been constructed and employed in the assessment of 
depressive phenomena: observer rating scales and self-rating 
scales. 
2.4.1 Observet-rating 
The most popular observer rating scale is that developed by 
Hamilton (1960, 1967). The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(HRSD): 
"has been devised for use only on patients already 
diagnosed as suffering from affective disorder of 
depressive type''. (p.56, 1960). 
When used by a trained observer, this scale provides a quantita-
tive assessment of the intensity and severity of the depressive 
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i 11 ness. 
The HRSD is composed of 17 items covering the cognitive, behavioural, 
and somatic aspects of depression. Amongst the symptoms included 
in this scale are depressed mood, guilt, suicide, different types 
of insomnia, retardation, agitation, anxiety, hypochondriasis, 
loss of weight, and other somatic manifestations. Almost half 
of these symptoms are rated on a 5-point scale (0 - absent, 
1 - mild, 2 and 3 - moderate, 4 - severe). The remaining 
symptoms are rated on a 3-point scale (0- absent, 1 - slight 
or doubtful, 3 - clearly present). Hamilton recommends that the 
scoring should be done by two independent raters or clinicians. 
In his original study, Hamilton reported a good inter-rater 
reliability (r = .90, p <.001). 
In their study, Carrell and his colleagues (1973) compared the 
HRDS and the Zung SOS and found the performance of the former 
much more superior. They agreed with Hamilton ,that: 
''the scale •.. fulfils its purpose of providing a 
simple way of assessing the severity of·a patient's 
condition quantitatively, and of showing changes 
in that condition''. (p. 276, 1967). 
Because of its established validity.and good record of inter-
rater reliability the HRDS is now widely used, together with 
self assessment scales such as the BDI, as an outcome measure 
in therapeutic as well as pharmacological treatment of depression 
(e.g. Shaw, 1977; Ruch, Beck, Kovacks, and Hollon 1977). 
Unlike the HRDS, the Raskin Depression Scale (Raskin, Schulterbrandt, 
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Reatig, and McKeon, 1970) and the Cutler and Kur1and Depression 
Scale (Cutler and Kurland, 1961) are not widely used in this 
country. Although their authors claim high rates of inter-rater 
reliability, their validity and utility both for clinical and 
research purposes is very limited. 
2.4.2 Self-rating 
A substantial number of self-rating scales have been specifically 
developed for use with different categories of depressed patients. 
The construction of these scales is based on the general assump-
tion that patient's evaluations of himself are congruent with 
that made by clinicians; that is the patient is considered to 
be as able as the clinician in describing his symptoms. While 
this congruence may ho 1 d at moderate 1 eve ls of severity of the 
illness, it is very difficult to conceive of such a consistency 
at severe or very severe levels of the illness (Carroll et al, 
1973; Hammen, 1981). 
0 
Self-rating depression scales have achieved a high level of 
popularity in the last few years. They have been used with both 
clinical and non-clinical populations for both therapy and 
research purposes. Learned helplessness investigators have 
shown a special preference for this type of instruments; they 
have been the heavy users of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). 
2.4.2.1 The Beck Depression Inventory 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, and Erbaugh, 1961) is perhaps the most popular of the 
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self report measures of depression. Like the HRSD, the BDI: 
"has been developed to provide a quantitative assessment 
of the intensity of depression''. (p.569, 1961). 
Although originally devised to measure the severity of depressive 
manifestations, the BDI is now also used as diagnostic instrument. 
There is evidence suggesting that this scale can distinguish 
quite effectively not only between various degrees of severity 
(e.g., between severe and very severe clinical condition) (Beck 
et al 1961; Metcalfe and Goldman, 1965) but also between non-
clinically depressed and non-depressed persons (Bumberry, Oliver, 
and Mclure, 1978). The validity and reliability of the BDI 
have been confirmed by a number of studies carried out in America 
(Beck, 1967; Beck and Beamesderfer, 1974), in Britain (Metcalfe 
and Goldman, 1965), and in France (Delay, Pichot, Lemperiere 
and Mirouze, 1963). 
The BD! consists of 21 groups of symptoms. Each symptom is 
represented by four to five self-evaluative statements and scored 
on a range from 0 (absence) to 3 (severe). The patient is asked, 
if not assisted in the completion of the scale, to read each 
group of statements and then circle the number of the statement(s) 
that best describes him at the moment of the interview (here and 
now). The total score of the patient is obtained by summing up 
the scores of each group of statements. The larger the score 
the greater the severity of the patient's condition. 
The BD! has been praised for its sensitivity and specificity (e.g., 
(e.g., Delay et al., 1963). Its apparent ability and power in 
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distinguishing between depression and other clinical conditions 
(Beck, 1967) make the BDI suitable for use, as a screening tool, 
with both clinical and non-clinical populations. In spite of 
its apparent superiority over other instruments, the utility 
of the BDI may sometimes be limited. Because as Beck and his 
colleagues concede: 
"its applicability depends on the co-operation of the 
patient as well as his ability to comprehend the 
items''. (p. 569, 1961). 
2.4.2.2 The Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale 
The Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS) (Zung, 1965) is 
not as widely used or as popular as the BDI, partly because it 
lacks sensitivity (e.g., Carrell et al., 1973). The SDS consists 
of 20 items which cover the affective, psychological and somatic 
manifestations of depression. When administered, the patient 
is asked to indicate on the scale the frequency (not the severity 
of the illness) with which he experiences the symptoms listed, 
by rating 'a little of the time', 'some of the time', 'good 
part of the time', and 'most of the time'. One of the deficien-
cies of the SDS that has been reported is its low level of 
sensitivity. Indeed, Carroll and his eo-workers reported data 
suggesting that the SDS is: 
"incapable of discriminating effectively between the 
three sub-groups of (depressed) patients'' {p.364, 1973), 
although Zung claims the contrary (e.g. Zung, 1965, 1967). The 
lack of sensitivity may be explained by the fact that the scale 
~ 
is originally designed to assess the frequency and not the 
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severity of the symptoms. The SOS may also be said to lack 
specificity because both anxious and depressed patients obtain 
high scores. This failure to discriminate effectively between 
two diagnostic entities constitutes one of its major drawbacks. 
Despite these rather serious limitations, the SOS, when used in 
conjunction with valid observer or self-rating scales, may be 
less misleading and may even provide valuable information. 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Depression Scale 
(MMPI-D) is another instrument which was developed to measure the 
depth of depression. Originally, the scale was composed of 
60 items that cover the following depressive manifestations: 
''pessimism of outlook on life and the future, feelings 
of hopelessness or worthlessness, slowing of thought and 
action, and frequent pre-occupation with death and 
suicide''. 
Factor analytic studies ~f the MMPI-D-60 revealed that the 60 
items making up this scale are lacking homogeniety (e.g., Comrey, 
1957). Accordingly the scale was reduced to half its original 
size. Although psychometrically more sound and acceptable, 
the MMPI-D-30 still suffers some deficiencies. For instance, 
the scale does not cover the wide range of somatic symptoms that 
are usually associated with depression. In addition, to this 
biased orientation, the MMPI-D-30 fails to discriminate effec-
tively between various degrees of severity of the depressive 
state. 
Other self-assessment scales such as the Depression Adjective 
Check List (Lubin, 1965) and the Multiple Affect Check List 
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(MAACL) (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965) have also been devised to 
quantify depression. These instruments appear to be more 
concerned with the subjective aspect of depression than with 
its clinical features. Although not developed for diagnostic 
purposes, both the DACL and the MAACL seem to be quite effective 
in detecting symptoms of depression (e.g., Hammen, 1981). 
2.4.3 Observer-rating versus self-rating scales 
One of the major deficiencies of self-rating scales is their 
limited utility. No matter how precisely or clearly the symptoms 
are described and defined misinterpretation and non-comprehension 
are bound to occur. It is evident that the performance of this 
kind of scale and its applicability depend in the first place 
on whether the patient is willing to co-operate and on whether 
he is able to comprehend the instructions and the items making 
up each scale. The performance of a self-assessment scale 
depends also on how well it is designed, but as Carrell and his 
colleagues remarked: 
''Even the best designed self-rating scale will nevertheless 
suffer from distortion of information when applied to 
patients with psychotic illness who have impaired perception 
and testing of reality''. (p. 364, 1973). 
The major drawback of observer-rating scales is the bias of a 
rater. Even a well.-trained rater falls victim to his expectations. 
It is a well-known fact that patients at admission (hospitilisa-
tion) are rated as more severely ill than those already hospitalised, 
not because of differences in clinical condition but because 
patients are expected to be more i 11 before than after hospital isa-
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t ion (e.g. , Sna i th , 1981) . Despite the problems inherent to 
both types of scale, they remain very useful. With reasonable 
assistance to the patient (in his completion of the scale) and 
with sufficient training of the rater, reliable results may be 
obtained and adequate assessment of depressive features may be 
provided by both observer-rating and self-rating scales. It 
is only by adopting appropriate assessment procedures that more 
progress could be made in the theoretical understanding and 
management of depressive disorders. 
2.5 CONCLUDING'REMARKS 
Before concluding this brief review perhaps it is worth saying 
a word on how most of these instruments tend to portray depression. 
Some of the self-assessment scales seem to describe depression 
as a mood state, others tend to conceptualise it was a symptom. 
Although by no means congruent with clinical descriptions of 
depression, these views are still popular in some quarters. 
But most rating scales are now concerned with depression not 
as a symptom but as a clinical syndrome. While there may still 
be disagreement as to the nature of depression there seems to 
be a large consensus on its nosological status. A common 
feature to the assessment measures reviewed here is that they 
view depression as a unitary phenomenon, a view which is impli-
citly promoted by contemporary psychological theories of 
depression (e.g., learned helplessness theory of depression; 
loss of reinforcement theory of depression). 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps there is as much disagreement on the aetiological issue 
of depression as on the question of its nosological status. 
This may be partly because aetiological inferences were made on 
the basis of inadequate or arbitrary nosological classifications 
and vice versa. Another reason that may explain this long 
dispute is the imprecise definition or meaning of the term 
depression. Indeed, the term depression denotes different 
things to clinicians and researchers of different theoretical 
pursuasions. For those in the psychoanalytic tradition, 
depression refers more to an affect than to a clinical condition; 
for those with an organic orientation, depression is more than 
an affect- it refers to a clinical syndrome involving a wide 
spectrum of symptoms including affective, cognitive, behavioural, 
and somatic symptoms. Besides the semantic confusion which 
surrounds this area of affective disorders, there is a lack of 
consensus on the research strategies that might be adopted in 
the study of depressive disorders. There are, as Akiskal and 
McKinney (1975) rightly point out, those who: 
''favour 'understanding' depression over objective 
description of observable signs and symptoms", (p.286), 
and there are those who over-emphasize clinical descriptions at 
the expense of theoretical understanding. These differences 
in both theoretical orientation and empirical consideration gave 
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rise to divergent views about the aetiblogy or causation of 
depressive illness. Those who adhere to a psychogenic view 
of depression, emphasize the aetiological significance of 
psychological factors; those who subscribe to a biological 
view, in contrast, trace the depressive symptomatology and 
m~nifestations to organic or biological events. Although 
recently reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive 
psychobiological model (Akiskal, 1980; Akiskal and McKinney, 
1975), these two contrasting conceptions of the origin and 
aetiology of depression still dominate the literature of 
affective disorders. 
A substantial number of psychological hypotheses and theories 
have been advanced to account for both subjective and clinical 
manifestations of the depressive illness. As might be expected, 
theories rooted in the psychoanalytic tradition explain the 
psychopathology of depression in terms of personality or 
psychodynamic factors and development events. Although mainly 
formulated in id psychology terms (libidinal stages), these 
theories still exert a considerable influence on contemporary 
thinking about the phenomenon of depression. 
More recent cognitive and behavioural formulations of depression 
appear to enjoy more popularity in both clinical and academic 
communities. Unlike traditional psychoanalytical theorie.s, 
the more recent ones are less speculative and more importantly 
lend themselves easily to experimental and empirical verification 
or evaluation. But despite this relative superiority, both 
cognitive and behavioural theories suffer from serious conceptual 
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inadequacies. 
Because of similarities in emphasis and conceptualisation, 
psychoanalytic theories will be reviewed and evaluated separately. 
To do them more justice they will be reviewed in the 'historical' 
context in which they have evolved. 
3.2 EARLY AETIOLOGICAL FORMULATIONS 
Depsite its substantial achievements in the nosological domain 
of mental disorders, clinical psychiatry remained a 'pseudoscience', 
at least until the birth of psychoanalysis. The emergence of 
this now different discipline gave psychiatry a new breath. 
The originality of psychoanalytical theory lies, as Bomporad 
(1980) pointed out, in: 
''its insistence that mental illness was not simply the 
outward manifestation of cerebral pathology, but that 
its symptoms were psychological in origin and had 
meaning.'' (p.lS) 
Until the birth of psychoanalysis, providing an adequate nosological 
classification of psychiatric disorders appeared to be the main 
~ 
RAISON D'ETRE of most, if not all, psychiatric investigators. 
Freud, in contrast, devised an analytic technique the aim of which 
was not only to describe or classify symptoms and syndromes but 
also, and more importantly, to uncover their causes and meanings. 
For Freud and his followers, symptoms are more than manifestations 
of an underlying pathology, they are symbolic representations 
of latent unconscious conflicts. 
The important claim by Freud that mental disturbances could be 
understood in terms of unconscious mental processes led to 
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criticism and eventually to the rejection of the widely adopted 
descriptive psychopathology. Accordingly, Freud's extensive 
theoretical formulations of anxiety, hysteria, ego defences and 
unconscious shifted away attention from nosological pre-occupations 
to more important questions regarding the aetiology and the 
nature of psychiatric disorders. The subsequent psychoanalytical 
investigations of unconscious processes and motives resulted in 
aetiological formulations that facilitated both the understanding 
and management of psychiatric disorders. 
Although depression was not at the top of the list of psychological 
disorders investigated by psychoanalysts, it has nevertheless 
received considerable attention in the psychoanalytic literature. 
Early psychoanalytic writers such as Abraham, regarded depression 
as an affect resulting mainly from excessive repression of libido. 
Just like in other disorders (e.g. neurosis) the emphasis was 
put on libidinal stages. Unlike the traditional libidinal 
orientation which, as already pointed out, attached great importance 
to libidinal strivings, the ego psychology orientation emphasised 
the ego's awareness of its sense of helplessness and its perceived 
inability to fulfil its narcissic aspirations. Psychoanalysts 
with ego psychology orientation conceptualise depression as an 
ego state characterised by its feelings of powerlessness, helpless-
ness, and low self-esteem. 
Despite the apparent theoretical attractions of both traditional 
and more recent or contemporary psychoanalytical formulations of 
depression, clinicians remained sceptical as to the possibility 
of these theories fitting the complicated clinical picture of the 
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depressive condition, and explaining or accounting for the wide 
spectrum of depressive symptomatology. 
3.2. 1 THE HOSTILITY TURNED-INWARD MODEL 
An initial attempt at providing a psychoanalytic formulation of 
the aetiology of depression was made, not by Freud as some believe, 
but by Abraham in 1911. In this first psychoanalytic paper on 
depression, Abraham used two key concepts, borrowed from Freud, 
to explain the nature and the origin of this affective disorder: 
the concept of libido and that of repression. In accordance 
with Freud's theoretical formulations of psychosexual development, 
Abraham conceptualised depression as a chronic fixation of the 
libido at an archaic or early developmental stage. More specifi-
cally, Abraham regarded depression as an affect resulting mainly 
from an excessive repression of libidinal desires and instincts. 
The depressive person is seen in this model as excessively 
dependent on others and the environment for love, happiness and 
security. 
Although theoretically sound, Abraham's view on depression was 
not shared by his colleagues. In fact, he was openly criticised 
by Freud for putting too much emphasis on libidinal stages. 
Following the publication of Freud's influential paper, 'Mourning 
and Melancholia' in 1917, Abraham revised and expanded his theore-
tical propositions vis a vis depression. 
Abraham's subsequent work reflected the strong and profound 
influence that Freud's formulations on melancholia had exerted 
on him. Accordingly, depression was no more conceived as a 
37. 
state of retarded or blocked libido, but as an affective state 
·due to the introjection of hostility originally destined to the 
ambivalently loved object. This is how Abraham described the 
process leading to the redirection of hostility and anger against 
the ego: 
"When melancholic persons suffer an unbearable 
disappointment from their love-object they tend to 
expel that object as though it were feces and to 
destroy it. They thereupon accomplish the act of 
introjecting and devouring it - an act which is a 
specifically melancholic form of narcissitic identi-
fication. Their sadistic thirst for vengeance 
now finds its satisfaction in tormenting the ego". 
(Abraham, 1924). 
Amongst Abraham's other contributions to the theoretical under-
standing of depression, were his important propositions concerning 
the predisposing factors to the onset of depression. Abraham 
viewed oral dependency, a sort of thirst for love, as the 
characteristic feature of the depressive personality. He postu-
lated that 'primal parathymia', traumatic experiences in 
childhood, plays an aetiological in the pathogenesis of depression. 
He maintained that the reactivation of childhood losses later in 
life is the critical factor in the development of depressive 
i 11 ne ss: 
''In the last resort melancholic depression is derived 
from disagreeable experiences in the childhood of the 
patient". (Abraham, 1924). 
The depressogenic effects of object loss have also been recognized 
by Freud. He insisted that the loss need not have happened in 
childhood, and the lost object need not have died for depression 
to develop and emerge: 
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"In melancholia the occasions which give rise to the 
illness extended for the most part beyond the clear case 
of loss by death, and include all those situations of 
being slighted, neglected and disappointed which can 
impart opposed feelings of love and hate into the 
relationship or reinforce an already existing ambivalence''. 
(Freud, 1917). 
The importance of object loss both as a predisposing and precipi-
tating factor to the development of depression has been stressed 
in Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia', his major piece of work 
on the origin and the nature of depressive disorder~. In this 
classic paper, Freud drew a sharp parallel between the state of 
mourning and the clinical condition of melancholia. He found 
similarities not only in antecedent conditions but also in affec-
tive or emotional manifestations. A common feature to both 
mourning and melancholia is that they both develop and emerge as 
a reaction to a sudden loss of a loved object. More common 
to both states, are the sorrow and the sadness triggered by 
loss, the pathological self-reproaches and criticism, the loss of 
energy, and the lack of interactions and interest in outside 
world. However, the critical difference, according to Freud, 
is that in mourning the loss is external, whereas in melancholia 
the loss is internal (unconscious): 
"In grief the world becomes poor and empty; in 
melancholia it is the ego itself''. 
Freud identified further differences in the way the loss is 
handled in both melancholia and mourning. He insisted that in 
the latter state, the anger arising from feelings of resentment 
and desertion is directed toward the lost object (the object 
actually being a person); in melancholia, however, the anger is 
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directed internally since the lost object is introjected (hence 
the pathological self-criticisms). 
Freud regarded melancholia as a state of pathological mourning. 
He argued that the libido is the major factor which determines 
the course that the experience of mourning will take - whether 
it will be 'healthy' or pathological mourning (melancholia). 
Freud observed that in normal mourning the free libido (that 
is the libido previously invested in the lost loved object) is 
actively re-invested in another subject; in melancholia, 
however, the free libido is not re-invested in any external object, 
but introjected or withdrawn into the ego. Freud considered 
the identification with and the introjection of the lost 
object as critical to the development and manifestation of 
depressive disorders. This is how he described the process 
that eventually provokes depressive illness~ 
"An attachment of the libido to a particular person, 
had at one time existed; then owing to a real slight 
or disappointment coming from this loved person, the 
object relationship was shattered .... the free libido 
was not displaced on to another object; it was not 
employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish 
an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. 
Thus, the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and 
the latter could henceforth be judged by a special 
agency; as though it were an object, a forsaken object. 
In this way an object loss is transformed into an ego 
loss and the conflict between the ego and the critical 
activity of the ego and the ego as altered by 
identification''. (Freud, 1917). 
For Freud, the introjection of the disappointing object and the 
hostility associated with it breeds depression. Because the 
hatred and the criticism destined to the love object are now, 
by means of both mechanisms of identification and projection, 
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directed against the self. This discharge of anger against the 
self engenders feelings of dysphoria, inadequacy, guilt, sadness, 
and eventually depression. For Freud, the introjection or 
retroflexion of anger is the SINE QUA NON of depression. 
The hostility-turned-inward model, initiated by Abraham then 
expanded and refined by Freud, is regarded as the major psycho-
analytical contribution to the theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon of depression. Although this model enjoys respec-
tability and popularity in some quarters, it has been criticised 
both on theoretical.and empirical grounds. Critics pointed out 
that Freud failed to say how depression differs from other 
affects that also result from the introjection of hostility. 
Perhaps the major weakness of this model lies in its failure 
to account for all aspects (subjective as well as clinical) of 
depression. In fact, some argue that Freud's model has little 
or no relevant relationship to the clinical picture of depression 
(e.g. Akiskal & McKinney, 1975). 
Attempts at externalising or re-directing hostility toward 
external objects, have not produced any significant improvement 
or change in the level of depression (e.g., Klerman and Gershon, 
1970; Wadsworth and Baker, 1975). A final point that needs 
to be made about the conceptual 'inadequacy' of this model, 
is that contrary to Freud's tendency to assimilate depression to 
hostility turned inward, contemporary research has provided 
evidence showing that both depression and hostility are distinct 
affects that can co-exist within the same person. In other words, 
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one can experience hostility without feeling depressed. 
3.2.2 THE LOWERED SELF-ESTEEM MODEL OF DEPRESSION 
The lowered self-esteem model of depression abandoned the widely 
adopted libidinal approach to emphasise the role of the ego in 
the pathogenesis of depression. In this model, depression is 
viewed as an affect characterised by the collapse of self-esteem. 
The self-esteem model was first outlined by Finichel (1945), 
but it was Bibring (f953) who later developed it and refined it. 
"Bibring's theory" as Bomporad so rightly described it (1980), 
is a ''paradigm of simplicity and clarity'' (p.31). 
Rather than conceptualising depression as 'a residue of libidinal 
strivings', as was the case with the proponents of id psychology, 
Bibring conceives of depression as an affect arising out of 
ego contradictions. For Bibring, the conflicts giving rise 
to depressive disorders are not between the ego and the super 
ego, but within the ego itself. 
Although previous psychoanalytic writers mentioned self-esteem 
in relation to depression, they failed to recognise its importance 
in both the aetiology and development of depressive illness. 
Although Bibring recognises the importance of object loss and 
developmental events emphasised by both Abraham (1926) and Klein 
(1948), he maintains that depression is mainly a reaction to a 
loss or a blow to self-esteem: 
''Depression can be defined as the emotional expression 
of a state of helplessness and powerlessness of the ego, 
irrespective of what may have caused the breakdown of the 
mechanisms which established self-esteem". (1953). 
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Central to this theory is the ego's awareness of its helplessness 
and powerlessness. For an individual to exhibit an acute sense 
of helplessness, he must, according to Bibring, perceive a 
discrepancy between his actual situation and his narcissic 
aspirations. The perceived inability to achieve or attain 
aspirations is apparently the mechanism which activates the fall 
of self-esteem and triggers depression. 
Unlike other psychoanalytic theories of depression, the present 
one has been favourably reviewed by most clinicians and researchers. 
Part of the reason is that the self-esteem model is much closer 
to clinical reality in general and to the clinical picture of 
depression in particular. Another reason as to why Bibring's 
model was more acceptable is because its conceptual formulation 
is consistent with contemporary theorising and thinking about 
the phenomenon of depression. For instance, low self-esteem 
has been described .as a characteristic feature of depressive 
illness in most clinical observations and reports. Similarly, 
the component of helplessness is central to one of the most 
recent and perhaps successful theories of depression (Seligman, 
1974; Abramson et al, 1978). Another reason why Bibring's 
theory has had more success than traditional psychoanalytical 
formulations, is because it is less speculative and provides 
more acceptable descriptions and explanations of depressive 
syndrome. 
But despite the apparent adequacy of the lowered self-esteem 
model of depression, questions arise as to its ability to explain 
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or account for all aspects of the clinical syndrome of depression. 
Low self-esteem could perhaps account for the subjective component 
of depression, but is unlikely to do so for the behavioural and 
somatic symptoms of this syndrome. In fact, recent theories 
of depression such as Beck's cognitive model (1967) and 
Seligman's learned helplessness theory (1974), regarded loss or 
low self-esteem as an epiphenomenon or a symptom of depression 
but not as its cause. 
It appears after all that the construct of self-esteem is 
important but perhaps not sufficient to account for the wide 
range of depressive symptoms and disorders. 
3.2.3 OBJECT LOSS, STRESS, AND DEPRESSION 
There has been a widespread conviction that object loss plays 
an aetiological role in depressive illness. However, such 
belief and enthusiasm is hardly matched or justified by the 
existing empirical findings. The studies carried out so far 
in this line of research offer little or no support for the 
hypothesised causal connection between object loss and depression. 
Attempts at determining the nature of the relationship between 
these two variables have often been undermined by various 
methodological problems and constraints (see Tennant et al, 
1981, for a detailed discussion of these problems). 
Psychoanalysts are, perhaps, unanimous in regarding object loss 
as an antecedent of depressive complaints. The importance of 
developmental object loss in the pathogenesis of depression, 
has been emphasised by both Abraham (1926) and Freud (1917). 
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In fact, they both postulated a causal link between childhood 
loss and depression later in life. They regarded depression 
as an affective reaction to childhood losses. 
The initial attempt at assessing the consequences of childhood 
loss on psychomotor functioning of human infants was made by 
Rene Spitz in 1945. Spitz reported to have thoroughly examined 
the reaction of a group of human infants that were separated 
from their mothers in the second half of the first year of life. 
The infants' reaction to the separation event, later termed 'anaclitic 
depression', was found to have similar features to that of a 
depressive reaction. Specifically, the infants' reaction was 
characterised by crying, psychomotor retardation, withdrawal, 
insomnia, anorexia, and weight loss. Although this finding 
may be regarded as a firm evidence of the depressogenic effects 
of object loss, some have challenged this interpretation. It 
was argued that the infants' morbid reaction reflected nothing 
but the consequences of an abrupt institutionalisation. 
Although this may be true for the Spitz study, the syndrome 
that was soon after described by Robertson and Bowlby (1952) 
in older children, cannot be accounted for by the sole phenomenon 
of 'hospitalism' or institutionalisation. The separation syndrome 
reported by these authors consisted of three phases: Protest 
Phase - protest is believed to be the initial reaction with 
which the children respond to the loss of an important attachment 
bond (mother). In this stage the child is described as restless, 
agitated, and anxiously searching for his mother. Despair 
stage- in this stage the child is described as withdrawn, 
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helpless, and sinking into despair. Detachment stage - in this 
stage the child loses interest in the outside world; the rejec-
tion of the mother is imminent. But despite this seemingly 
convincing evidence of the relationship between parental loss 
and depression, clinicians questioned its validity. It was 
argued that maternal deprivation or separation does not 
necessarily result in depressive reaction. Given an appropriate 
maternal substitute, some have argued, most of the symptoms and 
disorders described by Spitz and Bowlby could be prevented. 
The work of Bettelheim in the 'kibbutz' in Israel illustrates 
the point about the prophylactic effects of maternal substitute. 
Attempts at linking adult depression to early object loss have 
also failed to provide unambiguous data. A study that 
managed to establish a connection between these two variables is 
that of Brown (1961). Brown found that 41% of 216 depressed 
patients examined reported a loss of a parent before the age of 
fifteen, compared with only 16% of a sample of medical patients. 
A more recent study by Brown and Harris (1978) went even further -
they linked adult depression to a loss of mother before the age 
of eleven. Although their data showed that only 10.5% of the 
depressed women examined and ·6% of normal women included in the 
study ever reported a loss of mother before eleven, they never-
theless emphasised its importance in the aetiology of depression: 
"Thus, loss of mother before eleven may well permanently 
lower a woman's feeling of mastery and self-esteem and 
hence acts as a vulnerable factor by interfering with 
the way she deals with loss in adult life". {p. 240, 1978). 
While the above two studies may seem to confirm the hypothesised 
causal relationship between childhood loss and depression later 
46. 
in life, that of Beck and his eo-workers (1963) rejects any 
aetiological implication for early or childhood loss. The 
results reported by Beck and his colleagues showed quite clearly 
that neither maternal nor paternal loss is related to depression. 
They found that parental loss (loss of mother or father in 
childhood) failed to distinguish a depressed patients group from 
a non-depressed patients group. Other authors such as 
Birchnell (1961; 1970a; 1970b) have linked childhood bereave-
ment and other types of losses not only to depression but also 
to other forms of psychiatric disorders. 
It appears then that neither clinical observations nor research 
reports support the claim for an aetiological role of childhood 
losses. In a recent review of the relevant literature, Tennant 
and his colleagues (1980) arrived at a similar conclusion. These 
authors refuted any claim for a causal link between parental 
loss and depression: 
"We conclude that the current state of knowledge indicates 
that parental death in childhood on its own has little 
impact upon the risk of depressive illness i~ adult life''. 
( p. 298 ' 1980) . 
Stressful life events in adult life have also been considered 
of a great importance in the development of depression. Much 
of the research carried out in.this area, consisted of showing 
that depressed patients experience more stressor events than 
non-depressed patients prior to the onset of depression. Most 
of the studies published so far reported results which showed 
only a weak association between stress and depression, although 
some have made wild claims about such relationship. The 
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most widely quoted study in this line of research is that of 
Paykel ( 1974). His results indicated that only 25% of the 
depressed patients studied experienced stress prior to their 
episode of depression; although a stronger link was later 
established between so-called 'exit events' and depression. 
Despite the claims for a causal relationship between stressor 
events and depression, doubt must be expressed as to the 
possibility of these events playing an aetiological .role in 
depression - there is a lack of evidence concerning the specifi-
city of stress to depressive illness (Tennant et al, 1981). In 
fact, medically orientated research showed that depression is 
not the only disorder associated with aversive events. 
Medical conditions such as coronary artery disease, myocardial 
infaction, peptic ulcer, rheumatoid arthritis, and even skin diseases 
have been linked to stressor events, (e.g., Rahe et al., 1964; 
Rahe & Lind, 1971). In another review of the studies that 
claimed to have established a causal relationship between stress 
and depression, Tennant and his colleagues (1981) once again 
refuted such claims: 
"Our conclusion is that many of the studies from which 
a causal connection between life events and depressive 
illness is inferred are so weak methodologically that 
little can be made of them'' (p.387). 
It appears then that stress may be important, but other variables 
such as personality traits, cognitive styles, coping styles 
may be better predictors of depressive illness. 
3.2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although not exhaustive, the present review has pointed to 
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'deficiencies' inherent in psychoanalytical theorising and 
thinking about depression. The theories reviewed here were 
found to be speculative and of little or no predictive value. 
As noted earlier, their extensive use of metapsychological terms 
and metaphorical concepts makes their experimental or empirical 
verification difficult if not impossible. Besides the various 
deficiencies from which they suffer, these theories have little 
or no relevant relationship to the clinical reality of depression. 
Nevertheless, psychoanalysts deserve recognition not only for 
initiating the psychological research into depression but also 
for giving respectability to this approach. 
3.3 CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF DEPRESSION 
In recent years, a substantial number of psychological theories 
have been proposed to account for the aetiology and development 
of depressive phenomena. Unlike early psychodynamic formula-
tions, contemporary psychological theories of depression have 
been almost entirely inspired by clinical practice and experi-
mental research. Although the psychological research on 
depression and other affective disorders may have been intimidated 
by the discovery of antidepressant drugs in the fifties, it has 
regained its confidence and authority in the late sixties. 
Substantial developments in both learning theory research and 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Neiser, 1967; Skinner, 1957) have 
led to the introduction and adoption of new psychological research 
strategies for the study of clinical depression. Thus, research 
in this area of affective disorders ceased to be the monopoly 
of medi ea 11 y trained and minded peop 1 e. 
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The adoption, in recent years, of cognitive and behavioural 
approaches to depression has altered if not revolutionised 
contemporary thinking about this clinical syndrome. Thus, 
depression is no longer conceptualized as an affect, but rather 
as a cognitive or a behavioural phenomenon in which the emotional 
or affective aspect is a secondary elaboration. The criticism 
and eventually rejection of the traditional affective approach 
gave an opportunity to both clinicians and researchers to 
reconceptualize depression and to adopt new and more fruitful 
research approaches. Accordingly, interest has been revived 
and new hypotheses concerning the nature, aetiology, and 
treatment of depressive illness have been systeaatically 
generated and tested. 
The emergence in the late sixties of a number of psychological 
formulations of depression has been the outcome of many years 
of empirical and experimental work. A characteristic feature 
of these contemporary theries is that they regard depression 
not simply as an affect but as a syndrome dominated by its low 
or pathological mood, reduced motivation, behavioural deficits, 
and somatic manifestations. Although several theories have 
been advanced to account for all these depressive phenomena, 
only a few have survived the scrutiny of experts. The present 
review is concerned only with these -kind of theories. 
One of the theories that has been favourably reviewed in the 
psychological literature on depression is Beck's cognitive 
theory (1967, 1974). Based on his clinical interventions and 
observations, Beck argued that the recurrent theme in depressed 
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patients' verbalisations and dreams is that of negative thinking. 
Beck also observed that when depression is alleviated such 
negative thought pattern no longer persists or emerges. These 
two important observations formed the basis of Beck's theoretical 
viewpoint. Beck's cognitive conceptualisation suggests that 
depression is due to maladaptive cognitive processes. Specifically, 
.all other depressive components whether they are affective, 
motivational, behavioural, or somatic are believed to be secondary 
to this cognitive disorder. 
Behavioural theories such as Lewinsohn's model of reinforcement 
(1974) emphasise the specific relationships between depressives' 
behavioural repertoire and external or environmental events. 
The depressive in this model is seen as socially unskilled and 
as such he fails to elicit response or reinforcement from his 
social environment. Lewinsohn seems to refer to a sort of 
breakdown in the reinforcement system of the depressive. He 
considers loss of reinforcement to be the major antecedant of 
depressive states. More specifically, depressive behaviours 
and manifestations are regarded as the immediate outcome of an 
individual's low rate of response-contingent positive reinforce-
ment. 
A more recent aetiological formulation of depression proposed 
learned helplessness as a central feature of clinical depression. 
The learned helplessness model of depression (Seligman, 1974; 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978) attributes depressive 
symptoms and phenomena to perceived response-outcome noncontingency. 
51. 
According to this model, depression results from an inability to 
control environmental outcomes due to a previous experience with 
noncontingent reinforcement (loss of control). Like the previous 
two models, the present one has generated considerable amounts 
of empirical and experimental research in the last few years. 
Although both cognitive and behavioural formulations claim to 
account adequately for all depressive components, empirical 
research shows that such claims are sometimes highly inflated. 
Although these formulations are more verifiable and less specu-
lative than psychoanalytic formulations, they still have serious 
drawbacks. For instance, critics have described them as 
circular, for they have a tendency to account for depression in 
terms of its symptoms or consequences. These theories have 
also been criticised for other conceptual irregularities. 
3.3.1 BECK'S COGNITIVE THEORY 
-Beck's theory of depression (1967, 1974) refutes the traditional 
affective approach, giving primary consideration to cognitive 
factors. Since the early days of modern psychiatry, the 
emphasis has been exclusively on the affective or emotional 
aspect of this syndrome. In the sixties Beck vividly questioned 
the validity of this affective approach and subsequently rejected 
it to adopt a cognitive framework. Beck's cognitive orientation 
has been regarded as a reaction to the neglect, by the classical 
psychoanalytic theory, of conscious cognitive processes. 
Beck traces the roots of depressive disorders to a negative 
cognitive set. He postulated that depressive are characterised 
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by maladaptive or anomalous cognitive schemas that pre-dispose 
them to view themselves, the world or the environment, and the 
future in a negative way; the so-called cognitive triad. In 
this model, depression is considered as the outcome of this 
cognitive triad. 
Beck argued that this negative cognitive set accounts not only 
for the patient's low self-esteem, but also for his reduced 
motivation and interaction with others, low performance, and 
somatic complaints. For instance, the negative view of the 
self- that is the depressed patient's belief that he or she is 
defective, bad and inadequate, accounts for the loss of self-
esteem. The patient's negative self-perception derives from 
his tendency to interpret experiences in terms of his presumed 
personal deficiencies. Similarly, the negative view of the 
present and the future accounts for the cognitive and 
motivational deficits of the depressive states. 
According to Beck, all depressive components, whether they are 
affective, motivational, behavioural or somatic are the outcome 
of negative conceptualisations (the cognitive triad). 
The second important element in Beck's cognitive theory of 
depression is that of negative schemas or 'silent assumptions'. 
These specific schemas consist of unspoken rigid rules - the 
so-called silent rules or assumptions. These rules are believed 
to give rise to negative conceptualisations of experiences and 
to inaccurate or biased perceptions of ongoing environmental 
stimuli. 
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Beck established that the depressive's unrealistic negative 
attitudes develop as i result of his tendency to interpret 
reality in terms of latent anomalous schemas. According to 
Beck these depressogenic schemas form the basis of the cognitive 
triad. 
Another factor which, according to Beck, plays an important role 
in the development and maintenance of depressive states, is that 
of logical errors. 
He identified the following logical errors in depressed patients' 
thinking patterns: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, 
overgeneralisation, magnification or minimisation, personalisation 
and dichotomous thinking. Arbitrary inference means drawing a 
conclusion from a situation in the absence of evidence to 
substantiate such conclusion. Selective abstraction refers to 
a tendency to concentrate on one aspect of the situation (usually 
the negative aspect), while ignoring the more important features 
of that situation. Overgeneralisation refers to drawing a 
conclusion (generally a negative conclusion) on the basis of a 
single incident or fact. Magnification or minimisation refers 
to a tendency to draw conclusions about situations on the basis 
of erroneous evaluations. 
Personalisation refers to a tendency to take responsibility for 
negative events in life in the absence of evidence to support 
such attitude. Finally, .dichotomous thinking refers to a tendency 
to think in black and white. To summarise, in this model 
depression is portrayed as a cognitive disorder characterised 
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by a set of negative attitudes (cognitive triad), specific 
schemas, and maladaptive thinking patterns (logical errors). 
A review of empirical literature on depression shows that Beck's 
cognitive conceptualisation of depression is supported by both 
correlational and experimental studies. In a series of studies 
carried out to evaluate his cognitive formulation, Beck (1974) 
found a strong evidence for the hypothesised relationship 
between negative thinking and depression (depression scale) and 
measures of pessimism (the third component of the triad) ( r = 0.56) 
and negative self-concept (the first component of the triad) 
(r = 0.70). Other evidence supporting this cognitive view of 
depression includes the link established between hopelessness, 
a central component of the cognitive model, and suicidal intent 
(r = 0.47). 
Stronger support for Beck's cognitive model is offered by studies 
demonstrating the specificity of negative cognitions to depression. 
In a study designed to test the hypothesis that depressed patients 
are characteristed by negative expectations, Loeb, Beck and 
Diggory (1971), found evidence in support of this component 
of the negative cognitive triad. The results obtained showed 
that, although depressed patients worked as nondepressed 
patients on a laboratory task, their ratings of the probability 
of fut~re success were significantly lower. Further evidence 
that depressives hold negative attitudes toward the future is 
provided by a recent study carried out by Hammen and Krantz (1976). 
They reported results which clearly supported Beck's notion 
that depressives have an unrealistically negative view of the 
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future. More specifically, it was found that depressed subjects 
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had lower expectations of success than nondepressed subjects. 
Relevant to Beck's cognitive viewpoint are also the studies that 
examined depression in relation to higher cognitive processes 
such as memory. In one of these studies, Lloyd and Lishman 
(1975) found evidence that depressives exhibit a recall bias. 
Specifically, it was found that depressives' recall of 
negative experiences was quicker and easier than that of positive 
experiences. A recent study by Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty, 
(1980), however, reported data which showed that such biased 
recall is more an epiphenomenon than an antecedent of depressive 
states. Further evidence for Beck's notion that depressives 
have an exaggerated tendency to misinterpret external or environ-
mental stimuli has been provided by a series of experimental 
studies. In an important study dealing with this issue, Nelson 
and Craighead (1977) found that depressives compared to non-
depressives, underestimated the percentage of positive feedback 
they had received following performance on an experimental 
task, and tended to overestimate the percentage of negative 
feedback they were given. This finding was later replicated 
by a study that employed clinically depressed and non-depressed 
patients (De Monbreun and Craighead, 1~77). 
Although, as just pointed out, both correlational and experimental 
studies offered evidence for the hypothesised relationship between 
cognition and depression, further research demonstrating the 
primacy of cognitive factors is necessary if negative cognitions 
are to acquire an aetiological status or role in depression. 
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One of the studies that indirectly supported Beck's cognitive 
interpretation of depressive phenomena is that of ~elten 
( 1968) • To the extent that Yelten's study is a valid test 
of the cognitive model, it confirmed the aetiological role 
of maladaptive thinking in depression. Using a verbal mood 
induction procedure, Velten demonstrated that depressed mood 
could be successfully induced by instructing subjects to read 
negative or depressing self-referent statements. This finding 
that depressed mood could be produced by instructing subjects 
to adopt negative beliefs about themselves supports the 
cognitive interpretation of self-esteem (e.g. Coleman, 1975). 
Further evidence for the cognitive basis of depression has 
been provided by Ludwig (1975). His findings corroborate 
the view that depression could be induced or alleviated by 
manipulating cognitive variables such as beliefs, attitudes, 
and other cognitions. 
The cognitive model of depression has been systematically 
supported by both clinical and experimental studies. Although 
Beck's account of depressive phenomena may be highly comprehen-
sive and exhaustive, it is weak in some ways. Because of its 
flexibility and the lack of specificity, Beck's cognitive 
theory is difficult if not impossible to falsify or disconfirm. 
In fact Seligman (1981), a leading authority in this field of 
research, went even further when he questioned the scientific 
basis of the cognitive formulation: 
"The model's main weaknesses", he remarked, "are the 
looseness of its terms, its descriptive and shallowly 
explanatory cast, and its loose contact with any 
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scientific base. Put more badly, the theory is ad 
hoc" (p.l34, 1981). 
In spite of these serious difficulties, Beck's cognitive theory 
has made substantial contributions both to the theoretical 
understanding and treatment of depressive disorders. In 
fact, Beck's description of the cognitive functioning of the 
typical depressive is the most accurate and exhaustive to 
date. More importantly, the set of therapies that the cog-
nitive model of depression has generated are perhaps the best 
that psychotherapy can offer in this area of clinical practice. 
3.3.2 LEWINSOHN'S LOSS OF REINFORCEMENT MODEL OF DEPRESSION 
In the last decade a number of behavioural formulations have 
been developed and advanced to account for a large proportion 
of depressive complaints and behaviours (e.g. Costello, 1972; 
Ferster, 1974; Lewinsohn, 1974). An important feature of 
these behavioural theories is their extensive use of basic 
learning principles in their attempts to both explain and modify 
depressive behaviours. Behavioural conceptualisations of 
depression have, unlike psychodynamic or cognitive theories, 
focussed almost exclusively upon the depressed patient's overt 
behaviours and social interaction patterns. A defining charac-
teristic of depression within these operant models is a lack 
of adequate reinforcement for adaptive behaviour. Speci fica 11 y, 
low rate of positive reinforcement is believed to act as an 
eliciting stimulus for dysphoria and depressive behaviours. 
Although all behavioural formulations of depression are unanimous 
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in hypothesising a link between depressive behaviours and 
maladaptive patterns of reinforcement, they advance different 
hypotheses as to the nature of reinforcement that supposedly 
elicits depressive symptoms and behaviours. For instance, 
Ferster, (1974) attributes depression to a loss of a major 
reinforcer, whereas Costello (1972) accounts for this syndrome 
in terms of a loss of reinforcer effectiveness. Social 
learning theorists such as Bandura (1971), however, attribute 
the aetiology of depression to faulty self-reinforcement 
systems. But only Lewinsohn's formulation concerning both 
the nature of the depressogenic reinforcement and the charac-
teristics of the depressive's behavioural repertoire appeared 
to be articulate and comprehensive (Blaney, 1977). Almost 
all other behavioural models fall short of providing a 
satisfactory account of the aetiology and development of 
depressive disorders. 
will be reviewed here. 
Accordingly, only Lewinsohn's theory 
Lewinsohn's theory concerning both the origin and development 
of depression stands in sharp contrast to Beck's cognitive 
viewpoint (1967, 1974). The former appears to be concerned 
with the interactional and environmental aspects of depression, 
while the latter attaches more importance to the cognitive 
basis of depressive phenomena including depressive behaviours. 
A major advantage of Lewinsohn's theory over Beck's is the 
reference it makes to the socio-cultural environment in its 
analysis and explanation of depressive disorders. Its major 
drawback, however, is its tendency to over-emphasise the role 
of environmental factors in depression at the expense of 
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internal cognitive processes (e.g. Hammen and Glass, 1975). 
Lewinsohn attributes depressive behaviours to a low rate of 
response-contingent positive reinforcement. He advanced three 
reasons as to why the depressed individual may be placed on a 
reduced positive reinforcement schedule. One important 
reason is that the social environment fails to provide 
reinforcement. Another reason is that the individual avoids 
participation in pleasurable activities that are highly rein-
forcing, although this social avoidance may be considered as 
a consequence rather than an antecedent of depression. 
Another equally plausible explanation as to why the individual 
may be placed on a prolonged extinction schedule (lack of 
positive reinforcement) is that he/she lacks the necessary 
skills (social skills deficit) to elicit reinforcement from 
his social environment. 
In sum, when talking about depression Lewinsohn seems to refer 
to a sort of breakdown in the reinforcement system. Figure 
3 illustrates this operant conception of the aetiology of 
depression. As Figure 3 indicates, depression is believed 
to occur when there is a low rate of positive reinforcement. 
To confirm this aetiological hypothesis one needs not only 
to demonstrate that the rate of response-contingent positive 
reinforcement is lower in depressed than in non-depressed 
persons, but also that the amount of response-contingent 
positive reinforcement is closely associated with depression 
{positively correlated). More important if one is to claim 
a causal link between depression and reduced positive reinforce-
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of Lewinsohn's 
model of depression (adapted from 
Lewinsohn, 1974) 
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ment, is the demonstration that depression could be induced 
or reduced by manipulating the rate of positive reinforcement. 
The bulk of empirical research that has addressed Lewinsohn's 
behavioural formulation of depression may be said to have 
considered all the issues listed above. In a series of corre-
lational studies, Lewinsohn and Libet (1972) and Lewinsohn and 
Graf (1973) claimed to have established a link between a low 
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rate of positive reinforcement and depression. Lewinsohn 
and his colleagues examined the relation between depressed 
subjects' self-reported mood and participation in pleasant 
activities (served as a measure of amount of positive reinforce-
ment received). As predicted, they obtained results which 
showed a positive correlation between the level of depression 
and the frequency.of participation in pleasurable activities. 
Although this may seem to confirm the aetiological significance 
of reduced positive reinforcement in depression, it may also 
be the case that social avoidance or lack of participation 
in positive activities has little or no aetiological relevance. 
In other words, the correlational data reported by Lewinsohn 
and his colleagues leave open the question of direction of 
causality. What is needed in this context is not only the 
demonstration that depression is associated with a reduced 
amount of positive reinforcement, but also that inadequate 
reinforcement is an antecedent rather than-a symptom of 
depression. 
A study that attempted to deal with the direction of causality 
issue was carried out by Hammen and Glass (1975). Specifically, 
their study tested Lewinsohn's claim that depression is causally 
related to a low rate of response-contingent positive reinforce-
ment. In order to test this specific hypothesis, Hammen and 
Glass instructed three groups of depressed subjects either to 
increase participation in positive activities (increase 
activities group), to increase protein intake (attention-
placebo group), or not to alter their activities (self-
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monitoring group). Following a two week period all subjects 
were assessed for their level of depression. The comparison 
failed to show any significant difference in self-reported 
depression between the group induced to increase the frequency 
of reinforcing activities and control groups. This failure 
to find any significant reduction in depression as a result 
of high rate response-contingent positive reinforcement 
represents a serious challenge to Lewinsohn's operant concep-
tualisation of depressive phenomena. 
Another study that also assessed the therapeutic implications 
of increasing the rate of response-contingent positive reinforce-
ment is that of Padfield. In this outcome study, Padfield 
(1975) assessed the effects of inducing a group of depressed 
women to engage in positive activities. When compared to 
another group of depressed women who received no such instruc-
tion (control), no significant improvement was found as a 
result of participation in pleasurable activities. This 
finding that increased positive reinforcement failed to reduce 
depression questions the validity of a low rate of response-
contingent positive reinforcement as an adequate explanation 
of depressive behaviours and disorders. Until positive 
reinforcement is shown to be superior to placebo in alleviating 
depressive symptoms, any claim for the aetiological significance 
of reduced positive reinforcement will be unjustified. 
To summarise: there is little or no evidence in the empirical 
literature on depression, suggesting that depression or its 
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behavioural and affective correlates could be induced or 
reduced by simply manipulating the amount of response-contingent 
positive reinforcement. Perhaps Blaney (1977) was right in 
declaring that Lewinsohn's theory: 
''should be treated as a characterisation of the 
depressed person's interaction with the environment 
rather than as a hypothesis concerning the causal 
antecedents of depressive episode" (p. 210). 
3.3.3 LEARNED HELPLESSNESS MODEL OF DEPRESSION 
Recently another model of depression has been proposed to 
account for various depressive symptoms and manifestations. 
The learned helplessness model of depression (Seligman, 1974; 
Abrahamson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1978) invokes environmental 
as well as cognitive or internal factors to explain the aetiology 
and development of this clinical syndrome. Unlike cognitive 
or behavioural models of depression, the present one combines 
both cognitive and behavioural views to address the aetiological 
and therapeutic issues of depression. This interactionist 
approach to explaining emotional upsets and disorders has 
generated a great deal of research in both areas of social and 
clinical psychology. Studies examining people's reactions 
to aversive or stressful life events, such as car accidents, 
rape, (Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Janoff-Bulman and Wortman, 1977) 
have particularly benefitted from this framework. 
The learned helplessness phenomenon has initially been observed 
in animals. Cats and dogs exposed to aversive stimulations, 
such as electric shock, failed to escape when tested in a shuttle 
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box. This learning deficit later called 'learned helplessness' 
is believed to result from noncontingency learning; that is 
the acquisition of a belief (for humans) that responding is 
independent from reinforcement or outcome. For learned 
helplessness deficit to occur, the belief in noncontingency 
should be generalised to situations in which control is available. 
Following this important finding, Seligman hypothesised a 
parallelism between experimental helplessness and clinical 
manifestations of human depression. He regarded depression 
and its behavioural and affective components as a consequence 
of expectations of response-outcome independence. In other 
words, the apparently complex aetiology of clinical depression 
is reduced to the so-called associative deficit (response-
outcome independence). 
Studies that attempted to produce the learned helplessness 
deficit in humans (e.g. Hanusa and Schulz, 1977; Klein, Fencil-
Morse, and Seligman, 1976; Tennen and Eller, 1977; Wortman, 
Panciera, Shusterman, and Hibscher, 1976) have reported results 
which were inconsistent with the learned helplessness hypothesis. 
While some studies (e.g. Hanusa and Schulz, 1977) have observed 
'facilitation effects' following experience with uncontrollable 
outcomes, others however, have only obtained the helplessness 
effects (performance decrements) in certain circumstances. 
That is, when previous failure to control outcomes is accounted 
for in terms of personal shortcomings (internal attributions 
of failure), such as incompetence, inability and so forth. 
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The conclusion that emerged from human helplessness research 
seems to suggest that the laboratory produced helplessness is 
not only a function of noncontingency learning but also, and 
more importantly, of the type of attributions involved in 
the helplessness process (the concept of attribution will be 
dealt with in the next chapter). 
The importance of attributions in mediating and shaping the 
emotional and behavioural aspects of depression was fully 
acknowledged and reflected in the recent formulation of the 
learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 
1978). The revised learned helplessness model of depression 
adopts an attributional framework both to solve some serious 
conceptual irregularities and to account for the available 
experimental data generated by the original model. According 
to the attributional reformulation, the helplessness or 
depressive reaction depends not merely on the environmental 
condition of uncontrollability but also on the kind of attribution 
displayed for loss or lack of control. For. instance, the 
helplessness deficits can only be transferred to situations 
where control is available, if the attributions made, for 
uncontrollability or failure in the original situation, were 
internal and global (internal-global attributions). 
The reformulated learned helplessness model of depression pre-
dicts that depressives have an exaggerated tendency to make 
internal, stable, and global attributions for negative outcomes 
(failure) and external, unstable, and specific attributions for 
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positive outcomes (success). In brief, the internality, 
stability, and globality dimensions of attributions are believed 
to influence respectively the intensity, chronicity, and 
generality of disorders. 
Although the attributional reformulation may have answered 
important questions about the aetiology and development of 
depression, it has failed to clarify other relevant issues. 
As noted by Wortman and Dintzer (1978), the reformulated 
model (Abramson et al., 1978) is not very specific about the 
relationship between motivational, affective, and cognitive 
components of helplessness and depression. Another problem 
with the Abramson et al. model concerns its failure to 
specify the conditions under which a given attribution will 
be displayed (e.g., Wortman & Dintzer, 1978; Jackson & Larrance, 
1978). Indeed, in its present form the learned helplessness 
model provides no basis for understanding why some people 
make internal, stable, and global attributions when faced 
with uncontrollable or aversive outcomes, and why some other 
people display external, unstable, and specific attributions 
for similar outcomes. Until the determinants of particular 
atrributions will be specified and relevant issues clarified 
(e.g., the nature of the relationship between motivational, 
affective, and cognitive components of helplessness and 
depression), the potential of the helplessness model in 
increasing theoretical understanding of helplessness and 
depressive phenomena will be greatly limited. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of attribution has recently enjoyed a great deal of 
popularity and credibility in both areas of social and clinical 
psychology. It has been evoked and used both by theoreticians 
and researchers to advance the theoretical understanding of 
achievement-related behaviours (Weiner, 1974), emotional dis-
orders (Val ins and Nisbett, 1972; Johnson et al., 1977), arid 
of psychotherapeutic processes (Kopel and Arkovitz, 1975). 
The attribution framework has also been adopted to remedy 
conceptual inadequacies and irregularities inherent to such 
theories as achievement motivation theory (Atkinson and 
Feather, 1964; Weiner et al., 1971) and learned helplessness 
theory (Seligman, 1974; Abramson et al., 1978; Miller and 
Norman, 1979). The adoption of attributional approaches in 
these areas and others gave rise to fruitful debates about 
various conceptual as well as empirical issues in social and 
clinical psychology (cf. Harvey, !ekes, and Kidds, 1976, 
19 78) . 
Attribution refers to the process through which an individual 
makes judgements about the causes of his/her behaviour and 
that of others. It also refers to the ways in which people 
generate explanations for occurences in everyday life. 
Research on people's intuitive perceptions of causality 
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(attributions) has been initiated by Heider (1958), and elaborated 
and refined by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). 
writings have, as Semin (1980) recently pointed out: 
"laid the necessary groundwork for what is probably 
the most influential framework in today's social 
psychology: attribution theory" (p.29l). 
Their 
Attribution theory provides a useful framework for studying and 
understanding social behaviour in both its adaptive and maladap-
ti ve forms. The theory also provides an empirical framework 
for testing hypotheses concerning the antecedent conditions of 
specific instances of behaviour. 
Depsite its apparent conceptual adequacy, attribution theory 
has been described as lacking the necessary ingredients of a 
good theory of social cognition (e.g., Semin, 1980). Critics 
(e.g., Harris and Harvey, 1981) have specifically questioned 
some basic assumptions made by attribution theorists. One 
such assumption is that the attributor operates as a statis-
tician or scientist when attempting to explain or interpret 
things that happen to him/her and to other people. This 
metaphor has also been challenged by judgement researchers 
(e.g., Fischhoff, 1976; Hogarth, 1980). The conclusion 
emerging from judgement research suggests, contrary to the 
picture projected by attribution theorists, that people's 
information processing capacity is greatly limited. 
But perhaps the most justified criticism of attribution theory 
concerns its lack of reference to the social context in which 
attributions are generated and displayed. To paraphrase 
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Semin (1980), the individual in attribution theory is portrayed 
as though he/she is operating in 'social vacuum'. Thus, the 
need for theoretical statements that will capture this social 
dimension of attribution becomes apparent. Failure to 
'socialize' attribution theory could seriously undermine its 
status as a leading view within social psychology. 
4.2 THE FORMATION OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS 
The chief concern of attribution theory and research has been, 
and still is, the description and explanation of processes that 
lead to making causal attributions. Early theorists such as 
Heider, Jones and Davis, and Kelley have written extensively 
on the antecedent conditions and development of causal attribu-
tions and explanations. Specifically, their work involved 
the identification and descriptions of the heuristics that 
perceivers use to arrive at causal judgements. 
Although Heider's 'naive' analysis of action (1958) and Jones 
and Davis (1965) correspondent inference formulations are 
highly influential (in attribution research), Kelley's ANOVA 
model carries more weight when it comes to describing the 
phenomenology of the attributor. In particular, Kelley's 
extensive analyses have led to the identification and specifi-
cation of attributional 'rules'. Kelley's ANOVA model is 
believed to provide a more adequate framework for analysing and 
understanding attributional processes. 
Kelley contends that people's intuitive perceptions of causality 
are governed by a fundamental principle referred to as 'the 
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covariance principle'. Specifically, the covariance principle 
states that: 
"an effect is attributed to the one of i.ts possible 
causes with which, overtime, it covaries" (Kelley, 
1972, p.3). 
Kelley listed four criteria that attributors presumably apply 
to assess and determine cause-effett covariation (attribution). 
These are distinctiveness, consensus, consistency overtime, 
and consistency over modality. 
Distinctiveness refers to information concerning the individual's 
response to the entity (stimulus). Consensus refers to 
information concerning the responses or reactions of other people 
to the same entity. Consistency overtime refers to information 
regarding the individual's response to the entity overtime. 
Consistency over modality refers to information regarding the 
individual's response to the entity over modality. 
The perceiver or attributor, in Kelley's model, is assumed to 
obtain information from three different sources: entity (supplies 
distinctiveness information), persons (supply consensus informa-
tion), and time/modalities (supply consistency information)-
this information is then subjected to a process akin to analysis 
of variance. This is how Kelley (1972) describes the process 
leading to attribution of causality: 
"given information about a certain effect and two or more 
possible causes, the individual tends to assimilate it 
to a specific assumed analysis of variance pattern and 
from that to make a causal attribution'' {p.l52). 
72. 
In sum, Kelley's model suggests that in the pre-attribution 
stage, perceivers weight, combine, and organize information 
in the manner of a statistician. This information synthesis 
is believed to form the basis of the attribution of causality. 
Evidence for Kelley's hypothesis that different types of infor-
mational cues lead to different kinds of attributions (internal 
and external attributions) has been provided by McArthur (1972). 
In a classic study on the determinants of causal attributions, 
McArthur presented subjects with behavioural information (e.g., 
'John laughs at the comedian'). Each behavioural event 
presented to subjects was accompanied by low or high distinc-
tiveness information (e.g., 'John laughs at hardly any other 
comedian' - 'John laughs at almost every other comedian'); 
high or low consensus (e.g., 'almost everyone who hears the 
comedian laughs at him' - 'hardly anyone who hears the comedian 
laughs at him'); and high or low consistency (e.g., 'in the 
past John has almost laughed at the same comedian' - 'in the 
past John has almost never laughed at the same comedian'). 
Following the presentation of these informational cues, subjects 
were asked to indicate the extent to which the person's 
response to the stimulus (John's reaction to the comedian) 
was due to (i) something about the person (person attribution), 
(ii) something about the stimulus (stimulus attribution), (iii) 
something about the particular circumstances (circumstance 
attribution), or (iv) some combination of person, stimulus, 
and circumstance. The results obtained showed, as hypothesised 
by Kelley, that person attribution was exhibited following the 
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presentation of low consensus, low distinctiveness, and high 
consistency. Stimulus attribution was determined by high 
distinctiveness, high consensus, and high consistency. 
Circumstance attribution was found to be associated with low 
consensus. These findings that different attribution are 
based on different types of information are in line with 
Kelley's ANOVA conception of the processes of causal attri-
butions. 
In his subsequent pu1:5lications, Kelley (1971, 1972, 1973) 
described two more schemes that perceivers presumably use to 
form and generate causal attributions: the augmentation and 
the discounting methods. These two methods or principles, like 
the covariation principle, are employed to gather and organize 
information that serve as raw data for attributional judgements. 
The augmentation principle states that: 
"if for a given effect, ooth a plausible inhibitory 
and a plausible facilitative cause are present, the 
role of the facilitative cause will 1:5e judged greater 
than if it alone were presented as plausible cause of 
the effect" (Kelley, 1971, p.l2). 
The discounting principle, in contrast, propose that: 
''the role of a given cause in producing a given effect 
is discounted if other possible causes are also present" 
(Kelley, 1971, p.8). 
Although Kelley's description of these specific judgemental 
schemes may be theoretically sound, there is as yet no evidence 
suggesting that people m~ke such a cognitive effort when 
assessing their behaviour or the behaviour of others. In 
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fact, a recent study carried out by Hansen (1980) reported 
evidence suggesting, contrary to Kelley's views, that attri-
butors follow a principle of cognitive economy. In line 
with the cognitive economy hypothesis, Hansen (1980) concluded 
that percei vers: 
"prefer information allowing for simpler confirmatory 
inferences over infonnation requiring most sophisticated 
confinnatory inferences, based on augmentation and 
discounting'' (p.l007). 
Finally, Kelley (1972) also discussed the possibility of causal 
schemata serving as the basis for causal judgements or attribu-
tions. According to Kelley, causal schemata are evoked in 
particular situations in order: 
"to make economical and fast attributional analysis" 
{p.2, 1972). 
Here again Kelley's formulation could be criticised on two 
accounts. Firstly, Kelley failed to identify or specify 
those situations in which causal attributions are based on 
causal schemata, and those situations in which causal attribu-
tions and explanations are based on consensus, distinctiveness, 
and consistency information. There are some indications, 
however, that causal schemata are. invoked mainly to account for 
unusual occurences and events (e.g., Cunningham and Kelley, 
1975). Secondly, Kelley failed to explain how causal schemata 
affect the search for and the utilization of new data and how 
the new data might affect the existing schemas. Kell ey was 
apparently aware of this gap when he remarked that: 
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"further development of attribution theory requires 
an account of this conflict between existing cognitive 
structures and new data and the process by which they 
interact and become reconciled" (p.l20, 1973). 
4.3 THE CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS 
Considerable progress has been achieved in attribution theory 
as a result of extensive theoretical and empirical work within 
the area of achievement motivation. Following the formulation 
of the attributional model of achievement motivation, Weiner, 
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1971) made a set 
of propositions vis a vis the underlying properties of causal 
attributions. Based on the writings of Heider (1958), Rotter 
(1966), and Kelley (1967), Weiner and his associates (1971) 
argued quite convincingly that causal attributions may be 
categorized along the causal dimensions: the dimensions of locus 
of causality (internal attributions vs. external attributions), 
and the dimension of stability (stable attributions vs. unstable 
attributions). The former dimension involves attributions 
to internal (within the person) and to external·(within the 
environment) factors or causes, while the latter dimension 
involves attributions to stable (fixed) and unstable (variable) 
causes. 
This two-dimensional analysis of attributions has been inspired 
by previous work on perceived causes of success and failure. 
Weiner and his associates (1971) identified four causes that 
may account for performance in achievement related contexts: 
ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck. They found that 
these causal attributions exhibited similarities as well as 
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differences. For instance, both ability attribution and 
effort attribution are internal, but the former is stable, 
whereas the latter is unstable or variable. Similarly, task 
and luck attributions are both external (outside the person), 
however, the former is characterised by its stability and the 
latter by its variability or instability. 
Weiner et al.'s decision to subsume causal attributions within 
the dimensions of locus and stability appears to have been 
guided by two motives: identifying and specifying individual 
differences with regard to attributions, and relating performance 
consequences (e.g., emotions, expectancies) to two different 
kinds of attributions. 
In their attributional model of achievement motivation, Weiner 
and his associates (1971) hypothesised linkages between attribu-
tions and consequences of performance (i.e., success and failure). 
They proposed that the emotional consequences are influenced 
by internal and external attributions (internality dimension), 
while expectancy shifts are related to stable and unstable 
attributions (stability dimension). 
Recently, learned helplessness theorists (Abramson, Seligman, 
and Teasdale, 1978) also proposed a third attributional dimension 
to account for some aspects of the learned heiplessness phenome-
non: '''specific-global'' - orthogonal to internality and 
stability, that characterises the attributions of.people' (p.57). 
This third attributional dimension was introduced to account 
for the causes in which learned helplessness deficits are 
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limited to the original situation (no generalization across 
situations), and for the cases in which these deficits occur 
across situations. Specific attributions imply that helpless-
ness symptoms will be exhibited only in the situation in which 
they have been induced, global attributions, in contrast, imply 
that helplessness feelings will be experienced in most if not 
all stressful situations. 
In sum, attribution theory as formulated by Heider (1958), 
Jones and Davis (1965), Kelley (1967), and extended by Weiner 
(1974) and Abramson et al. (1978) states that attributions 
are based on specific judgemental rules and that these attribu-
tions shape our feelings and reactions to past as well as 
future events. Research in this area of social psychology 
has so far found considerable evidence consistent with both 
the hypothesised determinants and the predicted consequences 
of causal attributions (see Antaki, 1981; Harvey, !ekes, and 
Kidd, 1976, 1978; for a detailed review of this research). 
4.4 CURRENT ISSUES IN ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
AND RESEARCH: THE CASE OF ATTRIBUTIONAL BIASES 
An important issue in attribution theory and research has been, 
and still is, the nature of the biases or errors .that frequently 
distort people's causal judgements and attributions. Recent 
research has shown that the making of causal attributions does 
not always involve the use of logical judgemental rules. 
Specifically, it has been shown that causal attributions are, 
in some cases, subject to a number of biases. Examples of 
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attributional biases have been illustrated and documented by 
the findings reported in actor-observer studies, success-failure 
studies, and dispositional shift studies. 
4.4. l THE ACTOR-OBSERVER BIAS 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that attributions are 
biased has been offered by studies examining acto-observer 
causal attributions (e.g., Jones and Nisbett, 1972). 
to the issue Jones and Nisbett (1972) stated that: 
Referring 
''there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute 
their actions to situational requirements, whereas 
observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable 
personal dispositions'' (p.80). 
Jones and Nisbett (1972) listed three different factors that may 
account for actors and observers' attributional biases and 
differences. They postulated that actors and observers differ 
in their motivations, their perceptual perspectives, and in 
their information processing strategies: 
(i) The motivational explanation for actor-observer 
differential attributions suggests that actors are 
highly motivated to protect and/or enhance their 
self-esteem by attributing social desirable behaviours 
to personal dispositions and undesirable ones are 
attributed to situational causes or constraints. 
Studies relevant to this issue reported evidence 
that suggested that actors' differential attributions 
for success and failure are motivationally based (e.g., 
Bradeley, 1978; Miller and Ross, 1975). Consistent 
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with the motivational hypothesis, are also the studies 
that found that actors tend to take more credit than 
observers grant them for successful outcomes (e.g., 
Snyder, Stephan, and Rosenfield, 1976; Taylor and 
Koivumaki, 1976). When unsuccessful outcomes are 
involved, actors assume less responsibility than 
observers tend to ascribe them (e.g., Harvey, Harris, 
and Barnes, 1975; Ross et al., 1974; Snyder et al., 
1976; Taylor and Kovumaki, 1976). 
(ii) The perceptual or focus of attention explanation 
suggests that actors focus their visual attention 
on the surrounding environment, whereas observers' 
attention is apparently more directed at the actor 
than to the situation. Consequently, actors adopt 
situational explanations for their actions and 
observers favour dispositional explanations for 
the same actions. The empirical support for the 
focus of attention hypothesis is equally impressive 
(e.g., Arkin and Duval, 1975; Nisbett et al., 
1973; Storms, 1973). 
(iii) The third hypothesis advanced to account for the 
divergent causal attributions of actors and observers 
is informational in nature. The informational expla-
nation of actor-observer bias proposes that actors 
have a privileged access to many informational sources 
and cues that are relatively denied to observers. 
It has been suggested that actors have (historical 
knowledge' about their past actions and behaviours, 
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which is not readily available or accessible to 
observers (e.g., Manson and Snyder, 1977). Con-
sequently, observers will exclusively base their 
attributions on consensus information (social norm), 
and actors' attributions will be more based on 
distinctiveness and consistency information. 
Studies testing this informational hypothesis 
reported data that supported the informational basis 
of attributional biases displayed by both actors 
and observers (e.g., Eisen, 1979; Hansen and Lowe, 
1976). These studies found that actors tend to 
base their causal attributions on distinctiveness 
information, and observers rely heavily on consensus 
information for their causal explanations. 
4.4.2 THE SUCCESS-FAILURE CASE 
Attributions for achievement-related behaviours is another area 
of attribution theory and research in which attributional biases 
have been observed. A common finding reported by the studies 
dealing with this issue is that people tend to attribute success 
to internal causes or factors (internal attributions for success) 
and failure to external causes and constraints (external attri-
butions for failure) (e.g., Snyder et al., 1976; Wolosin et 
al., 1973). Some theorists attempted to account for this 
finding in motivational terms (e.g., Snyder et al., 1976; 
Bradley, 1978), others, however, favoured non-motivational or 
informational explanations (e.g., Miller and Ross, 1975; Nisbett 
and Ross, 1980). 
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Those who subscribe to a motivational view of self-serving 
biases argue that people are motivated to protect and/or 
enhance their self-esteem. As a consequence, they take credit 
for success and deny responsibility for failure. Briefly, 
this motivational hypothesis suggests that attributions in 
achievement-related contexts (i.e., attributions for success 
and failure) are biased by self-serving motives (Bradley, 
1978). 
Those who subscribe to a non-motivational or informational 
view of differential attributions for success and failure, 
in contrast, argue that these attributional biases arise from 
cognitive or informational sources. In their recent publica-
tion, Nisbett and Ross (1980) argued strongly in favour of a 
non-motivational view of attributional biases. They presented 
ample evidence that such biases derive from cognitive sources. 
They concluded that biases in attributions: 
"are almost inevitable products of human information-
processing strategies'' (p.l2). 
4.4.3 THE DISPOSITIONAL SHIFT CASE 
Attributional biases have also been observed in this relatively 
new area of research. It has been shown that actors' attribu-
tions or explanations of their past behaviour are less situational 
and more dispositional than their explanations for present 
behaviour (e.g., Moore et al., 1979; Peterson, 1980). This 
dispositional shift in attributions over time is believed to 
be due to the predominance of memories about self over memories 
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about the situation. Specifically, Moore and his colleagues 
(1979) suggested that memories about the self are more acces-
sible than those about the situation when people engage in 
attributional activities about past events and experiences. 
The relatively easy access to memories about the self is, 
according to the authors, facilitated by well developed self-
schemata as compared to weak situation-schemata. A recent 
study by Peterson (1980) reported evidence consistent with 
Moore et al.'s hypothesis that the dispositional shift in 
attributions is related to memory biases. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The present chapter has been devoted to a concept of increasing 
popularity and influence in both areas of social and clinical 
-psychology: attribution. As noted earlier, the concept of 
attribution has been evoked and use_d by researchers and 
clinicians to analyse behaviour both in its adaptive and 
maladaptive forms. In addition to enriching the literature 
on social cognition, attribution theory and research have 
advanced the theoretical understanding of a number of phenomena, 
including achievement motivation, .social interaction (e.g., 
interpersonal attraction, interpersonal conflict etc.), and 
learned helplessness. Though many issues, in attribution, 
remain to be clarified, there is no doubt that the attributional 
framework will continue to be influential in cognitive social 
pscyhology. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite recent advances in psychological research on depression, 
issues concerning both the aetiology and nosology of depressive 
disorders remain relatively unsettled. 
Three psychological theories (Beck, 1967, 1974; Lewinsohn, 1974; 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978) have been advanced to 
challenge directly the authority of the traditional affective 
approach to the syndrome of depression. 
Beck's cognitive theory (1967, 1974) claims that depression is 
set off by a negative cognitive set. In this model the 
depression-prone individual is seen as characterised by negative· 
cognitive schemas. Once activated (usually by an important 
loss), these maladaptive cognitive schemas or 'silent assumptions' 
lead the person to develop and maintain a negat1ve view of 
himself, and of the world, and of the future (the so-called 
cognitive triad) (see chapter three for further details). 
The affective aspect of depression is believed to be secondary 
to these faulty cognitions. This cognitive view of emotional 
disorders, equa1ly shared by Ellis (1962) and Valins and Nisbett 
(1971), is based on the assumption that: 
"the affective response is determined by the way an 
individual structures his experience'' (Beck, 1963). 
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Lewinsohn's behavioural viewpoint (1974), in contrast, attributes 
depressive disorders to a sort of breakdown in the reinforcement 
system. He postulates that depression results from a low rate 
of response-contingent positive reinforcement. The depressed 
individual is believed to be socially unskilled (social skills 
deficit) and as such he fails to initiate behaviours that would 
elicit positive reinforcement from others or the environment 
(chapter three gives further details). 
Although these two theories of depression claim respect and 
popularity in the psychological literature, some of their 
assumptions have nevertheless been questioned. But the major 
criticism addressed to both cognitive and behavioural models 
of depression concerns their tendency to over-emphasize one 
aspect of this syndrome at the expense of another, and also 
their apparent tendency to explain depression in terms of its 
symptoms and consequences (see Wortman and Dintzer, 1978, 
for a detailed discussion of these issues). 
The reformulated learned helplessness model of depression 
recently proposed by Abramson and his colleagues (1978) predicts, 
in contrast to both cognitive and behavioural views, that 
depression should occur only: 
"when highly desired outcomes are believed improbable 
or highly aversive outcomes are believed probable, and 
the individual expects that no response in his repertoire 
will change their likelihood" (p.68). 
In their reformulation of the learned helplessness hypothesis, 
the authors introduced and extensively used attribution theory 
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constructs to resolve some conceptual inadequacies and other 
shortcomings inherent to the original hypothesis (Seligman, 
1974). Specifically, the adoption of an attributional approach 
in the reformulation gave them the possibility, which was 
originally denied, of distinguishing between different types 
or forms of helplessness. As a result, the attributional 
analysis successfully differentiated between personal and 
universal helplessness, between transient and chronic helpless-
ness, and between specific and global or general helplessness. 
Some characteristic features of helplessness and depression 
such as generality, chronicity, and self-esteem loss are 
hypothesised to be related respectively to the globality, 
stability, and internality of the attribution for uncontrolla-
bility or helplessness. Of particular significance in this 
reformulation, is the importance acquired by causal attribution 
in the helplessness process. In fact, Abramson and her colleagues 
regard attribution as a central component of their helplessness 
theory. Their view at this point is clearly stated: 
"The individual first finds out that certain outcomes 
and responses are independent, then he makes an 
attribution about the cause. This attribution affects 
his expectations about future response-outcome 
relations and thereby determines, the chronicity, 
generality, and to some degree the intensity of the 
deficits'' (p.56). 
Although, as will be seen, the existing experimental data lend 
some support to this critical aspect of learned helplessness 
theory, further research is required to investigate directly 
the relationship between attribution and depression (cf. 
Wortman and Dintzer, 1978). Particularly, there is a need 
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to assess the potential role of attribution in the development 
and maintenance of depressive disorders. This concern together 
with other related issues prompted the current research. 
The present investigation was concerned with the causal 
relationship between attribution and depression. Specifically, 
this investigation was an attempt to reveal the extent to which 
manipulating attributions will affect depression (as measured 
by the BDI and MAACL). It was also designed to clarffy the 
specificity issue- that is, to determine whether certain 
types of attributions are more associated with depression 
than with anxiety, hostility, or other known psychopathological 
disorders. The study of this issue is of a particular 
importance, since it bears directly on the aetiological 
relevance of attribution to depression. 
5.1.1 ATTRIBUTIONS OF HELPLESSNESS 
Directly relevant to the present investigation are human help-
lessness studies (Klein et al. 1976; Tennen and Eller, 1977; 
Wortman et al. 1976) that manipulated subjects' causal attribu-
tions of noncontingent outcomes. In an experiment on the allevia-
tion of helplessness deficits, Klein and his colleages induced 
depressed and non-depressed students to make either internal 
or external attributions for failure to control outcomes. When 
tested on a problem solving task (anagrams), only depressed 
controls and internal attribution groups (depressed and non-
depressed) exhibited the performance deficits predicted by the 
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helplessness model. As was expected, external attribution 
groups performed better than internal or control groups. 
But despite the differences observed in performance, the 
results of this study still are not entirely relevant to the 
etiological or therapeutic issue; because there is little or 
no evidence suggesting that performance deficit at a laboratory 
task is indicative of depression. If helplessness investigators 
are to claim aetiolo.gical implication for noncontingency learn-
ing they will probably need to present post helplessness 
data involving not only performance but al.so depressive affect 
measures. Surprisingly, the data relevant to this very same 
issue, was not reported in Klein et al.'s study ( 1976). 
Failure to do so was attributed, as one might expect, to some 
methodological constraints: 
''The sliding data indicated that solvable problems 
decreased sadness and unsolvable problems increased 
self rated anger, but the scales are at best crude 
indicator of mood, so the data will not be 
reported" ( p. 512). 
A further attempt to manipulate causal attributions for non-
contingent outcomes, was made by Tennen and Ell er ( 1977). 
They obtained results which clearly indicated that the helpless-
ness process is strongly influenced by attribution instructions. 
But here again, the data seem to be more relevant to the 
helplessness model in general than to the helplessness model 
of depression. 
In sum, human helplessness studies, particularly those referred 
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to here, showed that non-contingency learning (response-outcome 
independence) was affected by subjects' beliefs about causality. 
But they neither established links between attributions and 
depressive components, nor did they demonstrate a relation 
between response-outcome independence (the so-called associative 
deficit) and depression. In fact, the possibility of depressives 
being sensitive to non-contingency has recently been refuted 
by Alloy and Abramson (1979). They reported results which 
showed that depressed subjects were even more accurate in 
their judgements of contingency than non-depressed subjects 
were. 
However, the possibility that particular types of attributions 
being involved in depression has already been recognized. 
5.1.2 DEPRESSION AND CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS FOR SUCCESS 
AND FAILURE 
More relevant to the present investigati.on are studies that 
examined the relationship between attribution and depression. 
In an important study, Rizley (1978) gave either success or 
failure feedback to depressed and non-depressed college students 
and instructed them to make causal attributions for their 
outcomes. He found that depressed subjects tend to ascribe 
more failure than success to internal or personal factors 
(inability, incompetence), whereas non-depressed ones 
attribute more causality to themselves for success than for 
failure. The tendency for depressives to make depressogenic 
attributions has also been observed by Kuiper (1978). The 
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pattern of results obtained from his study seem to suggest the 
existence of an attributional style specific to depressives. 
This hypothesis has been successfully examined by Seligman and 
his colleagues in a recent correlational study (1979). They 
reported results which clearly confirmed the hypothesis in 
.,question • Specifically, it was found that depressives tend 
to display internal stable attributions for negative outcomes, 
whereas non-depressives make external unstable attributions or 
similar outcomes. 
The attributional differences observed in this study and others 
seem to suggest that attributions are operative in the etiology 
or development of depressive disorders. 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 1 
While human helplessness studies were etiological in nature 
(or at least as it has been claimed), that is the demonstration 
that a given condition occasions depression or it correlates, 
the present study however, was more concerned with the implica-
tions that certain attributions may have on depression regardless 
of its causes or etiology. Considering the fact that attri-
butions are involved in depression, the current study attempted 
to determine whether manipulating depressed college students' 
attributions of success and failure on an anagram task would 
affect their subsequent mood. 
In this first experiment, one group of subjects was given 
instructions designed to elicit internal attributions for 
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failure (IAF) to solve most of the anagrams making the task. 
A second group of subjects was induced to make external attri-
butions for failure (EAF) on this task. A third group was 
exposed to failure (FO) but was not given attribution instruc-
tions. A fourth group of subjects was induced to make internal 
attributions for success (!AS) on this task. A fifth group 
was induced to make external attributions for success (EAS) 
on the same task. The sixth and the last group received 
success feedback (SO) but was not given attribution instructions. 
To evaluate the affective consequences of attributions, all 
subjects completed the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist 
(MAACL) both before and after the experiment. Briefly, the 
MAACL provides measures of three different affects: anxiety, 
depression and hostility. Thus, this experiment was a 2 
(success-failure) x 3(internal attribution, external attribu-
. 
tion and no attribution instructions) factorial design. 
Based on the previous research reviewed here, the following 
predictions were made: 
1. As a replication of Rizley's (1978) and Kuiper's (1978) 
finding that depressives attribute failure but not success 
to internal factors, FO subjects were expected to make 
more internal attributions than SO subjects. 
2. EAF subjects should report less depression on the MAACL 
than both IAF and FO subjects. While the former 
manipulation corrects the depressives' tendency to ·self-
blame, the latter one, however, reinforces this 
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depressogenic tendency. 
3; IAF subjects should report no more depresston on t~e 
MAACL than their counterparts in failure only (FO) 
condition. 
4. IAS subjects should report less depression than both 
EAS and SO groups. Because the former treatment is 
believed to be more esteem enhancing than the latter 
one. 
5. It was also anticipated that both anxiety and hostility 
affects will vary as a function of success-failure per se. 
5.2.1 METHOD 
Overview. Depressed undergraduate students selected on the 
basis of their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), 
participated in a problem solving experiment. Subjects were 
given either success or failure feedback following performance 
on an anagram task, and were induced to make internal or 
external attributions for their outcome. Subjects' mood 
was assessed before and after the experiment. -Mood change 
scores were obtained by comparing both the initial and subsequent 
moods as reported on the MAACL. 
Subjects. Fifty-four undergraduate students (30 females and 
24 males) from Plymouth Polytechnic, participated in this 
experiment. Subjects were selected on the basis of their scores 
on the BDI (Beck et al., 1961). Subjects scoring 8 or more 
on this scale were selected and randomly assigned to one of 
the six experimental conditions shown above. Studies adopting 
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similar selection procedure (e.g., Klein et al., 1976; Seligman 
et al., 1979) indicated that this cutting line offers a useful 
basis for differentiating between mildly depressed and non-
depressed persons. The validity and reliability of the BDI 
are well established and documented by various research reports 
(e.g., Beck, 1967; Metcalfe and Goldman, 1967). Although 
this instrument was initially designed for clinical use, 
subsequent work (Bumberry et al., 1978) revealed that it could 
also be used to measure depression in a college student 
population (see chapter 2 for further details). 
Following the administration of the BDI, all subjects completed 
the MAACL today form (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965). Briefly, 
the MAACL scale provides measures of three different affects: 
depression, anxiety, and hostility. The correlation between 
BDI and MAACL scores was .36 (p<.05). Table 1.1 presents 
the means and standard deviations for the BDI and MAACL 
depression scale. 
Procedure. A flow chart of the experimental procedure is 
shown in Table 1.2. All participants were run one at a time. 
Each subject was seated at a table facing a screen, and was 
administered both the BDI and MAACL (see Appendix A.l). After 
completing the mood questionnaires, all subjects were given the 
following standard instructions for the problem solving task: 
"This experiment attempts to identify the strategies 
that people generally use to solve problems. You will 
be given 20 anagrams; anagrams are, as you may know, 
words with the letters scrambled. They will be pro-jected one at a time on the screen in front of you. Your 
task is to unscramble each of them to form a word in English. 
When you recognize the word tell me aloud." 
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TABLE 1.1 -MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF BDI AND 
MAACL SCORES 
OUTCOME INTERNAL EXTERNAL NO ATTRIBUTION ATTRIBUTION ATTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS 
SUCCESS M so M so M so 
BDI 11.77 3.38 11 • 55 2.82 11.00 3.55 
MAACL 14.55 4.18 14.77 4.63 16.55 1.94 
FAILURE 
' 
BDI 10.88 3.66 11 . 00 1.63 12.22 4. 54 
MAACL 12.88 5.19 13.66 4.17 13.66 3.22 
NOTE: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. 
To manipulate subjects' performance on the anagram task 
(success or failure), it was necessary to use both types of 
anagrams, solvable and insolvable anagrams. 
In failure conditions, subjects were given 12 unsolvable 
anagrams (e.g., BNAHE), and 8 solvable ones (e.g., ODELM-MODEL). 
The order of presentation was random. 
In success conditions, subjects were given 20 solvable anagrams 
of a moderate difficulty. All anagrams had similar letter 
arrangements (e.g., UMANH-HUMAN) and were selected from Tresselt 
and Mayer's list (1966). 
Prior to commencing the task, all subjects received a training 
session consisting of 5 anagrams, the aim being the explanation 
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of the experimental procedure. 
Attribution manipulations. Before .commencing the task, a 11 
subjects received the following instructions: 
You may want to know how a sample of Polytechnic students performed 
on this task, here is a figure showing how they performed. 
The figures shown varied according to each experimental condition. 
In both !AS and EAF conditions, the figure presented merely 
showed the high percentage of students (80%) failing at this 
task (task difficulty). 
In both EAS and IAF conditions, the figure presented showed the 
high percentage of students (80%) succeeding at this task (ease 
of the task). 
This information concerning other students' performance at 
similar task is expected to influence attributions to internal 
or external factors. A similar procedure has been success-
fully used by Klein et al. (1976) to manipulate-subjects' 
attributions of their performance on a problem solving task. 
In the present experiment, no attempt has been made to manipulate 
the specific-global dimension of attribution (Abramson et al., 
1978). 
Following the success or failure feedback on the anagram task, 
all subjects were asked to estimate as accurately as possible 
' the number of anagrami they had solved. It was stated that 
subjects solving 10 or more anagrams had succeeded and those 
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who solved less than 10 had failed. After receiving success 
or failure feedback (determined by the number of anagrams 
solved), all subjects were given one of the two attribution 
questionnaires (see Appendix A.2) adapted from Rizley (1978). 
Each questionnaire inquired about the causal determinants of 
either success of failure. All factors known to influence 
attributions to internal causes (e.g., ability, effort) and 
attributions to external causes (e.g., task. difficulty, luck) 
were listed and subjects were asked to indicate on 7-point 
scale (ranging from 1-definitely not a cause of my success 
or failure; to ?-definitely a cause of my success or failure), 
the extent to which each of the factors determined their 
success or failure. 
Upon completion of the attribution questionnaire and the MAACL, 
all subjects were debriefed, paid and thanked for their partici-
pation. 
5.2.2 RESULTS 
Manipulation checks. Analysis of the data from the question 
that asked subjects to estimate the number of anagrams they 
had solved indicated that subjects in success conditions 
experienced success and subjects in failure conditions experienced 
failure. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of these data showed 
that the effect for outcome category (success-failure), was 
as expected, significant, F(l,48) = 227.02, p<.OOOl; such 
that subjects in success conditions reported that they had 
solved more anagrams than those in failure conditions (overall 
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TABLE 1.2 ;.·EXPERIMENTAL.PROCEDURE 
SELECT! ON PHASE 
Only Ss scoring 8 
or more on the 
BDI were 
selected. Ss 
also completed 
the MAACL as a 
further index of 
depression. 
TREATMENT PHASE 
Following performance 
on an anagram task, 
Ss were told either 
they succeeded or 
failed and them 
were induced to 
attribute their 
performance to 
either internal 
or external causes. 
Two groups of Ss 
received no such 
instructions 
(control). 
NOTE: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
ASSESSMENT PHASE 
Ss' mood (includ-
ing anxiety 
depression, and 
hostility) was 
assessed by 
means of the 
MAACL. 
MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Check List. 
M= 13.55 and 5.22 respectively). Table 1.3 presents the 
means and standard deviations of estimated number of anagrams 
solved. 
An analysis of variance of attribution ratings indicated a 
significant effect for attribution, F(2,48) = 3.65 p<.05. 
Further analyses showed that internal attribution groups made 
more attributions to internal factors (ability, effort) than 
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to external ones. Table 1.3 presents the means of attribution 
ratings by condition. Inspection of this table indicates that 
control groups (FO, SO) ascribed more failure than success to 
personal causes (M = 4.50 and 3.22 respectively). This result 
lends further support to the findings (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 
1978) that depressed persons have an exaggerated tendency to 
make negative self-attributions. 
TABLE 1.3- MEANS OF NUMBER OF ANAGRAMS SOLVED AND ATTRIBUTION 
RATINGS 
MEASURE !AS EAS so IAF EAF FO 
ANAGRAMS 12.87 14. 11 13.33 5.75 5.11 5.44 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
INTERNAL 5.00 4.22 4.00 3.33 2. 77 4.50 
EXTERNAL 3.61 3.27 3.22 2.00 3.56 3.22 
NOTE: Attribution ratings could range from 0 to 7. !AS 
Internal attribution for success; EAS = External 
attribution for success; SO = Success only; IAF = 
Internal attribution for failure; EAF = External 
attribution for failure; FO = Failure only. 
Mood Results. Preliminary analyses of the experimental data 
from the MAACL indicated that subjects displayed more hostility 
and reported more anxiety in the failure conditions than 
in success ones. In addition, the data indi.cated that 
depression is influenced not only by outcome (success-failure) 
but also by the type of attributions made to account for the 
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outcome in question. In order to compare treatment effects, 
anxiety and hostility change scores from pre - post administra-
tion were computed and subjected to analyses of variance. For 
the purpose of the experimental hypotheses and because of the 
nature of present data, an analysis of covariance was performed 
on depression scores. 
Anxiety. A 2(success, failure) x 3(internal attribution, 
external attribution, no attribution instructions) analysis of 
variance of the anxiety change scores indicated that the main 
effect.for outcome category (success, failure) was significant, 
F(l ,48) = 7.40, p<.Ol. The main effect for attribution was 
also significant, F(2,48) = 3.71, p<.OS. A simple main effects 
analysis revealed that subjects in IAF condition experienced 
more anxiety than those in EAF condition, F(2,48) = 3.33, 
p<.OS. However, the interaction between outcome and attribution 
was not obtained (F < 1.0). 
Hostility. Analysis of the hostility data from the MAACL 
showed that all subjects displayed more hostility following 
failure feedback than following success feedback. Analysis 
of variance of hostility change scores yielded a significant 
main effect for outcome, F(l,48) = 7.75, p<.Ol. Neither the 
effect for attribution nor the interaction were significant. 
Depression. Analysis of the data from the depression scale 
of the MAACL indicated a substantial change in depression 
following experimental treatments. The hypothesis that 
depressed mood will worsen following internal attributions of 
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failure but not following external attributions of the same 
outcome, was strongly supported by the present data. The 
analysis of covariance of depression scores, with pre-treatment 
scores serving as a covariate, indicated a significant effect 
for outcome category, F(l ,47) = 15.16, p<.OOl. The effect 
for attribution approached statistical significance, F(2,47) = 
2.47, p>.05 <.10. Table 1.4 presents the results of this 
analysis of covariance. As can be seen in the table, the 
interaction (outcome x attribution) was significant, F(2,47) = 
7.63, p<.005. Figure 1.1 illustrates this interaction. 
TABLE 1.4- RESULTS OF THE 2 x 3 ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
SOURCE OF VARIANCE 
OUTCOME (0) 
ATTRIBUTION (A) 
0 x A 
ERROR 
ss 
144 
47 
145 
445 
DF 
2 
2 
47 
MS 
144 
23.4 
72.5 
9.5 
F p 
15.16 <.001 
2.47 ns. 
7.63 <.005 
The adjusted means of treatment and control groups were computed 
and compared by T tests. The treatment comparisons indicated 
as expected that IAS group reported significantly less depression 
than IAF group, t(l6) = 3.53, p<.005. Further comparisons 
indicated that the former groups (IAS) had a lower depression 
mean (M= 12.01) than SO group (M = 15.30=, although the difference 
did not reach statistical significance, t(l6) = 1.54, p>.05 <.10. 
The picture that emerged from this result suggests that IAS 
treatment initiated changes in the euphoric direction. In 
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contrast, IAF treatment appeared to have caused more dysphoria 
(pre M= 12.89 post 19.56). As predicted IAF group reported 
more depression on the post experimental mood questionnaire 
than EAF group, t(l6) = 2.47, p<.025. Further comparisons 
showed that subjects ·induced to externalize failure (EAF) 
experienced less depression than their counterparts in control 
(FO) condition (M = 14.28 and 18.28 respectively). The 
difference between the two means reached significance, 
t(l6) = 1.87, p<.05. No significant differences were found 
between IAF and FO groups. .Failure to obtain differences 
on this measure may be due to the tendency of depressed 
persons to make internal attributions for bad outcomes (see 
Tablel.3). 
5.2.3 DISCUSSION 
' 
' 
The present investigation examined the effects of causal 
attributions for success and failure on mood of midly dep,ressed 
students. In addition, the study attempted to replicate 
previous findings (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; Seligman et 
al. 1979) that depressed persons have a tendency to attribute 
failure but not success to internal or personal dispositions. 
The major hypothesis of this study was derived from Rizley's 
(1978) theoretical position that depression reflects distortion 
in the attribution of causality. To some extent, the current 
results corroborate this attributional viewpoint. It was 
demonstrated that depression (as measured by the BDI and MAACL) 
was substantially and consistently influenced by attribution 
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fig. 1.1. Mean affect adjective check-List(MAACL) depression 
score as a function of attribution(Internal-External) and 
outcome(Success-failure). 
instructions. For instance, it was found that_depressed 
subjects were more depressed and anxious after making internal 
attributions for failure than when failure was attributed to 
external or situational constraints. 
The pattern of results that emerged from this study seems 
to suggest that a combination of failure experience and self 
attribution, is sufficient for a depressive episode 
Although it may seem premature to claim etiological implication 
for negative self-attributions, it is important to note that 
only subjects exhibiting these types of attributions did 
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experience changes in the dysphoric direction. 
Why were subjects dysphoric but not so much anxious or hostile 
following internal attributions for failure treatment? 
It is possible that this negative change in depression reflected 
nothing but a general tendency of depressed subjects to endorse 
more items that are indicative of depression than of hostility 
or anxiety on the MAACL. This explanation, however, becomes 
unlikely when considered in the light of the remaining results. 
For instance, it was found that following external attribution 
for failure treatment subjects were no more depressed than 
hostile or anxious. In fact they reported significantly 
less depression than their counterparts in failure only 
condition (control). 
Another and probably more plausible explanation for this increase 
in depression could be deduced from one of Beck's clinical 
observations: 
"When the person attributes the cause of loss to 
himself, the rift in his domain becomes a chasm: 
he suffers not only the loss itself but he 
discovers a deficiency in himself" (p. 10, 1974). 
Based on this observation and on the results obtained in this 
study, negative self-attributions seem to constitute a major 
antecedent of a depressive experience. One may speculate 
that depressed persons adopt this attributional strategy to 
maintain and/or exacerbate their depressive state. 
In line with the above pr9position, a number of researchers 
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(e.g., Beck, 1967; Nelson & Craighead, 1977) found that 
depressed patients attend to information that may confirm 
their negative attributes (e.g., negative self concept, 
inadequacy, unworthiness ... ). 
The finding that internal attributions for failure lead to 
a dysphoric reaction is compatible with the view espoused by 
learned helplessness theorists (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 
1978). According to the new helplessness model, depression 
and its cognitive and affective symptoms result from one's 
firm belief that he is incompetent in exerting control over 
important life events. 
Although the present experiment was not specifically designed 
to test this hypothesis, it provides data which supports the 
attributional account of depressive manifestations. 
Consistent with the attributional explanation of depressive 
reactions, is the finding that only depression and to a lesser 
extent anxiety were affected by the attribution-manipulations. 
Both hostility and anxiety affects tended to vary as a function 
of outcome (success-failure) per se. For instance, subjects 
displayed more anxiety and reported to have been feeling more 
hostile in failure conditions than in success ones. To the 
extent that subjects' hostile reaction was engendered by the 
situation it could be adaptive in nature. Since it could be 
argued that they were attempting to cope with a rather embarras-
sing situation in which they were exposed to a public 
(experimenter) evaluation. It is also possible that subjects' 
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increased hostility following unsuccessful attempts to solve 
anagrams, was associated with a motive to restore control 
over outcomes (Wortman and Brehm, 1975). Viewed from this 
perspective hostility and to some extent anxiety, are 
reactive in nature. According to Wortman and Brehm's 
reactance theory (1975), people who expect to have contro·l 
react with hostility and anger when "freedom" of exerting 
it (control) is threatened. It will be recalled that 
instructions suggesting the ease of .the task (e.g., internal 
attribution of failure) w~re likely to rai.se subjects' 
expectations of success. It follows that increased hostility 
in failure conditions may have resulted from the discrepancy 
that has been created between expectations and actual outcome. 
The results obtained from the post experimental mood ques-
tionnaire indicated as expected, that subjects in failure only 
condition (control) felt as depressed as those in internal 
attribution of failure condition. This finding is not 
surprising, since both groups provided similar personal accounts 
(internal attributions) for their failure to solve most of the 
anagrams making the task. This tendency of depressed persons 
to hold themselves responsible for bad outcomes may play a 
crucial role in the exacerbation process referred to earlier. 
If this attributional explanation is correct, one would expect 
to prevent the damaging effects of failure experience by 
reducing subjects' responsibility for the undesired outcome. 
This hypothesis was tested and was strongly supported by the 
data from the present experiment. It was found that subjects 
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induced to attribute failure to external or situational 
causes, reported to have been feeling less depressed and 
relatively less anxious than those ascribing causality to 
themselves for failure. Apparently the external. attribution 
instructions were successful in initiating cognitions by 
which further dysphoria was prevented. 
This prophylactic effect of external attributions bears some 
resemblance to what Rippere 11979) described as anti-depressive 
behaviour. According to this author people possess a 
repertoire or a constellation of behaviours that they presumably 
display to avoid sinking into depression. A deduction from 
this proposition is that the external attribution manipulation 
equipped subjects with 'constructs' capable of tackling the 
situation. 
Another possibility is that the manipulation corrected 
depressives' tendency to self blame, thereby reducing the risk 
of further dysphoria. Viewed from this perspective the 
finding may have some therapeutic implications. Teaching 
depressed patients to adopt self-protective attributions may 
be beneficial since such procedure could reduce subjects' 
feelings of inadequacy, worthlessness and other features of 
depression. For instance, Beck's cognitive therapy advocates 
almost similar procedures for the treatment of clinically 
depressed patients. Briefly, this therapy is aimed at 
modifying patients' negative cognitions and "silent assumptions". 
Data from the attribution questionnaires showed that the 
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failure only (FO) group had higher internality scores than 
the success only (SO) group. Thus, lending support to the 
consistently replicated finding (e.g. Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 
1978) that depressed persons tend to make internal attributions 
for unsuccessful outcomes but not for successful ones. This 
result also lends support to Seligman et al.'s (1979) 
suggestion that depressives are characterized with a specific 
attributional style. 
Finally, the contention that the helplessness deficit and 
depressive symptoms could be alleviated by mastery experiences 
was not particularly supported by the current data. In this 
experiment, subjects receiving success only (SO) treatment 
showed little or no improvements in mood. One explanation 
for this discrepancy is that subjects in the present experiment 
may not have perceived success. But the manipulation checks 
argue somewhat against this possibility. Another and maybe 
more plausible explanation lies in the depressives' 
'Maladaptive' perception of causality, that is their reluctance 
to take credit for success. Based on the latter explanation, 
a procedure that makes success more attributable to personal 
' 
dispositions should produce positive changes in mood. Data 
from the mood questionnaire tends to support this proposal. 
It was found that internal attributions of success group 
reported less depression (although not statistically signifi-
cant) than success only group. Unlike success only treatment 
internal attribution instructions appeared to have given 
subjects a means for internalizing success and engaging in 
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positive self-evaluations. 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 2 
The results obtained in Experiment 1 strongly indicated that 
depressed subjects' mood was affected or even determined by 
the type of attributions they displayed to account for their 
success or failure on the anagram task. 
Alth~ugh Experiment 1 revealed a substantial degree of 
association between attribution and depression as measured by 
the MAACL, it was possible that some of the results supporting 
this finding reflected experimental artifacts rather than actual 
treatment effects. First, the previous experiment used not 
only an artificial laboratory task but also a 'single' person 
situation, thus the results may be seriously limited in terms 
of external validity. Second, the observed effects could be 
prone to criticism on the grounds that they were entirely based 
on verbal or self reports. It will be recalled that the major 
independent variable (depression) was in fact assessed by an 
inventory relying solely on subjects' judgements concerning 
their subjective or internal state. Although great care was 
taken to minimize the demand effects (Orne, 1962), the results 
could still qualify for alternative interpretations. Therefore 
Experiment 2 was conducted to remedytothe methodological 
inadequacies inherent to the initial investigation. 
Accordingly, a dyadic situation was used and performance aspects 
were assessed in addition to mood ratings. In brief, Experiment 
2 further examined the effects of attributions on some features 
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of depression (including mood and psychomotor speed) in a 
dyadic situation. Based on the results from Experiment 1, 
it was anticipated: 
1. That subjects would feel more depressed and exhibit 
more performance deficits following internal attributions 
for failure than following external attributions of 
similar outcome. 
2. That subjects would also report less depression and less 
performance deficits after internal attributions for 
success than after externalization of success. 
As was found in Experiment 1, both anxiety and hostility 
affects were expected to vary as a function of success-failure 
per se. 
5. 3.1 METHOD 
Subjects and Design. Forty undergraduates, 18 males and 22 
males, from Plymouth Polytechnic participated in this experiment. 
Subjects were selected on the basis of their scores on the Zung 
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SOS) 1 (Zung, 1965). Subjects 
scoring 25 or more on the SOS were selected and randomly 
assigned to one of the following experimental conditions: 
1. Internal attribution of success (IAS). 
2. External attribution of success (EAS). 
3. Internal attribution of failure (IAF). 
4. External attribution of failure (EAF). 
The SOS is an instrument widely used in research with depressed 
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persons (see chapter 2). Studies using the SOS to identify 
depressed college students (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979) recom-
mended a cutting line of 22, thus those scoring more than 22 
were usually classified as depressed. 
As in Experiment 1, the MAACL was administered as a further 
index of depression. Table 2.1 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the SOS and MAACL for each experimental group. 
The correlation between SOS and MAACL scores was .57" (p<.D05). 
TABLE 2.1 -MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SOS AND MAACL 
SCORES 
OUTCOME 
SUCCESS 
SOS 
MAACL 
FAILURE 
SOS 
MAACL 
INTERNAL 
ATTRIBUTION 
M 
34. 10 
14.70 
31.55 
13.00 
so 
6.45 
4. 01 
6.62 
5.45 
EXTERNAL 
ATTRIBUTION 
M 
33.20 
13.50 
33.10 
13.70 
so 
6.53 
4.58 
6.68 
6.13 
NOTE: SOS = Self Rating Depression Scale. 
MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. 
Procedure. This experiment consisted of three different 
phases: 
(a) Selection phase - in which subjects completed both the 
SOS and MAACL. 
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(b) Treatment phase - in which subjects were induced to 
attribute success or failure on a problem solving task 
to either internal or external causes. 
(c) Assessment phase- in which subjects' mood as well as 
performance were assessed. 
When a subject entered the room, he or she was seated at a 
table facing another subject of the same sex (confederate). 
Upon completion of the SOS and MAACL, both subjects (the subject 
and the confederate) were each given a booklet containing 20 
matrices obtained from Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices 
set II (1962). Subjects were then given the following instruc-
tions for the task (adapted from Prindaville and Stein, 1978): 
The present experiment is designed to examine the relationships 
between some personality variables and problem solving strategies. 
The task that you will be given consists of a series of problems. 
The task itself is known as a pattern completion test. There 
are, as you can see, eight patterns at the top of the page 
which are arranged in a given order according to some logical 
principle. Your task is to select from among eight other 
patterns, at the bottom of the page, the pattern which goes 
next in the sequence according to that principle. I will be 
telling you whether you are correct or incorrect on every 
problem. You will have 25 seconds for each problem, after 
which I will ask for your choice. 
After receiving the standard instructions, all subjects were 
given additional information concerning the nature of the task 
(easy or difficult). The procedure used to manipulate subjects' 
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attributions of success or failure on the problem solving 
task, was similar to that used in Experiment 1. The confede-
rate's success or failure at the problem solving task was 
used to strengthen the attribution manipulations (this 
procedure has been successfully used by Wortman et al., 1976). 
According to Kelley (1971) an individual's attributions are 
influenced not only by his behaviour but also by the behaviour 
of other people with whom he interacts. 
Following the problem solving task, all subjects were asked to 
estimate the number of problems they had solved; they were 
then told that they had succeeded or failed depending on the 
experimental condition to which they were assigned. Following 
success or failure feedback, subjects were asked to make 
attributions to the following internal and external factors: 
ability, effort, task, and luck. The procedure used to 
assess subjects' attributions of success or failure in the 
present experiment is identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
Upon completion of the attribution questionnaire, subjects' 
mood was again assessed. 
Test task. Following the administration of the MAACL (post 
assessment of mood), all subjects were asked to participate 
in the second but different problem solving experiment. The 
task used to assess subjects' performance consisted of 20 
anagrams frequently used in human helplessness studies. Two 
measures of anagram performance were obtained (a) number of 
failures to solve within 100 seconds; (b) mean response latency 
for 20 anagrams. 
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After completing the anagram task, all subjects were adequately 
debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation. 
5.3.2 RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses of the data showed that the effect for 
sex was not significant. Therefore this variable will be 
dropped in subsequent analyses. 
Mood results 
Anxiety. A 2(success-failure) x 2(internal-external attribution) 
analysis of anxiety change scores showed that the effect for 
outcome category (success-failure) was not significant, F(l ,36) = 
2.80. Neither the other main effect nor the interaction were 
significant. All Fs < 1.0 (overall mean for success 6.95 
failure 8.40). 
Hostility. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of hostility change 
scores revealed that the main effect for success and failure 
was significant, F(l ,36) = 5.08, p<.05 (overall M for success = 
7.75 and failure 10.25). As can be seen in Table 2.2, subjects 
reported more hostility following failure than following 
success. 
Depression. Inspection of depression data from the MAACL showed 
that there was a trend for subjects to become dysphoric following 
negative self-attributions and to become slightly euphoric 
following internal attributions for success. An analysis of 
covariance of the depression scores indicated that the effect 
- for success-failure reached statistical significance, F(l ,35) = 
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TABLE 2.2 - MAACL MEANS AS A FUNCTION OF SUCCESS-FAILURE 
AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION 
OUTCOME INTERNAL EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION ATTRIBUTION 
DEPRESSION 
Pre Post Pre Post 
SUCCESS 14.70 13.20 13.50 13.40 
FAILURE 13.00 16.50 13.70 14.90 
ANXIETY 
Pre Post Pre Post 
SUCCESS 8.50 7.00 6.30 6.90 
FAILURE 7.40 8.10 8.30 8.70 
HOSTILITY 
Pre Post Pre Post 
SUCCESS 9.00 8.30 7.30 7.20 
FAILURE 7.90 9.80 9.00 10.70 
5.75, p<.05. However, the interaction was not significant, 
F(l ,35) = 1.37 ns, although the tendency was in that direction. 
Subsequent comparisons of adjusted means showed that IAF had 
higher depression mean than IAS group (M = 16.90 and 12.66 
respectively), the difference approached significance, t(l8) = 
1.55, p > .05 < .10. Further comparisons indicated that IAF 
group reported more depression than EAF group (M = 16.90 and 
14.91 respectively). Using a median split, subjects were 
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subdivided into high depressed (scores ranging from 16 to 24 
on the MAACL) and low depressed (7 to 15 on the MAACL) groups. 
This internal analysis showed that 'high' depressed tended 
to improve following IAS treatment (Pre M= 17.50 and Post 
13.17). In contrast 'low' depressed ones tended to become 
dysphoric after IAF treatment (Pre M= 8.60 and Post 13.20). 
Behavioural measures 
Anagram performance. An analysis of variance number of 
failures to solve anagrams indicated that neither the main 
effects nor the interaction were significant. As can be 
seen in Table 2.3, IAF group solved less anagrams than any of 
the remaining groups. Further analysis showed that IAF group 
performed worse than IAS group, t(l7) = 2.18, p<.025. 
TABLE 2.3 - MEAN ANAGRAM PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCTION OF 
SUCCESS-FAILURE AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION 
OUTCOME INTERNAL EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION ATTRIBUTION 
NO. OF FAILURES TO SOLVE 
SUCCESS 2.67 3.90 
FAILURE 5.30 4.20 
MEAN RESPONSE LATENCY (in sec) 
SUCCESS 24.50 38.46 
FAILURE 42.79 31 .49 
NOTE: This table shows the raw data; maximum response 
latency is 100 sec. 
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Psychomotor Speed. The latency data shown in Table 2.3 was 
subjected to logarithmic transformation before statistical 
analysis. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of transformed data 
showed that neither of the main effects were significant. 
However, the interaction was very significant, F(l,31) = 7.93, 
p<.OOl. Table 2.4 presents the results of a 2 x 2 analysis 
of variance. As anticipated, subjects receiving IAF treatment 
were slower in the subsequent test task than those given EAF 
treatment, t(l7) = 1.75, p<.05. Further comparison showed 
that IAS group were faster than EAS group, t(l7) = 2.20, p<.025. 
TABLE 2.4 - RESULTS OF THE 2 x 2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
SOURCE OF VARIANCE 
OUTCOME (0) 
ATTRIBUTION (A) 
0 x A 
ERROR 
5.3.3 DISCUSSION 
ss 
0.02 
0.02 
0.46 
1.8 
OF 
31 
MS F F 
0.02 1 ns. 
0.02 ns. 
0.46 7.93 <.001 
0.06 
This second experiment was an attempt to evaluate further the 
effects of manipulating attributions on depressed subjects' 
mood and performance. The results obtained offered mixed 
support for the hypotheses previously advanced. Consistent 
with the findings in Experiment 1, the mood results indicated, 
although not strongly, that subjects induced to ascribe 
causality to themselves for failure experience felt dysphoric 
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but not anxious or hostile. In contrast, those induced to 
attribute previous failure to external causes rated themselves 
as feeling only slightly depressed. 
Based on these results, it does seem that the cognitive device 
(attribution) that subjects presumably employed to explain or 
interpret their unsuccessful attempts to establish control over 
the outcome of the initial task, had a substantial impact on 
their subsequent mood or reaction. As in Experiment 1, increased 
depression was more associated with instructions advocating 
incompetence or inability as an ultimate cause of failure than 
with instructions suggesting the 'harshness' of the environment 
as a causal determinant of failure. These results are generally 
consistent with the abundant literature that emphasises the role 
of negative self-inferences and other negative cognitions in 
the depressive process. 
As observed in the initial experiment, depression tended to 
increase following internal attributions for failure than 
after external attributions of similar outcome. Apparently, 
this change in the depressive effect is directly related to the 
tendency of depressives to associate their ineffective actions 
with personal defects. To the extent that this interpretation 
is correct, it is in disagreement with Seligman's proposition 
(1975) that depression is the end product of an associative 
deficit. In other words, the failure to perceive the relation-
ships between responses and outcomes is supposed to be the 
sine qua non of depression. 
Although the present experiment was not specifically designed 
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to test Seligman's proposition, it nevertheless provides data 
which suggest that it is the 'associative' belief rather than 
the lack of it which seems to be closely linked to the depressive 
condition. Recent research on judgement of objective contingency 
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979) in depressed and non-depressed 
college students has also refuted the associative deficit 
hypothesis. In a series of experiments, Alloy and Abramson 
demonstrated that given a degree of objective contingency 
between subjects' responses and outcomes, depressed subjects 
were surprisingly 'realistic' and accurate in their judgements. 
Non-depressed subjects, in contrast, showed an 'illusion' of 
control over desired outcomes, even in the absence of any 
objective contingency between their responses and outcomes. 
However, when outcomes (contingent) are undesired, non-depressed 
subjects unlike depressed ones, tended to underestimate the 
degree of contingency or relationship between their actions 
and outcomes. 
As anticipated, the behavioural data indicated that subjects' 
subsequent performance at the test task was influenced by 
the type of attributions they displayed to account for their 
initial success or failure on the pre-treatment task. Here 
again, failure experience and self-attributions seemed to have 
combined to undermine performance on the anagram task, or at 
least one aspect of the performance. Inspection of the 
relevant data revealed that EAF group reported lower latency 
scores than IAF group. Although faster at solving anagrams, 
the former group (EAF) solved relatively no more than their 
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counterparts in IAF condition. This result ts not quite 
consistent with the Klein et al's finding (1976), that external 
attribution instructions improved depressed subjects' per-
formance. If anything, the present data suggest that the 
external attribution manipulation prevented subjects' 
performance from deteriorating. A possible explanation for 
this apparent discrepancy is that the designs of the two 
experiments differed. Unlike the Klein et al.'s study, the 
present one failed to control for the effect of attribution or 
instructions. Failure to include a control group (Failure 
Only group) in the present experiment made it difficult to 
tell whether subjects' performance did in fact improve following 
the external attribution instructions. 
Another explanation is that Klein and his colleagues did in 
fact observe, like here, a prophylactic effect of external 
attribution instructions, but interpreted it differently. 
This is quite possible inasmuch as their work is based on the 
'erroneous' assumption that depression reflects·a deficit in 
performance; and according to their rationale any manipulation 
aimed at correcting the helplessness symptom would automatically 
improve depressed subjects' performance. While laboratory 
produced helplessness may reflect a deficit in performance, 
there is little evidence suggesting that such deficit is 
characteristic of clinical depression. Studies that so far 
dealt with this issue (Lobitz and Deepost, 1979; Loeb et al. 
1971; Rozensky et al. 1977), failed to obtain any significant 
performance differences between clinically depressed and non-
depressed patients. 
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Although some of the mood results did not quite achieve the 
conventional statistical significance, there was nevertheless 
a trend for the data to suggest that subjects experienced more 
depression following internal attributions for failure than 
following external attributions for a similar outcome. 
Further, the results indicated as in Experiment 1, that 
attribution instructions affected depression but not hostility 
or anxiety. 
One question should be raised at this point. Why were the 
present mood results less significant than those obtained in 
the previous experiment? A possible explanation for this 
lack of congruency could be deduced from the results of an 
experiment carried out by Golin and his colleagues (1980). 
In their study, they instructed a group of depressed students 
that they would win a prize if they were successful at 
solving some anagrams. Another group was informed that they 
would be given a 'second chance' if they failed the anagram 
t~sk. The data obtained clearly showed that the 'second 
chance' group reported less depression, anxiety and hostility 
than the former group ('one chance' group). 
It is possible that the test task (anagram task) in the present 
experiment was perceived by subjects as a 'second chance' or as 
an opportunity for them to regain control; it follows that 
subjects' perception of the second experiment (test task) 
may have interfered with attribution instructions, thereby 
attenuating their effects on mood. 
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In summary, the present study showed that inducin·g depressed 
students to adopt one attributional strategy rather than 
another affected, although not strongly, both their subsequent 
mood and performance. 
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The major purpose of the two investigations was to examine 
and evaluate the effects of manipulating depressed students' 
attributions for success and failure on their subsequent mood 
and performance. Based on the previous research reviewed 
here (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; Seligman et al. 1979), 
it was predicted that subjects' depressed mood will be in-
fluenced not only by their initial success or failure but 
also by the kind of attributions they display to account 
for their performance. The results obtained clearly 
supported this attributional account of the depressive 
reaction. It was found that subjects' subsequent mood was 
a function of both outcome (success-failure) and attributions 
made about the outcome. Overall, the results were congruent 
with Weiner et al (1971) proposition that the consequences 
of a performance are mediated by attributions that subjects 
make about the causes of their performance. 
The finding in the present studies that increased depression 
was more associated with internal than external attributions 
for failure, provides further confirmation that negative 
self-attributions play an important role {n the development 
of depressive episodes. Such finding also suggests that the 
intensity of depressive feelings may be related to these 
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depressogenic or maladaptive attributions. 
The prediction that the 'damaging' effects of failure experience 
could be attenuated or even prevented by directing subjects' 
attributions towards external causes was supported. As argued 
earlier, this result may be relevant to therapy of depressed 
patients. Considering the fact that depressed persons are 
characterized by a tendency to engage in depressogenic attribu-
tions or in Beck's terms: 
"to blame themselves for everything that goes wrong 
around them" (p. 115, 1974), 
a procedure that corrects their depressogenic tendency to explain 
and interpret things that happen to them may have beneficial 
effects. Attempts at loosening the grip of such depressogenic 
attributions and beliefs may also, as demonstrated in Experiment 
1, prevent further dysphoria and provide means for engaging in 
antidepressive or protective attributions. 
The fact that subjects' subsequent reaction was influenced by 
attributions they displayed regarding the causes of their 
success or failure, demonstrates the importance of causal 
beliefs (attributions) in shaping affective or emotional responses. 
A question that should be asked at this point, is whether such 
attributions equally influence behaviour? The second experi-
ment was partially designed to answer this question. The 
behavioural data offered mixed support for the hypothesized 
relationship between attribution and behaviour. Additional 
research using less sophisticated behavioural measures is 
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required to clarify and elaborate on this issue. 
The mood results from both experiments indicated quite clearly 
that depression as reflected in both the BDI and MAACL was 
more affected by attribution instructions than either hostility 
or anxiety. Although this result may seem to suggest the 
specificity of certain types of attributions to depression, 
replication of such finding with clinical populations is needed 
before its relevance to theory can be seriously considered. 
A need also exists for further research to investigate whether, 
as the mood data of the present investigation tend to suggest, 
negative self-attributions (internal attributions for negative 
outcomes) induce dysphoria and other symptoms of depression. 
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FOOTNOTES 
l. Because of its nature, this experiment required a 
relatively shorter and easier scale to administer 
than the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The 
Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (SOS) appeared 
to fulfil these requirements. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two studies to be reported in the present chapter have been 
carried out in an attempt to examine further the relationship 
between causal attribution and depression. Specifically, 
these studies were designed to examine the possibility, sugges-
ted by Experiments 1 and 2~ that certain attributions play a 
causal role in depression. Although, as found in Experiments 
1 and 2, mood changes occurred as a result of the induction of 
failure attributions, causality between internal attributions 
for failure (negative self-attributions) and depressive 
symptoms cannot be inferred without evidence showing that 
depression or its correlates can be induced or alleviated by 
manipulating attributions. In fact, the designs of previous 
experiments do not allow claims to be made about the aetiologi-
cal role of attributions in depression, since neither of them 
included non-depressives. 
That causal attributions are closely associated with depression 
has been suggested and documented by the data of several studies 
(e.g., Barthe and Hammen, 1981; Klein et al., 1976; Kuiper, 
1978; Rizley, 1978), but little has been done since to try 
to determine the nature of this link. Although, in their 
attributional formulation of learned helplessness and depression, 
Abramson and her colleagues (1978) have written extensively 
on this issue, little evidence has been forthcoming to sub-
stantiate their claim that helplessness and depression are 
caused by attributions. A recent study that has directly 
128. 
attempted to address the question of causality between attribu-
tions and depression is thatofSeligman and his eo-workers 
(1979). They reported data which showed positive correlations 
between internal, stable, and global attributions for negative 
outcomes and depression scores. They also found that subjects' 
level of depression as reflected on the BDI was negatively 
correlated with their tendency to make internal, and stable 
attributions for positive outcomes. In their discussion of 
the results, Seligman and his colleagues argued in accordance 
with Abramson et al.'s attributional formulation of depression 
( 18 78) , that: 
"the depressive attributional style .•. followed by 
negative 1 ife events, actually causes depression" 
( p. 24 7). 
But they also conceded that their correlational data: 
''do not rule out the alternative hypothesis that 
depression causes people to attribute bad outcomes 
to internal, stable, and global causes" (p.247). 
Another, but more recent study that also examined the question 
of causality between attributions and depression is that of 
Golin et al. (1981). In their study, they assessed subjects' 
attributions of positive and negative outcomes as well as 
their level of depression on two separate occasions. To 
overcome some of the problems known to be associated with 
conventional correlational analyses (e.g., the problem of 
direction of causality), Golin and his colleagues analysed 
their data with a sophisticated statistical technique known 
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as a cross-lagged panel correlational analysis. They found 
evidence which lends support to Abramson et al. (1978) claim 
that depression is caused by a combination of a depressive 
attributional style and failure experiences. 
cautioned that their results: 
But they too 
''should be viewed as an indicator of temooral precedence 
and not as a positive proof of causation'' (pp. 20-21). 
Although, as pointed out, there is a correlational evidence 
y..>(eV:s,~ 
that depression is closely associated with certai'n~att·ri·but-i·ons, 
there is no experimental evidence to show that these attribu-
tions actually induce depression or its correlates. The 
present investigation attempted to remedy to this situation 
by assessing the effects of reversing depressives and non-
depressives' attributional style for failure- that is, 
inducing depressives to adopt a non-depressive attributional 
style (external attributions for failure), and inducing non-
depressives to adopt a depressive attributional style (internal 
attributions for failure). Based on the attributional 
formulation of learned helplessness and depression (Abramson 
et al., 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979) and its elaboration 
by Seligman et al. (1979), it was predicted that these 
attributional changes will lead to corresponding changes in 
level of depression as reflected in mood, expectations, and 
psychomotor performance. 
Another way of evaluating the aetiological significance of 
(certain) attributions will be to determine the degree of 
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specificity, if any, in the relationship between these attri-
butions and depression. A clinical study was carried out 
to directly examine this specificity hypothesis. A specific 
relationship between attribution and depression was hypothesised. 
A demonstration of a specific relationship between these two 
variables is required before attribution can acquire an 
aetiological status in depression. 
To summarise, the present investigation of the relationship 
between attributions and depression assessed, in an experiment, 
the effects of reversing depressives and non-depressives' 
attributional style for failure; and tested in a second but 
related study, the specificity hypothesis - that is, the 
hypothesis that certain types of attributions are associated 
with depression but not with other known ~sychopathological 
disorders. 
6.2 EXPERIMENT 3 
In the present study, the effects of inducing failure attribu-
tions on depressed and non-depressed subjects' mood, expectations, 
and psychomotor performance were assessed. The results of 
Experiment 1, and to some extent those of Experiment 2, indi-
cated that changes in depression (increase or decrease in MAACL 
scores) were due to certain attributions. Specifically, it 
was found that changes in depression, as measured by the MAACL 
and some objective measures, occurred as a result of the 
experimental induction of failure attributions. This finding 
led to the speculation, already entertained by Abramson et al. 
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(1978) and Seligman et al. (1979), that some of these attributions 
are depressogenic- that is, they may play a substantial role 
in the aetiology or development of depressive symptoms. 
Experiment 3 was designed to address, although only partly, 
this complex but equally important question about the causal 
role of attributions in depression. If certain attributions 
are to be granted an aetiological status in depression, then 
their induction (i.e., if they are made) should result in 
deficits similar to those commonly associated with naturally 
occurring depression (e.g., low mood, reduced expectations of 
future success or pessimism, psychomotor deficit and so on). 
Conversely, if such attributions are to be allocated a causal 
role in depression, then their modification or correction 
should be reflected (positively) in subsequent mood, expectations, 
and performance. Experiment 3 was an attempt to test, although 
only partly, these possibilities. 
Although Experiments 1 and 2 involved attribution manipulations, 
their primary concern was to determine the extent of the 
relationship between attribution and depression. Experiment 
3, however, was more directed towards evaluating the possible 
aetiological or causal effects of some of the attributions that 
have been shown to be closely linked to depression. Accordingly, 
both depressed and non-depressed subjects were included in the 
design of this experiment. It was expected that the induction 
of internal attributions for failure (IAF) will have more 
impact (negative) on non-depressed subjects' mood, expectations, 
and psychomotor performance than on those of depressed. 
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Because unlike the former ones, the latter ones (depressed) 
display their usual attributions (negative self-attributions). 
The induction of external attributions of failure, in contrast, 
is predicted to have more effect (relatively positive) on 
depressed than on non-depressed subjects. This differential 
effect of external attribution for failure (EAF) could also 
be explained by the fact that non-depressives adopt their 
usual attributional style for failure, whereas depressives 
acquire a new but a non-depressive attributional style for 
failure. It was also predicted that depressed subjects will 
report less depression following external attributions for 
failure (EAF) than following internal attributions for failure 
(IAF) or failure only (FO) (control). For non-depressed 
subjects, it was predicted that they will feel more depressed 
following internal attributions for failure (IAF) than following 
external attributions for failure (EAF) or failure only (FO) 
(control). 
To summarise, the purpose of Experiment 3 was to assess the 
effects of failure attributions on mood, expectations, and 
psychomotor speed of depressed and non-depressed college 
students (high and low BDI's). 
6. 2.1 METHOD 
Subjects and Design. Forty-eight undergraduates, 37 females 
and 11 males, from Plymouth Polytechnic served as subjects 
in the present experiment. Subjects were selected and assigned 
to a depressed or non-depressed group on the basis of their 
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scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)1 scores (Beck 
et al., 1961). Subjects scoring 9 or more on the BDI were 
assigned to the depressed group, and those with BDI scores of 
8 or less were assigned to the non-depressed group. Subjects 
also completed the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List 
(MAACL) today form (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965) before and after 
the experimental manipulations. The MAACL is more sensitive 
than the BDI to changes in depressed mood. Table 3.1 presents 
the means and standard deviations of BDI and MAACL scores· 
for each of the following experimental conditions of the 
experiment: 
1. Depressed/internal attribution for failure (D/IAF). 
2. Depressed/external attribution for failure (D/EAF). 
3. Depressed/failure only (D/FO). 
4. Non-depressed/internal attribution for failure (ND/IAF). 
5. Non-depressed/external attribution for failure (ND/EAF). 
6. Non-depressed/failure only ND/FO). 
As indicated above, this experiment as a 2 (Mood-depressed/ 
non-depressed) x 3 (Internal attribution for failure, External 
attribution for failure, failure only) factorial design. 
The procedure used to manipulate subjects' attributions about 
their failure at the empathy task, was similar to that used 
in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Empathy task. The task was described as a test of 'social 
intelligence', and was similar to that used by Kuiper (1978). 
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TABLE 3.1 -MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF BDI AND MAACL 
BY MOOD AND ATTRIBUTION 
MOOD IAF EAF FO 
M so M so M 
DEPRESSED 
BDI 10.37 1.44 12.12 2.39 12.62 
MAACL 13.37 5.11 15.00 7.48 16.50 
NON-DEPRESSED 
BDI 3.50 1.65 4.87 1. 51 3.62 
MAACL 9.87 4.05 8.87 3.96 9.75 
NOTE: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Check List; 
IAF = Interna 1 Attribution for Failure; 
EAF = External Attribution for Failure; 
FO = Failure only. 
so 
3.1 0 
2.91 
2.18 
5.78 
The empathy task consisted of 50 words, extracted from a 'word 
association test' devised by Kent and Rosanoff (1970), each 
printed on a separate card and was briefly displayed on a 
tachistoscope. Subjects were given the following instructions 
(adapted from Kuiper, 1978): 
The task that you will be given provides an index of social 
intelligence. Specifically, it measures with certain accuracy 
people's ability to know what other people are thinking and 
feeling. Briefly, the task consists of 50 words, each printed 
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on a separate card. You will be presented with one word at 
a time, your task will be to say aloud the word which most 
people would associate with the word shown to you. It is 
important to remember that the correct association (answer) 
is not necessarily the one which you would make, but the one 
most people tend to make. If your answer is correct you 
wilT hear 'correct', if your answer is not correct we will 
go on to the next word. Are there any questions before we 
begin? 
Dependent measures. Three dependent measures, 2 subjective 
and 1 objective were obtained, as a measure of level of 
depression, following the experimental induction of failure 
and attributions. Subjects first completed the MAACL depression 
scale, and then they were asked to rate on a 9-point scale 
how well they think they would perform if given another problem 
solving task. This scale served as a measure of subjects' 
expectations of future success. Following the completion of 
both the inventory and the expectancy scale, subjects were 
asked to write numbers backwards from lOO on a blank sheet 
and were timed for 60 secs. This number-writing speed test 
has been shown to be a good and reliable measure of psychomotor 
speed (e.g., Coleman, 1975; Velten, 1967). 
It was hoped that the combined use of both subjective and 
objective measures would enable a more reliable and relatively 
more objective assessment of the dependent variable (depression). 
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Procedure. Table 3.2 presents a flow chart of the experimental 
procedure. When the subject entered the room, he or she was 
seated at a table and then given the BDI and MAACL. Upon 
completion of the depression inventories, the subject was 
given information about the purpose of the empathy task, and 
about how a sample of Polytechnic students performed on this 
task (attribution manipulations). After receiving the instruc-
tions (see empathy task), the subject was led to another table 
on which the tachistoscope was placed. Before commencing 
the task, the subject was given an example, the aim being the 
explanation of the procedure to follow when performing on the 
empathy task (word association task). Following the demonstra-
tion, the subject was presented with the first word from the 
empathy task. Each word was typed on a separate card and 
displayed one at a time on the tachistoscope. 
Following performance at the empathy task, the subject was 
asked to estimate as accurately as he/she could the number 
of correct answers he/she gave during performance at the 
empathy task. The subject was then told that he/she performed 
badly (failure), and was then asked to write down the major 
cause of his/her failure and to indicate, on a 9-point scale, 
whether his/her outcome was due to personal causes or external 
causes. The stability and globaltty dimension were also 
assessed). Immediately after assessing the subject's attribu-
tions about his/her failure on the empathy task, the subject 
was asked to complete the MAACL. Following completion of 
the MAACL, the subject was asked to indicate, on a 9-point 
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TABLE 3.2 - A FLOW CHART OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
SELECTION PHASE 
Ss with BDI scores 
of 9 or greater 
were assigned to 
a depressed group, 
and those with 
BDI scores of 8 
or lower were 
assigned to·a 
non-depressed 
group. 
EXPERIMENTAL PHASE 
Ss were randomly 
assigned to one of the 
six experimental 
conditions of the 
experiment. Four 
groups 2(depressed and 
2 non-depressed) were 
induced either to make 
internal (IAF) or 
external attributions 
ASSESSMENT PHASE 
Ss' attributions 
about their 
failure on the 
empathy task, 
their mood, 
their expecta-
tions of future 
success, and 
their psycho-
motor perfor-
(EAF) for their mance were 
failure on the assessed. 
empathy task. The 
two remaining groups 
(1 depressed and 1 
non-depressed) re-
ceived no attribution 
instructions, they 
were given failure 
on 1 y ( FO). 
NOTE: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
IAF = Interna 1 attribution for failure; 
EAF = External attribution for failure; 
FO = Fa i 1 ure only. 
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scale, how wen he/she thinks he/she would perform if given 
another problem solving task (expectancy measure). As a 
measure of his/her psychomotor speed, the subject was given 
the number-writing speed test. Following the psychomotor 
performance, the subject was debriefed, paid, and thanked. 
6.2.2 RESULTS 
Manipulation checks. Preliminary analyses of the data from 
the question that asked subjects to estimate the number of 
correct answers they had given during performance on the empathy 
task showed, as expected, that all subjects experienced failure, 
overall M= 10.52 (21.04% correct). 
Similar analyses showed that the attribution manipulation was 
also successful. Subjects assigned to internal attribution 
of failure (IAF) condition explained their failure in terms of 
internal causes (e.g., my nature; inability to understand 
others), overall M= 6.12, and those assigned to external 
attribution of failure (EAF) condition made external attribu-
tions for their failure on the empathy task (e.g., not enough 
time, the situation), overall M= 4.56. Table 3.3 displays 
the means and standard deviations of attribution scores and 
number of correct answers. 
As can be seen in Table 3.3, in failure only (FO) condition 
(control) depressed subjects made internal attributions M= 
7.24, whereas non-depressed ones made external attributions 
M = 4.37. This result is in line with the learned helpless-
ness thinking that depressives and non-depressives display 
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TABLE 3.3 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ATTRIBUTION 
SCORES BY MOOD AND ATTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS 
MOOD INTERNAL ITV STABILITY GLOBAL! TV 
M so M so M so 
DEPRESSED 
IAF 6.25 1.64 6.25 1.39 4.62 1.94 
EAF 4.62 1.59 6.00 1.80 6.12 1.85 
F:O - 7.25 0.96 6.87 1.29 6.25 1. 71 
NON-DEPRESSED 
IAF 6.00 1.87 6.62 1.59 4.87 2.32 
EAF 4. 50 2.17 6.12 1.38 6.00 1.80 
FO 4.37 1.97 5.50 2.69 4.37 2.24 
NOTE: IAF = Internal Attribution for Failure; 
EAF = External Attribution for Failure; 
FO = Failure only. 
Ratings are on 9-point scale; higher scores 
indicate that attributions are more internal; 
lower scores indicate that attributions are 
more external. 
divergent attributions for negative outcomes (Abramson et al., 
1978; Miller and Norman, 1979; Seligman et al., 1979). 
The finding is also consistent with the results report~d by 
both Kuiper (1978) and Rizley (1978) that depressed students 
explained their failure in terms of personal or internal 
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causes (e.g., inability, incompetence), whereas non-depressed 
students explained the same outcome in terms of external or 
situational causes (e.g., task difficulty, bad luck). 
TABLE 3.4 - RESULTS OF THE 2 x 3 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MAACL 
SCORES 
SOURCE OF VARIATION 
MOOD (A) 
ATTRIBUTION (B) 
A x B 
ERROR 
ss 
102.08 
137.37 
50.55 
749 
OF 
1 
2 
2 
42 
MS 
102.08 
68.68 
25.27 
17.83 
F 
5.72 
3.85 
1.42 
p 
<0.05 
<0.05 
ns. 
MAACL Depression Scale. The data from the MAACL depression 
scale were subjected toananalysis of variance (see Table 
3.4). A depression change score was obtained for all subjects 
(by comparing the pre and post scores on the MAACL), before 
performing the ANOVA. A 2 (mood-depressed/non-depressed) x 
3 (IAF, EAF, FO) analysis of variance of depression change 
scores revealed that the effect for mood (depressed/non-
depressed) was, as expected, significant, F(l ,42) = 5.72, 
p<0.05. A test on the simple effects of mood (Winer, 1962), 
showed, as predicted, that non-depressed subjects reported 
more change in depression in the dysphoric direction than 
depressed ones following internal attribution for failure 
(IAF) treatment, F(l ,42) = 5.60, p<0.05. Further, the 
prediction that depressed subjects will respond more posi-
tively to the external attribution for failure (EAF) treatment 
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was also supported by the data from the MAACL depression scale. 
It was found that depressed subjects reported less change in 
depression (in fact, they reported no change at all) in the 
dysphoric direction than non-depressed subjects after EAF 
induction, F(l ,42) = 2.95, p<O.l0>0.05. 
The ANOVA of depression change scores also showed that the 
effect for attribution was significant, F(2,42) = 3.85, p<0.05. 
A test on the simple effects of attribution revealed that non-
depressed subjects felt more dysphoric following IAF than 
following EAF or FO treatement (p<0.05). Depressed subjects, 
however, reported no more depression following IAF treatment 
than following other treatments (F<l.O). Because, as argued 
earlier, non-depressed subjects were adopting the depressive 
attributional style, whereas the depressed ones were adopting 
their usual attributional style for failure. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, the effects of reversing non-depressives and 
depressives' attributional style for failure were in the 
predicted direction. Non-depressed subjects felt more 
dysphoric pre M= 9.87 and post= 17.50, depressed subjects, 
however, reported no more depression pre M = 15.00 and post 
M= 15.00. Table 3.4 displays all other means of MAACL 
change scores. 
Expectancy scale. An analysis of variance of the data from 
the question that asked subjects to indicate how well they 
expect to perform if given another problem solving task showed 
that only the effect for attribution was significant, F(2,42) = 
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Fig. 3.1. Depression change.score for depressed(D) and non-
depressed(ND) subjects as a function of type of attribution. 
7.45, p<0.005. A test on the simple effects of attribution 
revealed that non-depressed subjects reported less expectations 
of success following IAF than following EAF or FO treatment, 
F(2,42) = 5.74, p<O.Ol. Figure 2 displays this effect. 
Neither the other main effect nor the interaction were 
significant. 
PSYCHOMOTOR SPEED DATA 
A 2 x 3 analysis of variance of psychomotor speed data (number-
writing speed test) showed that neither the effect for mood nor 
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Fig. 3.2. Expectations of success for depressed(O) and non-
depressed(ND) subjects as a function of type of attribution. 
the interaction were significant, (F<l.O and F = 2.30 respectively). 
However, the effect for attribution was significant, F(2,42) = 
3.27, p<O.OS. As predicted, non-depressed subjects induced 
to adopt the depressive attributional style for failure (IAF) 
wrote fewer numbers (were slower) than those in EAF or FO con-
dition (p<O.Ol). Table 3.5 shows all the means and standard 
deviations of psychomotor speed scores for all conditions. 
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TABLE 3.5 - MEANS OF MAACL DEPRESSION CHANGE SCORES, PSYCHOMOTOR 
SPEED SCORES, AND SELF-EXPECTANCY SCORES BY MOOD 
AND ATIRIBUTION 
MOOD IAF EAF FO 
DEPRESSED 
MAACL DEPRESSION 2,63 0 1.25 
SELF-EXPECTANCY 3.12 4.50 4.25 
PSYCHOMOTOR SPEED 50.75 50.62 48.62 
NON-DEPRESSED 
MAACL DEPRESSION 7.63 3.63 1.37 
SELF-EXPECTANCY 3.00 5.12 5.00 
PSYCHOMOTOR SPEED 48.12 59.87 46.75 
NOTE: IAF = Internal Attribution for failure; 
EAF = External Attribution for failure; 
FO = Failure only; 
MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Check List. 
6.2.3 DISCUSSION 
The present experiment was designed to exanine further the 
relationship between attributions and depression. Specifi-
cally, it was an attempt to investigate whether depression 
(as measured by the BDI and MAACL) was causally related to 
certain types of attributions. Based on the results of 
previous experiments and on the Abramson et al.'s attribu-
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tional account of learned helplessness and depression (1978) 
and its extention by Seligman et al. (1979), it was predicted 
that depression or its correlates will be manifested following 
internal attributions for f~ilure (IAF), but not following 
external attributions for the same outcome (EAF). The data 
of the present experiment tend to support this hypothesis. 
The results of the present experiment revealed, as predicted, 
that inducing non-depressed subjects to make internal 2 
attributions for failure on a problem solving task made them 
dysphoric. This finding that the occurence of depression 
(as reflected on the MAACL) is causally related to the 
depressive attributional style (IAF) is consistent with the 
learned helplessness viewpoint that personal helplessness 
and depression are precipitated by a combination of stressful 
life events or failure and internal attributions. This 
finding is also consistent with the results reported by several 
recent studies that depression is closely associated with 
internal attributions of failure but not with external 
attributions of failure (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; 
Seligman et al., 1979). 
Although the results of the present study do not allow any 
speculation as to why internal attributions for bad outcomes 
have depressogenic effects, there is a possibility, nonetheless, 
that these kinds of attributinns (negative self-attributions) 
induce the very negative or depressing cognitions i.e., self-
blame, self-criticism, pessimism (Beck, 1976) which facilitate 
the manifestation of the depressive syndrome. Beck appears to 
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have reached the same conclusion when he stated that the 
depressed person: 
''regards himself as deficient, inadequate, unworthy, 
and is prone to attribute unpleasant occurrences to 
a def1c1ency 1n h1mself. Since he attr1butes h1s 
d1ff1cult1es to h1s own defects, he blames himself 
and becomes increasingly self-critical'' (p. 129, 1976 -
emphasis added). 
The finding, in this study, that the tendency to attribute 
failure to external causes (EAF) is inconsistent with depres-
sion, is in line with the prediction that the adoption of the 
non-depressive attributional style for failure will prevent 
the dysphoric reactions that depressives usually exhibit 
following failure experiences. This finding is also consistent 
with numerous studies (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; 
Seligman et al., 1979) suggesting that the tendency to externa-
lize failure is not depressing in its effects. Further, 
this second finding lends some support to Abramson et al.'s 
view (1978) that the ascription of bad outcomes to external 
difficulties or causes is incongruent with depressive affect 
and personal helplessness. 
In sum, the results of the present experiment show that depression 
or at least depressive affect tend to be exhibited following 
the adoption of the depressive attributional style but not 
following the adoption of the attributional style typical of 
non-depressives. So the present results suggest, in line 
with the studies cited above, that depressive affect is 
causally related to internal attri.butions for failure but not 
to external attributions for failure. 
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Although there is ample evidence, in this study, that depression 
in college populations is causally related to certain attri-
butions, there is no evidence that such attributions are also 
involved in the aetiology of clinical depression. In fact, 
the extent to which clinical depression is related to these 
attributions can only be determined by further research 
involving clinical populations. Additional research, 
involving both clinically depressed and non-depressed patients, 
is necessary to determine whether these attributions are 
specific to depression or whether they are a common feature 
of all psychopathologies. It is this issue that the next 
study has attempted to resolve. 
6.3 EXPERIMENT 4 
The present study of the relationship between causal attribution_ 
and depression was designed to dete~ine further whether the 
kind of attributions, thought to be depressogenic (e.g., 
Barth~ and Hammen, 1981; Gong-Guy and Hammen, 1980; Riz1ey, 
1978; Seligman et al., 1979), are involved in the aetiology 
of the depressive syndrome. One way of assessing the aetio-
logical significance of these attributions is to determine 
whether they are specific to clinical depression or whether 
they are a common feature of general psychopathology. It 
should be pointed out that the demonstration of a specific 
relationship between these two variables is of great importance, 
since it will provide additional but stronger evidence that 
attributions and depression are causally associated. While 
the presence of a specificity in their relationship may add 
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support to the hypothesised causal connection, the absence of 
a specificity in this relationship, however, wtll cast sertous 
doubt on the aetiological status of attributions in depression. 
Although there is evidence to suggest that certain attributions 
are closely associated with depression, such evidence should 
not be viewed as a sufficient proof of their aetiological 
relevance. Because, as already pointed out, a specific 
relationship between attributions and clinical depression had 
not been established. Studies that linked attributions and 
non-clinical depression (as measured by different depression 
inventories) (e.g., Barth~ and Hammen, 1981; Kuiper, 1978; 
Rizley, 1978; Seligman et al. 1979) failed to consider the 
alternative hypothesis that these attributions may also be 
associated with other psychopathologies. The present study 
was an attempt to bridge this gap. Particularly, this study 
addressed the question of specificity by assessing clinically 
depressed and non-depressed patients' attributions of negative 
as well as positive outcomes. It was hypothesised that 
depressed and non-depressed patients' attributions for negative 
and positive outcomes would be divergent; on the basis of the 
findings reported earlier and in accordance with the Abramson 
et al.'s attributional account of helplessness and depression 
(1978), that depressed compared to non-depressed patients 
should display internal attributions for negative outcomes and 
external attributions for positive outcomes. 
To summarize, this study examined the question of specificity, 
in the relationship between attributions and depression, by 
comparing clinically depressed and non-depressed patients' 
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attributions of positive and negative outcomes. An interaction 
between depression (depressed/non-depressed) and outcome 
(positive/negative) was predicted. 
6.3.1 METHOD 
Description of the sample. The sample consisted of 19 patients, 
11 depressed and 8 non-depressed, hospitalized either because 
o~ a major depressive disorder or because of an important 
' 
personality disorder. The patients included in this study 
had all been given a diagnosis. Those assigned to the 
depressed group fulfilled the research diagnostic criteria for 
a major depressive disorder (Feighner et al., 1972). Other 
criteria for inclusion in the depressed group included (a) score 
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BD!) (Beck et al., 1961) 
greater than 15; (b) no signs of organic brain damage; (c) 
no evidence for a history of mania. The patients assigned 
to the non~depressed group were selected according to the 
following criteria: (a) no signs of organic brain damage; 
(b) score on the BD! lower than 10; (c) diagnosis other than 
depression. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the final sample 
consisted of 11 depressed patients, who met the research 
diagnostic criteria for a primary depression, and 8 non-depressed3 
patients, who fulfilled the criteria for inclusion in the non-
depressed group. 
Assessment measures. After the initial interview, all patients 
included in this study completed the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BD!) and a short attribution questionnaire adapted from Seligman 
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TABLE 4.1 -CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTIC DEPRESSED NON-DEPRESSED 
MALE 2 6 
FEMALE 9 2 
AGE (years) 
M 40.63 26.25 
SD 13.30 8.12 
SDI 
M 24.00 7.75 
SD 7.56 3.63 
NOTE: SDI = Beck Depression Inventory. 
et al. (1979). The attribution questionnaire consisted of 
4 hypothetical events (2 positive and 2 negative) and questions 
enquiring about the occurrence and the perceived causes of 
these events. The two positive events involved a professional 
achievement event: 'Imagine that you have just-been promoted 
in your job', and a positive interpersonal sequence. The 
two negative events involved: 'a failure to obtain a steady 
employment', and a serious interpersonal difficulty. Following 
a detailed description of each event, subjects were asked to 
write, on the space provided, the major cause of the event, 
and then they were asked to indicate, on a 9-point scale, the 
extent to which the event is due to their personal qualities 
(internality dimension of attribution), the extent to which 
the event is due to other people or circumstances (the externality 
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dimension of attribution). Because of the difficulties, 
evidenced by many patients, in understanding both the 
stability and globality dimensions of attribution, it was 
decided to drop the questions related to these two attributional 
dimensions. 
Procedure. The study took place in the psychology department 
at St. Lawrence's Hospital. All patients were seen individually. 
A semi-structured interview, that lasted approximately 25 
minutes, was administered to obtain anamnestic relevant 
information. In addition to supplying the clinical data, 
the interview served as a basis for deciding on the patient's 
suitability to take part in the study. Following this initial 
interview, the patient was asked to complete the BDI. 
Following the administration of the BDI, the patient, if 
selected, was given the attribution questionnaire. All 
patients received the following instructions before the 
administration of the attribution questionnaire: 
The present study is concerned with the way people explain or 
interpret things that happen to them in every day life. The 
questionnaire that you will be given was designed to examine, 
although only partly, this issue. The questionnaire itself 
consists of 4 hypothetical situations, followed by some ques-
tions about the perceived cause of each situation. Your task 
will be first to try to imagine yourself, as vividly as you 
can, in each situation, and then try to answer some questions 
about the cause of the situation. Please remember that we 
want to know your own belief about the occurrence of each event. 
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Following the administration of both the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) .and the attribution questi'onnaire, all 
patients were debriefed and thanked for their co-operation. 
TABLE 4.2 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ATTRIBUTION 
SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD AND NATURE OF 
EVENT 
MOOD POSITIVE EVENTS NEGATIVE EVENTS 
M so M so 
DEPRESSED 
INTERNAL! TV 4.95 2.33 6.13 3.36 
EXTERNALITY 4.59 0.85 3.31 1.99 
NON-DEPRESSED 
INTERNAL! TV 6.25 1.39 4.00 0.93 
EXTERNAL ITV 4. 06 1.34 5.50 1.50 
NOTE: Ratings are on 9-point scale; higher scores on the 
internality scale indicate that the attribution is 
more internal; higher scores on the externality scale 
indicate that the attribution is more external. 
6.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether, as suggested 
by several investigations (e.g. Barth~ and Hammen, 1981; Kuiper, 
1978; Rizley, 1978; Seligman et al., 1979), certain types 
of attributions are specific to depression. It was argued 
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that one way of testing this specificity hypothesis will be 
to establish whether, as predicted by Abramson et al.'s 
attributional formulation of learned helplessness and depres-
sion (1978), clinically depressed and non-depressed patients 
differ systematically in their attributions about the causes 
of negative as well as positive events. The results of this 
study are, as can be seen in Table 4.2, in line with the main 
prediction. 
TABLE 4. 3 - RESULTS OF 2 x 2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 
INTERNALITY SCORES 
SOURCE OF VARIATION ss DF MS F p 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
MOOD (A) 1.58 1 . 58 <1. 0 
SUB. WITHIN GROUPS 95.71 17 5-.63 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
EVENT (B) 2.70 2.70 1.17 
A X B 19.90 19.90 8.65 <0.01 
B X SUB. WITHIN 39.07 17 2.30 GROUPS 
The internality scores were first averaged over the two negative 
and two positive events, and then were subjected to an analysis 
of variance (see Table 4.3) with depressed/non-depressed as 
the between subjects factor and negative/positive event as a 
repeated measure. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of internality 
scores revealed, as expected, that the interaction between level 
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of depression and the nature of event (negative/positive) was 
significant, F(l ,17) = 8.65, P.<O.Ol. Figure 4.1 displays this 
interaction. Tests on the simple main effects were conducted 
to interpret this interaction. A test on the simple main 
effect of level of depression (depressed/non-depressed) within 
the negative events showed, ·as predicted, that depressed 
patients made more internal attributions for negative events 
than non-depressed patients, F(l,l7) = 19.45, P<O.OOl. This 
finding that clinically depressed patients have an exaggerated 
tendency to display negative self-attributions is consistent 
not only with the attributional account of depression (Abramson 
et al., 1978; Seligman et al., 1979), but also with Beck's 
observation that these depressogenic attributions dominate 
the clinical picture of depression: 
"The depressed patients, in common with other people, 
attempts to determine the cause of his problems -
In his notion of causality, the depressed patient is 
prone to regard himself as the cause of his · 
difficulties - He may carry this notion of self 
causality to absurd extremes. When it is pointed out 
that self-blame is maladaptive, he then blames himself 
for blaming himself" (pp. 292-293, 1976). · 
This finding regarding the relatively high degree of specificity 
·in the relationship between negative self-attributions and 
depression was further corroborated by the clinical material 
collected both before and after the administration of the 
questionnaires. The use of the retrospective anamnesis 
method during the clinical interview offered a possibility to 
examine patients' attributions as they naturally occurred. 
Specifically, a retrospective elicitation of (patients') 
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. personal negative events provided an opportunity-to examine 
the kind of attributions they make to account for their 
unpleasant experiences. As expected, most depressed patients 
were inclined to relate personal negative events to perceived 
personal defects. A typical depressogenic attribution, 
entertained by a depressed patient, was readily made by a fema1e 
patient whose son had apparently been convicted for a minor 
offence. The patient showed an exaggerated sense of respon-
sibility for the incident. A similar depressogenic account 
was provided by a patient whose wife was suffering from a 
chronic medical condition. Another patient, whose boyfriend 
had discontinued their relationship, concluded that she was 
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to blame for her personal disappointment: 'I am not a nice 
person to live with •.. '. Clearly, depressed patients' 
accounts of their misfortunes appeared to be different both in 
content and in form from those of non-depressed patients. 
Taken together, the data from the questionnaire and the clinical 
observations confirm that negative self-attributions are, 
as hypothesised by Abramson et al. (1978), specific to the 
state of depression. 
The second prediction that a high degree of specificity exists 
in the relationship between external attributions for positive 
events and depression, was not strongly supported by the data 
from the attribution questionnaire. The predicted interaction 
between the level of depression (depressed/non-depressed) and 
the nature of event (positive/negative) achieved only the 
conventional statistical significance, F(l ,17) = 6.47, p<O.OS. 
A test on the simple main effects of level of depression within 
positive events showed that depressed patients displayed more 
external attributions for positive events than non-depressed 
patients, F(l ,17) = 7.10, p<O.OS. Contrary to the prediction, 
this result indicates that there is only a limited specificity 
in the relationship between external attributions for positive 
outcome and depression. 
This finding that external attributions for good outcomes and 
depression may have a limited degree of specificity in their 
relationship was confirmed by the observations made during the 
clinical interviews. Specifically, it was found that only 
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severely depressed patients (a score of 35 or more on the BD!) 
showed a tendency to account for positive personal events in 
terms of external causes. For instance, a severely depressed 
young woman who had apparently been promoted just before her 
hospitalization accounted for the event (promotion) more in 
terms of external circumstances: 'I was promoted ... because 
there was a vacancy in the office'. An interesting possibility 
is that external attributions for positive outcomes may be 
more symptomatic of depression (i.e., a consequence of being 
depressed) than a part of its aetiology (i.e., an antecedent 
of depression). 
To summarise, the present study tested the specificity hypothesis -
that is, the possibility that certain attributions are specific 
to depression- by comparing clinically depressed and non-
depressed patients' attributions for both negative and positive 
events. The results obtained provided only a partial support 
for this hypothesis. Specifically, the data from the interna-
lity question revealed, as proposed by Abramson et al. (1978) 
and Seligman et al. (1979), that there may be a high degree of 
specificity in the relationship between negative self-attributions 
and the state of depression. The data from the externality 
question, however, indicated that there is only a limited 
degree of specificity in the relationship between external 
attributions for positive outcomes and depression. 
Although, as suggested by the data of the present study, 
negative self-attributions and to some extent external attribu-
158. 
tions of good outcomes, are specific to depressio~. a conclusion 
with regard to their aetiological significance cannot easily be 
drawn without further work. Causal attribution is only one 
among other factors that are believed to play a role in the 
aetiology of depression (cf. Akiskal & McKinney, 1975). 
6.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The two studies just reviewed were concerned with the issue of 
whether attributions play an aetiological role in depression. 
Experiment 3 was partially designed to clarify this issue. 
It was reasoned, on the basis of both the results of Experiments 
1 and 2 and the attributional formulation of learned helplessness 
and depression (Abramson et al., 1978)~ that one way of determin-
ing whether attributions play a causal role in depression would 
be to reverse non-depressives and depressives' attributional 
style for failure (cf. Seligman et al., 1979) and assess the 
effects on mood, psychomotor speed, and expectations. The 
results obtained revealed, as expected, that inducing non-
depressives to adopt a depressive attributional style for 
failure (i.e., internal attributions for failure) resulted 
in depressed mood, and to some extent in reduced expectations 
of success, and low psychomotor performance. In contrast, 
the adoption by depressives of a non-depressive attributional 
style for failure (i.e., external attributions for failure) 
resulted in no such effects. These results were interpreted 
as consistent with Abramson et al. (1978) and Seligman et al. 
(1979) contention that internal attributions for negative 
outcomes have an aetiological status in depression. 
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While there is ample evidence, from both the present work and 
that of Golin et al. (1981), that depression in its mild form 
(non-clinical) is causally related to negative self-attributions 
(i.e., the tendency to make internal attributions for negative 
outcomes), it is not clear whether such attributions are also 
important in the aetiology of clinical depression. It was 
argued that one way of assessing their aetiological importance 
or relevance would be to determine whether they are specific 
to depression or whether they are a general characteristic of 
psycho?athology. The results from this clinical study indicated, 
as anticipated, that there is a high degree of specificity 
in the relationship between negative self-attributions and 
depression. These results add substance to the claims, by 
learned helplessness and attribution theorists (e.g., Miller & 
Norman, 1979; Seligman et al., 1979), that these type of 
attributions (i.e., negative self-attributions) play an 
aetiological role in depression. 
In conclusion, there is both experimental and clinical evidence 
that attributions are involved in the aetiology and/or 
development of depressive symptoms and disorders. In particu-
lar, there is an indication from the present work that the 
depressives' tendency to make negative self-attributions may be 
at the basis of their typical symptomatology and complaints. 
Whether their 'depressogenic' tendency to account for personal 
negative events reflects the influence of their mood (i.e., 
depressed mood) is a question that cannot be answered at this 
point. Although there is ample evidence, from both the 
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present investigation and others (e.g., Golin et al., 1981), 
that attributions induce depressive symptoms, the possibility 
that the depressive condition may also lead people to display 
these depressogenic attributions cannot be ruled out without 
further work. In particular, additional research is needed 
to examine more closely the relationship between mood states 
(e.g., depressed mood) and causal attributions. Only by 
examining every aspect of this relationship (between causal 
attribution and depression) that its true nature will be 
fully known. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The validity and reliability of the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BD!) as a measure of depression in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations are well 
documented and established (see chapter two). 
2. Although in this experiment only the internality dimension 
(internal-external attribution) of attribution was 
manipulated, there is a reason to believe that subjects 
assigned to IAF condition displayed the depressive 
attributional style described by Abramson et al (1978) 
and Seligman et al (1979)- that is, they made internal, 
stable, and global attributions for failure (see Table 
3.3). 
3. The non-depressed group consisted of 3 first-admission 
schizophrenics, 3 alcoholics, and 2 patients with 
hysterical features. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
An issue not resolved by the previous studies is whether the 
depressives' tendency to display internal attributions for 
bad outcomes and external attributions for good outcome is 
influenced or perhaps promoted by their characteristic mood 
state (i.e., depressed mood). Although there was no indi-
cation, from previous studies or any other study reviewed so 
far, that these depressogenic attributions are induced by 
depressed mood, there is a possibility, however, that they 
may be reinforced or strengthened by such a mood state or 
condition. That is, there is a possibility that a recipro-
cal relationship may exist:. between depressogenic attributions 
and depressive condition. The present study attempted to 
examine this proposition by assessing the effects of induced 
mood states. On causal attributions for positive and negative 
outcomes. 
While learned helplessness and attribution theorists (e.g., 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978; Miller and Norman, 
1979; Seligman et al., 1979) may have emphasised the primacy 
of attributions in the depressive experience, they did not 
exclude the possibility that these attributions may be 
reinforced or even shaped by the depressive condition. In 
fact, the possibility that mood states may have a substantial 
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impact on cognitions has been thoroughly considered by Teasdale 
and Fogarty (1979) and Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty (1980). 
They reported evidence consistent with the reciprocity view 
of the relationship between negative cognitions and patholo-
gical mood states. This is how Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) 
concluded their report: 
''Cognitive models of depression ... need to be 
extended to include a reciprocal relationship 
between cognitions and the state of depression" 
(p.256). 
From the clinical point of view, Beck, a leading authority in 
this field of research, also appeared to favour the reciprocity 
view of the aetiology and development of the depressive syndrome: 
"Essentially, we believe that depressive illness involves 
a vicious cycle in which cognitive distortions, negative 
affective experience, and maladaptive behaviour become 
mutually reinforcing, resulting in self-perpetuating 
closed system'' (Beck and Burns, 1978, p. 203). 
Accordingly, the following two experiments ~1ere designed to 
determine whether attributions for positive and-negative 
outcomes vary as a function of mood states. 
7.2 EXPERIMENT 5 
The present investigation of the relationship between mood 
states and causal attributions was an attempt to determine 
whether there is a biasing effect of mood on attribution. 
While no attempts have been made to assess the effects of 
differential mood states on attributions, evidence regarding 
the effects of different moods on other types of cognitions 
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(e.g., retrieval processes) is available (e.g., Lloyd, and 
Lishman, 1975; Teasdale, and Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, Taylor, 
and Fogarty, 1980). In an important study, Teasdale and his 
eo-workers (1980) reported results which clearly showed that 
even higher cognitive processes such as memory are affected 
by mood states; they found that memory for happy and unhappy 
experiences is facilitated by mood. Using the Velten mood 
induction procedure (Velten, 1968), Teasdale and his colleagues 
found, that following the experimental induction of depressed 
mood, subjects were more likely to retrieve unhappy memories 
than happy ones. By contrast, elated subjects retrieved 
significantly more happy memories than unhappy memories. 
The Teasdale et al.'s finding that mood states facilitate 
the accessibility of certain cognitions, points to the 
possibility that attributions about the causes of different 
outcomes may also be promoted or influenced by mood states. 
The present experiment tested this proposition by inducing 
non-depressed college students into either depressed or elated 
mood, and then assessing their attributions for positive and 
negative events. It was anticipated that elated subjects 
(elation condition) would make more internal, stable, a~d 
global attributions for positive events than depressed subjects 
(depression condition). As a test of the reciprocity 
hypothesis, it was predicted that depressed subjects (de-
pression induction) would display more internal, stable, and 
global attributions for negative events than elated subjects 
(elation induction). 
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To summarise, the present experiment was carried out to assess 
the effects of induced mood states on attributions for positive 
and negative events. 
7.2.1 METHOD 
Overview. 20 subjects selected on the basis of their Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) scores, 
received depressed mood induction or elated mood induction 
(Velten, 1968), and their attributions about positive and 
negative events were then assessed. 
Subjects and Design. 20 undergraduates scoring less than 9 
on the BDI were selected and used as subjects in this experiment. 
The mean BDI was 5.60 and age 23.90 yr. The 20 subjects 
(14 females and 6 males) were drawn from a sample of 36 
students and were randomly assigned to one of the 2 conditions 
of the experiment. 
A 2(elated-depressed) x 2(positive-negative event), with repea-
ted measures on the second factor, design was used. 
Materials 
Mood Induction. The mood induction technique used in the 
present experiment was the one devised and developed by 
Velten (1968). Briefly, this verbal mood induction procedure 
consists of positive or elating statements (e.g., 'I have a 
sense of power and vigor') or depressing self-referent state-
ments like 'I am discouraged and unhappy about myself'. In 
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each condition, subjects read, first silently and then aloud, 
40 cards containing either positive (elation condition) or 
negative (depression condition) self-referent statements. 
Subjects were instructed to read each card first to them-
selves and then out loud. The cards were presented in the 
standard sequence, i.e., progressing from neutral statements 
like 'Today is neither better nor worse than any other day' 
to depressing statements like 'Everything seems utterly futile 
and empty' or elating statements such as 'I'm really feeling 
sharp now' or 'I'm full of energy'. Prior to commencing the 
mood task, all subjects received 7 cards containing the 
instructions. Briefly, the instructions reminded the subject 
that he/she should try to feel the mood suggested by each of 
40 mood statements. The instructions emphasised that this 
could be done either by repeating the statements over and 
over, imagining a situation dominated by such mood, or by 
a combination of both techniques. 
Mood Checks. The Mutiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) 
(Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965) was used to assess the effective-
ness of this verbal mood induction procedure. Briefly, the 
MAACL provides two measures, one of depression and the other 
of anxiety. To ensure a more objective assessment of mood 
states, a measure of psychomotor speed was also obtained, this 
number-writing speed measure, also used by Velten in his 
original study (1968), was obtained by instructing subjects 
to write numbers from 100 backwards for 1 mn period. 
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Dependent Measures. An attribution style questionnaire 
(see Appendix A4) was used, to assess subjects' attributions 
about 3 positive events (e.g., 'Jou have been promoted in your 
job') and 3 negative life events (e.g., 'You go out on a 
date, and it goes badly'), following the mood induction. 
This attributional style questionnaire, adapted from Seligman 
et al. (1979), provides measures about the internality, 
stability, and globality dimensions of attributions (see 
chapter 4 for a detailed discussion about these attributional 
dimensions). All measures of these three attributional 
dimensions were on a 9-point scale. (High scores on these 
scales indicate that the causal attribution is internal, 
stable, and global). 
Procedure. A flow chart of the experimental procedure can 
be seen in Table 5.1. As can be seen in this table, only 
subjects scoring less than 9 on the BDI were used in this 
experiment. Following the completion of the BDI, all subjects 
were given the 7 cards containing the standard instructions 
of the Velten verbal mood induction task. Subjects were 
instructed to read each mood card (first to themselves and 
then aloud) and to try to imagine themselves in the mood 
state suggested by the statement typed on the card. They 
were told that an electronic device will signal them when to 
start reading each card. The auditory signals were spaced 
18 sec. apart. Subjects were instructed to pick up a new 
card whenever they hear the tone signal. Following a brief 
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TABLE 5.1 -EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
SELECTION 
SDI <9 was 
the main 
selection 
requirement. 
All Ss 
scored less 
than 9 on 
this 
depression 
scale. 
MOOD INDUCTION 
10 Ss received 
depression in-
duction 10 Ss 
received ela-
tion induction. 
MANIPULATION 
CHECKS 
All Ss corn-
pleted the 
MAACL (de-
pression and 
anxiety scale). 
A psychomotor 
measure was · 
also 
obtained. 
ATTRIBUTION 
MEASURES 
Subjects' 
attributions 
(including 
the interna-
1 ity, sta-
bi 1 i ty, and 
globality 
dimensions) 
about plea-
sant and 
unpleasant 
1 i fe events 
were 
recorded. 
demonstration of the procedure, a deck of cards was placed in 
front of the subject, and a signal was then given to him/her 
to start reading the first card. 
After the mood induction task, subjects were asked to complete 
the MAACL and to write numbers, on a sheet of paper, from 100 
backwards for 60 sec. period. Following this psychomotor 
exercise subjects were asked to complete the attribution style 
questionnaire. This questionnaire.consisted of 3 positive 
and 3 negative situations. Subjects were first instructed 
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to imagine themselves, as vividly as they can, in each 
situation and then write down the major cause of each situation 
or event in the blank provided. Further questions inquiring 
about the internality, the stability, and the globality of 
the cause were also included in the questionnaire. Upon 
completion of the attribution style questionnaire, all subjects 
were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their co-operation. 
TABLE 5.2 - MANIPULATION CHECKS 
MEASURE 
DEPRESSION 
ANXIETY 
PSYCHOMOTOR 
SPEED 
DEPRESSION ELATION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
M M t P 
15.70 7.20 3.54 <.005 
8.00 5.00 2.71 <.01 
49.30 53.80 2.04 ns. 
Manipulation Checks. As can be seen in Table 5.2, the mood 
task was relatively effective in inducing the mood states of 
depression and elation. As expected, depressed subjects 
reported to have been feeling more depressed than elated 
subjects, M= 15.70 and 7.20 (p.<.005) respectively. 
Subjects in the depression condition reported also more 
anxiety than their counterparts in the elation condition, 
M= 8.00 and 5.00 (p<.Ol) respectively. However, the two 
groups did not differ very significantly in their psychomotor 
speed performance, for depressed M= 49.30 and elated 
M= 53.80 (p<.05). 
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Attribution Measures. The attribution ratings were first 
averaged over the three positive and three negative events 
and then were subjected to analyses of variance, with depres-
sed/elated as the between-subjects factor and positive/ 
negative event as a repeated measure. 
Internality Dimension. In order to determine whether 
attributions for positive and negative events vary as a 
function of induced mood states (depression/elation) the 
internality ratings (the extent to which the event is due 
to personal factors) were subjected to an analysis of variance. 
A 2(depression/elation) x 2(positive/negative) analysis of 
variance, with repeated measures on the second factor, of 
internality ratings revealed that neither the effect for 
mood nor the interaction were significant (Fs<l.O). 
However, the effect for event was significant; such that 
subjects regardless of the mood induction they received 
(elation or depression) made more internal attributions 
for positive than negative events, F(l ,18) = 11.18, p<.OOS. 
This pattern of attributions is similar to the one non-
depressives display to account for success and failure in 
laboratory situations (cf. Rizley, 1978). 
Stability Dimension. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of 
stability ratings also showed that the effect for event 
(positive/negative) was very significant, F(l ,18) = 17 .45, 
p<.OOl. Regardless of their mood, subjects made more stable 
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attributions for positive than negative events, overall mean 
for positive events was 7.03 and negative events 5.36. 
Neither the other main effect (mood) nor the mood X event 
interaction were significant (Fs<l.O). 
Globality Dimension. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the 
globality ratings were also inconsistent with the main pre-
diction of this study. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of 
globality ratings showed that, contrary to the prediction, 
neither the effect of mood nor the interaction were signi-
ficant. The other main effect, however, was significant, 
F(l,l8) = 11.43, p<.005. Subjects made more global attri-
butions for positive than negative events regardless of their 
mood state, overall mean for positive events 6.17 and negative 
events 4.27. 
TABLE 5.3- MEANS OF INTERNALITY, STABILITY, AND GLOBALITY 
RATINGS 
MOOD 
DEPRESSION 
INTERNAL! TV 
STABILITY 
GLOBAL! TV 
ELATION 
INTERNAL ITV 
STABILITY 
POSITIVE EVENTS NEGATIVE EVENTS 
6. 56 
7.09 
5.98 
6. 50 
6.97 
5.1 0 
5.67 
4.30 
4.85 
5.05 
GLOBALITY 6.37 4.25 
NOTE: Ratings are on 9-point scale; Higher ratings indicate 
that attributions are more internal, stable, and global. 
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7.2.3 DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to determine wheth.er ~here is 
a reciprocal relationship between depressogenic attributions 
and the state of depression. It was argued that one way of 
clarifying this issue would be to examine the relationship 
between mood states and attributions for positive and negative 
events. The Velten mood induction technique provided the 
opportunity to study the relationship between these two 
variables. It was predicted, on the basis of Teasdale et 
al.~ results (1980) and in accordance with the reciprocity 
view of the aetiology of depression, that attributions for 
positive and negative events would vary as a function of 
mood states. Specifically, it was expected, that elated 
subjects will make more internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions for positive events than depressed subjects. For 
negative events, however, it was predicted that depressed 
subjects will make more internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions than their counterparts in the elation condition. 
The results of the present experiment failed to support these 
predictions. 
The failure of this study to provide evidence for the biasing 
effects of mood states on attributions may be due to one of 
the following reasons: 
(a) It is possible that the verbal mood induction procedure 
used in the present experiment failed to produce 
significant mood changes. Indeed, the pattern of 
attributions displayed by the subjects, in the present 
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experiment, was typical of non-depressives. That is, 
subjects made more internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions for positive than negative events. It was as 
if they had not experienced any mood change. Although 
the manipulation checks argue for the effectiveness of 
the mood manipulations, one should not underestimate the 
power of demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) in creating 
such impression. 
(b) Another possibility is that attributions are more funda-
mental than mood states and therefore cannot easily 
be influenced or modified by such a transient mood as 
elation or depression. However, this possibility 
appears without basis when considered in the light of 
recent experimental findings. Indeed, as already 
pointed out, several studies found evidence that even 
higher cognitive processes, such as memory, are sub-
jected to the influence of mood states (e.g., Teasdale, 
Taylor, and Fogarty, 1980). 
(c) Another but more plausible explanation for the failure 
of the results to show any effect for mood may lie in 
the instrument used to assess the dependent variable 
(attribution). Although described as an adequate 
measure of attributions (see Seligman et al., 1979), 
the attribution scale used in the present study may 
have lacked the necessary sensitivity to register the 
various degrees of internality, stability, or globality 
of the cause. In fact, a recent study (Blaney, Behar, 
and Head, 1980) reported results which suggested that 
175. 
the Seligman et al.'s attributional style scale (1979) 
may have more serious drawbacks than just lack of 
sensitivity. 
To summarise, the present experiment was carried out in an 
attempt to determine whether attributions for positive and 
negative outcomes vary as a function of mood states. The 
results obtained failed to provide any evidence for the 
biasing effects of mood states on attributions. The failure 
of the results to show an effect for mood was attributed to 
some defects in the instrument empioyed, in this study, to 
assess the main dependent variable (attribution). This 
methodological consideration prompted another experiment 
in which the relationship between mood states and causal 
attributions was further examined. 
7.3 EXPERIMENT·6 
The present experiment was designed to examine further the 
relationship between mood and attribution - it was carried 
out in an attempt to investigate whether mood states have 
biasing effects on attributions of causality. It was 
reasoned earlier that if mood has any influence at all on 
attribution then the induction of different mood states should 
produce corresponding differences on attributions. The 
previous experiment tested this specific proposition and found 
no evidence to support it. This failure to show any effect 
for mood was attributed to the inadequacy of the scale used 
to assess the dependent variable (i.e., attribution). The 
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present experiment attempted to remedy to this by using the 
attribution scale commonly used in the studies linking 
attributions to depression (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 
1978). 
In addition to using a different attribution scale, the 
following changes were introduced: (a) Subjects' attributions 
were not about hypothetical events but about success or failure 
on a problem solving task; (b) the attribution questionnaire 
used in the present experiment did not ask about attributional 
dimensions (e.g., internality, stability, globality) but 
about causal determinants of success or failure; (c) the 
design of this experiment was a 2(elation/depression) x 
2(success/failure) with no repeated measures. 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the effects of 
induced elation and depression on causal attributions for 
success and failure on a problem solving task. 
7.3.1 METHOD 
Overview. 32 subjects selected on the basis of their Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) scores, 
received elation induction or depression induction following 
performance on a problem solving task, and their attributions 
about success and failure were then assessed. 
Subjects and Design. 32 undergraduates scoring less than 9 
on the BDI were selected and used as subjects in the present 
experiment. The mean BDI was 3.62 and age 20.52 yr. The 
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subjects were randomly assigned to one of the following four 
conditions of the experiment: 
1. Elation success (ES). 
2. Elation failure (EF). 
3. Depression success (DS). 
·4. Depression failure (DF). 
A 2(elation/depression) x 2(success/failure) factorial design 
was used, as before. 
Materials 
Mood Induction. The mood induction procedure was the same 
as that used and described in the previous experiment. 
Briefly, subjects were instructed to read 40 cards containing 
mood statements. The subjects assigned to the depression 
condition read depressing statement, and those assigned to 
the elation condition read elating or euphoric statements. 
As in the previous experiment, the subjects were encouraged 
to feel the mood suggested by each of the 40 cards making up 
the verbal mood induction task. 
Mood Measures. As in the previous experiment, the Multiple 
Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) 
was used to check on the effectiveness of the mood induction 
procedures or manipulations. In addition to measuring the 
subjects' level of anxiety and depression, a measure of their 
psychomotor speed (number-writing speed) was also obtained. 
Attribution Measures. As pointed out in the introduction, 
subjects' attributions about their success or failure on the 
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problem solving task (see below for the description of the 
task) were assessed with the attribution questionnaire 
described and used in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Appendix A2). 
Unlike the scale used in the previous experiment, the present 
questionnaire lists the causal determinants of success or 
failure, i.e., ability, effort, task, and luck, and asks the 
subjects to indicate (on a 9-point scale) the extent to which 
each of these factors contributed to his/her performance. 
Treatment Task. The task used to manipulate subjects' 
performance was the same as that used in Experiment 2. This 
task was described as a pattern completion test. It consisted 
of 20 matrices (or problems) obtained from Raven's Advanced 
Progressive Matrices set II (1962). Subjects were given 
20 sec. for each problem. After each problem, subjects were 
told either they were right (success condition) or wrong 
(failure condition). Following performance on this problem 
solving task, subjects were told either they had succeeded 
or fai 1 ed. 
Procedure. Prior to performing on the problem solving task, 
all subjects were asked to complete the BDI. Upon completion 
of the BDI, subjects were given the first problem from the 
problem solving task. Following performance on the pattern 
completion task, subjects were led to another table on which 
a deck of cards was displayed. The procedure used to induce 
mood states was the same as that used in the previous experiment. 
Following the mood induction task, subjects' mood (anxiety, 
depression), number-writing speed, and attributions about their 
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success or failure on the pattern completion task were assessed. 
Following the administration of the attribution questionnaire, 
all subjects were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their 
co-operation. 
7.3.2 RESULTS 
Table 6.1 shows the effects of induced elation and depression 
on mood (as measured by the MAACL) and on number-writing speed. 
As can be seen in this table, the mood manipulations had been 
effective. As expected, subjects assigned to the depression 
condition·reported to have been feeling more depressed and 
anxious than their counterparts in the elation condition, 
F(l ,28) = 55.19, p<.OOOl and F(l ,28) = 16.48, p<.OOl respec-
tively. The writing-speed measure also showed that depressed 
subjects (depression induction) wrote fewer numbers than 
elated subjects, overall mean 52.00 and 56.74 respectively. 
However, this difference did not achieve the conventioanl 
statistical significance, F(l ,28) = 2.86, ns. 
Induced Mood and Attributions. The purpose of this study 
was to assess the effects of induced elation and depression 
on attributions for success and failure. It was predicted 
that elated and depressed subjects will differ in their 
attributions for success and failure. As can be seen in 
Table 6.2, three of the four measures of attributions (i.e., 
ability, effort, and luck) support this prediction. 
Ability Attribution. The hypothesis that attributions for 
success and failure will be biased by mood was supported. A 
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TABLE 6.1 -MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF MAACL SCORES AND 
PSYCHOMOTOR SPEED (NUMBER-WRITING SPEED) SCORES 
MOOD SUCCESS FAILURE 
M so M so 
ELATION 
MAACL ANXIETY 4.62 1.81 4.87 1. 74 
MAACL DEPRESSION 6.25 2.05 6.87 2.53 
PSY. SPEED 58.37 6.06 55.12 6.81 
DEPRESSION 
MAACL ANXIETY 9.25 2.63 9.75 2.64 
MAACL DEPRESSION 16.50 2.00 17.50 5.31 
PSY. SPEED 51.00 7.41 53.00 6.18 
NOTE: MAACL = Multiple Affect Adjective Check List. 
2(elation/depression) x 2(success/failure) analysis of 
variance of ability ratings revealed, as expected, that 
the mood X task outcome interaction was significant, 
F(l ,28) = 15.01, p<O.OOl. Figure 6.1 displays this 
interaction. Tests for simple main effects of mood re-
vealed that ability attributions (internal attributions) 
for success and failure varied as a function of induced 
elation and depression. The analyses showed that depressed 
(depression induction) compared to elated subjects (elation 
induction) made more ability attributions for failure, 
F(l ,28) = 11.72, p<O.OOl, and rated ability as a less 
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important causal determinant of success, F(l ,28) = 4.22, 
p<O.OS. Further evidence that subjects' attributions of 
success and failure are biased by mood was provided by the 
finding that elated subjects displayed more ability attribu-
tions for success than for failure, F(l ,28) = 12.68, P<O.OOl. 
This finding that mood leads to differential attributions for 
success and failure suggests the possibility that the depres-
sives and non-depressives divergent attributions for positive 
and negative outcomes may be partly due to their characteristic 
mood. 
TABLE 6.2 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ATTRIBUTION SCORES 
AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD AND OUTCOME 
MOOD ABILITY EFFORT TASK LUCK 
M so M so M so M so 
ELATION 
SUCCESS 6. 50 1. 73 5.62 1.81 5.87 1 • 63 4.50 2.12 
FAILURE 3.25 2.04 2.37 0.50 5.87 2.58 3.75 1. 78 
DEPRESSION 
SUCCESS 4.62 1. 78 5.87 1.63 5.75 0.66 2.00 1.65 
FAILURE 6.37 1.24 5.25 1.98 5.37 1.67 4.62 1.87 
NOTE: Ratings are on a 9-point scale. 
Effort Attribution. The data from this second attribution 
measure also support the mood explanation of the differential 
attributions for success and failure. A 2 x 2 analysis of 
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variance of effort ratings revealed that the effect for mood 
was significant, F(l ,28) = 5.93, p<0.05. As Table 6.2 
indicates, subjects made more effort attributions for failure 
(internal attributions for failure) following depression 
induction than following elation induction, F(l ,28) = 10.04, 
p<0.005. The other main effect was also significant, 
F(l ,28) = 9.31, p<0.005. This effect reflects the tendency 
of elated subjects to attribute more success than failure 
to personal effort (P<O.OOl). Note the strong parallel 
between elated subjects' attributions and those typical of 
non-depressives. 
Further analyses showed that mood and task outcome (success/ 
failure) interacted, although not very significantly, to 
affect effort attributions, F(l ,28) = 4.00, p<O.l0>0.05. 
This mood X outcome interaction is displayed in Figure 6.2. 
Task Attribution. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of task ratings 
showed that neither the main effects nor the mood X outcome 
interaction were significant (F<l.O). Therefore the data 
from this attributional measure will not be reported. 
Luck Attribution. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance of the data 
from this measure also showed that neither of the two main 
effects were significant. However, the interaction achieved 
statistical significance, F(l ,28) = 5.73, p<0.05. This 
interaction can be seen in Figure 6.3 which shows that the 
results from this attribution measure (i.e., luck attribution) 
parallel those obtained from ability attribution measure. It 
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as as if subjects viewed luck as a personal factor, rather 
than a feature of the external world. Accordingly, they 
ascribed more success 'to luck following elation induction 
than following depression induction, F(l ,28) = 6.29, p<0.05. 
Further evidence that subjects may view luck as a personal 
disposition was provided by the finding that depressed 
subjects (depression induction made more luck attributions 
for failure than for success, F(l ,28) = 6.94, p<0.05. 
7.3.3 DISCUSSION 
The present experiment assessed the effects of induced 
elation and depression on causal attributions for success 
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and failure. The results obtained showed, as predicted, 
that subjects' attributions about their success of failure 
on the problem solving task were strongly affected or biased 
by mood. Specifically, it was found that inducing elated 
mood in non-depressives led them to account more for success 
than failure in terms of personal or internal causes (ability, 
effort). In contrast, when non-depressives received a 
depressed mood induction, they tended to attribute causality 
to themselves more for failure than for success. 
This finding that induced mood states differentially affected 
causal attributions for success and failure extends further 
the list of cognitive· processes that are reported to be biased 
by mood states (e.g., Teasdale, and Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, 
Taylor, and Fogarty, 1980; Alloy, Abramson, and Viscusi, 
1980). Indeed, a number of recent studies reported ample 
evidence that mood states exert a strong influence on certain 
types of cognition. The results of the present study suggest 
that the biasing effects of mood states are not restricted to 
retrieval of memories (Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogart~. 1980), 
or to judgement of contingency (Alloy, Abramson, and Viscusi, 
1981). There is a possibility that a number of other 
cognitions, not considered by these studies, may also reflect 
mood biases. 
The present finding that the experimental manipulations of mood 
differentially affected causal attributions for success and 
failure suggests that attributional preferences or biases 
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may partly derive from mood sources, so people's differential 
attributions for success and failure may reflect differences 
in mood. In fact, this possibility that judgemental biases 
may be closely related to mood states has been considered in 
a recent study by Alloy, Abramson, and Viscusi (1981). In 
their study, Alloy and her colleagues attempted to determine 
whether the reported differences in judgement of personal 
control between depressives and non-depressives (Alloy and 
Abramson, 1979) reflect differences in mood states. Their 
results showed that depressives and non-depressives' judge-
mental differences do indeed reflect mood biases. By 
inducing depressed mood in non-depressives and elated mood 
in depressives they reversed their characteristic ways of 
judging personal control. That is, their data showed a 
strong effect or mood on judgement of contingency. 
The results of the pres~nt experiment also showed that inducing 
depressed mood in non-depressed students reversed their judge-
ments of causality, so that following depression induction, 
non-depressed subjects exhibited depressogenic attributions 
for success and failure. That is, they tended to attribute 
more causality to internal or personal causes (ability, 
effort) for failure than for success. This finding that the 
induction of depressed mood in non-depressives led them to 
display depressogenic attributions adds substance to the 
earlier proposition that depressogenic attributions may be 
promoted by the mood state they induce in the first place. 
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The finding in the present study that induced depressed mood 
caused non-depressives to account in a depressive fashion for 
their performance on the problem solving task has an important 
implication for the attributional model of depression (Abramson, 
Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978). While Abramson and her 
colleagues have hypothesized a causal relationship between 
attribution and depressive affect - that is, that certain 
attributions lead to depressive affect and symptoms, results 
from Experiments 1 - 6 tend to suggest that attribution and 
depressive affect may have a reciprocal relationship: certain 
attributions (e.g., negative self-attributions) lead to 
depressive affect, and the depressive affect may in turn 
generate the kinds of attribution that are likely to promote 
or maintain the depressive state. To the extent that this 
interpretation is correct, it requires that the attributional 
model (Abramson et al., 1978) and other cognitive models 
(e.g., Beck, 1967) should be extended to account for this 
and other findings (e.g., Teasdale et al., 1980; Alloy et 
al., 1981) advocating reciprocity in the relationship between 
cognitive biases and depressive affect. 
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present investigation of the relationship between mood 
states and causal attributions was carried out to determine 
whether depressogenic attributions (e.g., negative self-
attributions, external attributions of positive outcomes) 
are promoted or indeed related to depressed mood. It was 
reasoned that one way of examining this question would be by 
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assessing the effects of induced moods on attributions for 
positive and negative outcomes. Accordingly, the effects 
of mood manipulations on attribution of causality were assessed 
in two related studies. Contrary to the prediction, the 
results of the first study failed to show any effect for 
mood. Regardless of the mood-manipulation they received, 
subjects in this experiment displayed more internal, stable, and 
global attributions for positive than negative outcomes. It 
was argued that the results of this experiment reflected 
inadequacies of the scale used to assess attributions. As 
a result, a second experiment was designed in which a relatively 
more valid and reliable attribution scale was used. As 
predicted, the results showed a marked effect of mood on 
causal attributions of success and failure - it was found 
that mood differentially affected attributions of causality 
for success and failure. The demand characteristics (Orne, 
1962) explanation for this finding was ruled out, since only three 
of the four measures of attributions showed the mood effect. 
Had all four attribution measures revealed the effect for 
mood, the results would have qualified for this explanation. 
A question that needs to be answered at this point, is how 
to reconcile the results of these two experiments? As 
already argued, there is a strong possibility that the failure 
of the results of the first experiment to show an effect for 
induced mood may be due to the inadequacy of the method used 
to assess the main dependent variable (attribution). Another 
explanation for these divergent results, is that perhaps mood 
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states exert an influence on individual attributions (ability 
attribution, effort attributi~n. luck attribution -as found 
in the second experiment) but not on attributional styles 
(internality, stability, and globality- assessed in the first 
experiment). Because, attributional styles are, unlike 
attributions to individual factors or causes, generalised 
beliefs or attitudes (cf. Abramson et al., 1978) that can 
resist the influence of transient mood states. Although 
attractive, this explanation is unlikely since the results 
of the second experiment (Experiment 6) showed that even 
internal, stable attributions (i.e., ability attributions) 
were affected by induced elated and depressed mood states. 
The finding, in the second experiment, that induced depressed 
mood led to depressogenic attributions (i.e., the tendency 
to attribute more failure than success to personal or internal 
factors) was interpreted as supporting the reciprocity view 
of the relationship between attribution and depressive affect. 
This reciprocity view of the relationship between different 
components of depression (i.e., cognitive, and affective) 
appears to be more relevant to the clinical reality of 
depression. It was argued on the basis of both the present 
results and the results reported by others (e.g., Teasdale, 
Taylor, and Fogarty, 1980; Alioy, Abramson, and Viscusi, 
1981) that cognitive models of depression (e.g., Abramson et 
al., 1978; Beck et al., 1979) should be extended to capture 
the clinical reality of this syndrome. 
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An important question left unanswered, is how mood affects 
attributions of causality? One can only speculate at this 
point since mood or affect is still considered to be post-
cognitive (Zajonc, 1980, has a detailed but constructive 
criticism of this conception). A plausible explanation, 
as to how mood states affect judgements of causality, is that 
the mood manipulations may have influenced subjects' 
perceptions of themselves, which in turn affected their 
causal explanations. Another explanation, inspired by 
Kelley's informational conception of the attribution process 
(1967) is that the mood induction procedures may have 
increased the saliance of certain informational cues (e.g., 
consensual information determines ability attribution) which 
in turn determined subjects' attributions of their performance. 
The question of whether perception, information use, or any 
other variable, mediated the effect of mood on attribution 
of causality can only be solved by future research. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
An important issue left unexplored in the attribution-depression 
field concerns the nature or the origin of depressogenic 
attributions. While a great deal may have been learned about 
their various consequences (including their affective and 
behavioural consequences), understanding of their origin and 
antecedent conditions is still surprisingly very limited. 
Indeed, much of the empirical research in the attribution-human 
helplessness field has limited itself to demonstrating systematic 
attributional differences between depressives and non-depressives. 
As a consequence, the antecedents of their attributional 
tendencies are still uncertain. 
A similar situation of neglect also exists on the theoretical 
front. Recent theories, including learned helplessness 
formulations (Abramson et al., 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979), 
have devoted relatively little attention to the factors that 
may be responsible for the depressives-non-depressives' attribu-
tional tendencies and preferences. In fact, Abramson and her 
colleagues (1980) acknowledged the limitation of their model 
with respect to accounting for the nature of attributional 
preferences and biases. Commenting on the issue, Abramson, 
Garber, and Seligman (1980) conceded that: 
"the attributional reformulation is relatively silent 
with respect to specifying the determinants of what 
particular attribution a person happens to make for 
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uncontrollabi lity" (p.l8, 1980). 
Clearly, there is a need not only to specify the determinants 
of depressogenic attributions but also to clarify why depres-
sives and non-depressives arrive at different causal attribu-
tions when faced with uncontrollable or aversive situations. 
The present investigation, carried out to clarify these 
issues, was designed to investigate whether depressives and 
non-depressives' attributional tendencies and biases are 
related to their characteristic ways of processing and 
utilizing information. 
While a multitude of factors may promote depressives and 
non-depressives attributional preferences, clinical literature 
suggests that their attributional differences may be better 
accounted for by differences in information processing 
strategies (e.g., Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979). Indeed, 
there is a strong possibility, as Beck's clinical observations 
tend to suggest, that depressives and non-depressives' 
attributional differences may have an information basis. 
Consistent with this proposition, is the commonly reported 
finding that depressed persons, compared to non-depressed 
ones, process and organize information within characteristic 
depressive schemas. Thus, there is a strong possibility that 
depressives and non-depressives characteristic ways of pro-
cessing information may constitute the basis of their 
attributional tendencies. 
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More relevant to the argument that biases or differences in 
attributions may have an informational origin, is Kelley's 
(lg67, 1973) theorizing about how people arrive at causal 
attributions or judgements. In his 1967 paper, Kelley 
proposed that attributors consider three types of information 
before they make causal attributions: distinctiveness, 
consistency, and consensus (chapter four gives a detailed 
review of Kelley's ANOVA model of attribution processes). 
It is therefore possible that depressives-nondepressives' 
attributional differences reflect differences in the utili-
zation of distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus 
information - that is, they may base their attributions 
on different informational cues. In that case depressives 
and non-depressives should exhibit differences in the ways 
in which they evaluate causal information (i.e., consensus, 
consistency etc.). Experiment 7 was designed to test this 
specific proposition. 
8.2 EXPERIMENT 7 
The present experiment was designed to investigate whether, as 
suggested by Beck's clinical observations and Kelley's theoreti-
cal statements, depressives and non-depressives' attributional 
tendencies reflect differences in information processing and 
utilization. As an initial step towards clarifying this 
issue, it was decided to examine depressed and non-depressed 
students' assumption about attribution-relevant information 
(i.e., causal information). 
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Depressed and non-depressed students were asked to indicate 
the importance (on a 11-point scale) of having consistency, 
consensus, and distinctiveness information if they were attempt-
ing to understand the causes of personal positive and negative 
events. The general prediction was that depressed and non-
depressed students (high and low BDI scores respectively) 
would differ in their evaluations of causal information. 
8. 2.1 METHOD 
Subjects and design. 30 undergraduates (15 depressed and 15 
non-depressed) were recruited and used as subjects in the present 
experiment. Subjects were assigned to the depressed group 
if they scored more than 9 on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) ' and to the non-depressed group 
if they scored less than 9 on the same scale. Mean BDI of 
depressed was 12.73 and of non-depressed subjects 3.33. The 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) (Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965) was used as a further index of depression. Mean 
MAACL of depressed was 16.46 and of non-depressed subjects 
7.93. 
This experiment was a 2(depressed-non-depressed) x 2(positive-
negative event) design, with repeated measures on the second 
factor. 
Information Measures. A questionnaire consisting of three 
hypothetical positive events (e.g., 'passing a driving test') 
and three negative events (e.g., 'failing a job interview') was 
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constructed and administered to subjects following the completion 
of both the BDI and MAACL. Subjects were first asked to 
imagine that each event described in the questionnaire happened 
to them, and then they were asked to estimate (on a 11-point 
scale) the importance of acquiring or having consensus informa-
tion (information concerning the performances of other people 
in the same achievement situation), consistency information 
(information concerning the subject's past performances in 
the same achievement situation), and distinctiveness information 
(information concerning the subject's performance in other 
achievement situations) when attempting to understand the occur-
rence or the causes of personal positive and negative events. 
PROCEDURE 
After completing both the BDI and MAACL, all subjects received 
a short questionnaire, consisting of three positive and three 
negative events, together with the following instructions: 
The present study is concerned with the way people explain or 
understand things that happen to them in everyday life. More 
specifically, the present study is an attempt to find out how 
people organize and process information when they make judge-
ments about the causes of events that happen to them. In this 
experiment you will be given a series of situations involving 
success or failure, and then you will be asked to estimate 
the importance of having certain informational cues (listed 
below each situation) if you were attempting to understand 
the causes of your success and failure. Please note that 
197. 
your task consists mainly of (a) imagining that each event 
described in the questionnaire happened to you personally, 
and then (b) estimating on 11-point scales the importance of 
having certain types of information if you were attempting to 
understand why certain events happened to you. Please don't 
hesitate to ask for further clarifications if necessary. 
Following the administration of this 'information' questionnaire, 
all subjects were paid and thanked for their co-operation. 
8.2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to see whether depressed and non-depressed subjects 
displayed differences in information evaluations, distinc-
tiveness, consistency, and consensus ratings were subjected 
to analyses of variance, with mood (depressed-non-depressed) 
as the between-subjects factor and positive-negative event 
as a repeated measure. 
DISTINCTIVENESS DATA 
A 2(depressed-non-depressed) x 2(positive-negative event) analy-
sis of variance of distinctiveness ratings (averaged over the 
three positive and the three negative events) showed that 
neither the effect for mood nor the interaction were significant. 
However, the effect for event (positive-negative) was significant, 
F(l,28) = 9.05, p<O.Ol. Newman-Keuls (Winer, 1962) comparisons 
of means showed that non-depressed subjects ascribed more 
importance to distinctiveness information when explaining 
negative events than when explaining positive events, M= 6.86 
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and 5.06 {p<.Ol). The same pattern of results was also 
obtained for depressed subjects, although statistically not 
significant (see Table 7.1). 
Consi.stency Data. A 2 x 2 ANOVA of consistency ratings 
(averaged over the three positive and the three negative 
events) showed that neither the effect for mood nor the 
effect for event was significant. The interaction between 
mood and event also failed to reach significance, F(l ,28) = 
2.49, ns. The Newman-Keuls test on means indicated, however, 
that when asked to explain the occurrence of personal negative 
event, depressed and non-depressed subjects differed in 
their evaluations of consistency information. Depressed 
subjects rated consistency information to be more important 
than did non-depressed subjects, M= 8.60 and 7.06 (p<.Ol) 
respectively. Further comparisons of means revealed that 
depressed subjects rated consistency information to be more 
important when attributing negative vents than when attribu-
ting positive personal events, M= 8.60 and 6.80 )p<.Ol) 
respective 1 y. 
Consensus Data. A 2 x 2 ANOVA of consensus ratings (averaged 
over the three positive and the three negative events) 
revealed that the main effect for mood was significant, 
F(l ,28) = 4.57, p<0.05. The main effect for event {positive-
negative event) was not significant. However, the mood 
(depressed-non-depressed) x event (positive-negative) 
interaction approached statistical significance, F(l ,28) = 
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TABLE 7.1 -MEANS OF DISTINCTIVENESS, CONSISTENCY, AND CONSENSUS 
RATINGS AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD (DEPRESSED-NON-
DEPRESSED) AND TYPE OF EVENT (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE) 
POSITIVE EVENTS 
Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus 
DEPRESSED 5.86 6.80 9.13 
NON-DEPRESSED 5.06 7.20 6.53 
NEGATIVE EVENTS 
Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus 
DEPRESSED 7.40 8.60 8.60 
NON-DEPRESSED 6.86 7.06 7.53 
NOTE: Ratings are on 11-point scales, ranging from = 
not at all important to 11 = extremely important. 
3.09, p<O.l0>0.05. Figure 7.1 displays this interaction. 
As can be seen in this figure, depressed and non-depressed 
subjects differed in their evaluations of consensus information 
when they were asked to attribute or explain positive personal 
events; depressed subjects rated consensus information to 
be more important than did non-depressed subjects, M= 9.13 
and 6.53 (p<O.Ol) respectively. As expected, non-depressed 
subjects ascribed more importance to consensus information 
when accounting for personal negative events than when 
accounting for positive events, M= 7.53 and 6.53 (p<O.Ol) 
respectively. 
The prediction that depressed and non-depressed subjects 
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would differ in their evaluations of causal information (i.e., 
consensus, consistency and distinctiveness) received some 
support in the present study. The results showed that 
depressed and non-depressed students differed in their evalua-
tions of two of the three types of information (consistency, 
and consensus). These results are consistent with recent 
theorizing about the informational basis of attributional 
biases and differences (e.g., Manson and Snyder, 1977; Miller 
and Ross, 1975; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
The finding that depressed subjects rated consistency information 
to be more important than did non-depressed subjects when they 
were asked to account for negative events suggests that 
depressives may be more inclined than non-depressives to search 
for and use personal history information when making causal 
attributions for personal negative events. Perhaps depressives' 
maladaptive 'attributions are related to their tendency to use 
personal information (e.g., consistency) as opposed to environ-
mental types of information (e.g., consensus). _ Future 
research that concentrates on the types of information that 
depressives process and use when engaged in attributional 
activities should test this proposition. 
The prediction that depressives and non-depressives will differ 
in their evaluations of causal information was relatively 
supported by the data from the consensus scale. It was 
found that depressed subjects rated consensus information to 
be more important than did non-depressed subjects, when they 
were asked to account for personal positive events. This 
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finding adds substance to the earlier argument that depressives 
and non-depressives' attributional preferences and differences 
may be related to biased use of causal information. 
Most relevant to this argument, however, is the finding, in the 
present study, that subjects' evaluations of consistency, and 
consensus information tended to be a function not only of 
their mood (depressed-non-depressed) but also of the type of 
event (positive-negative) they were asked to account for. 
This is another indication that biased use of causal information 
may be at the basis of depressives-non-depressives' differential 
attributions for personal outcomes. 
While the present study may have answered the question about 
the origin of attributional preferences, it left unanswered 
a further question - the reason as to why depressives and non-
depressives may be biased in their information evaluations 
and perhaps utilization is not clear. One can only speculate 
at this point. Perhaps both depressives and non-depressives 
hold different causal hypotheses about the occurrence of 
personal positive and negative events, and then they may 
apply the principle of cognitive economy (cf. Hansen, 1980) 
in the process of confirming such hypotheses (i.e., searching 
for relevant causal information). It is also possible that 
their biased evaluations of causal information may be motiva-
tionally based. The search for information may be motivated 
or guided by the need to maintain a stable view of the self-
concept (stable self-conception) (Heider, 1958). Only 
future research could determine whether a cognitive or a 
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motivational explanation accounts better for these informational 
biases. 
Although it may have provided some insight into the nature of 
attributional biases, the present study is limited in many ways. 
An obvious limitation of this study is its assumption that 
people's attributions are based on distinctiveness, consistency, 
and consensus information. Even Kelley conceded that the 
making of causal attributions may involve the use of informa-
tional cues other than the ones considered in the present 
study. A further limitation of this study is its tendency 
to assimilate information evaluation to information utilisa-
tion. Although differences in information evaluation may 
actually reflect differences in information utilisation, the 
hypothesis that depressives and non-depressives use information 
differently requires stronger evidence than that provided 
by the present study. A third limitation of this study is 
its inability to reveal whether depressives and non-depressives 
actually differ in the amount and/or types of causal information 
they use to arrive at their causal attributions. Because 
of these limitations, another investigation was conducted in 
which differences between depressives and non-depressives in 
·information processing and utilisation were further examined. 
8.3 EXPERIMENT 8 
The present study further investigated whether, as the results 
of the previous investigation tend to suggest, depressives and 
non-depressives' attributional biases and differences are 
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related to differences in the amount and/or types of information 
they use to make causal attributions. As pointed out in the 
previous section, Experiment 7 looked at information proces-
sing and utilization in a rather restricted context. So 
in the present study the amount as well as the types of 
information that subjects themselves search for and use when 
making causal judgements about the occurrence of important 
events was assessed. Depressed and non-depressed subjects 
(high and low BDI scores respectively} were asked to list the 
types and amount of information they would require to account 
for the occurrence of an hypothetical event. It was hoped 
that by allowing subjects to seek and use freely the amount 
of information they require, a better insight may be gained 
into how depressives and non-depressives process, organize, 
and use information to generate causal attributions about 
important life events. 
To summarise, the purpose of this study was to assess the 
types and amount of information that depressed and non-depressed 
subjects search for and use in making causal attributions 
about important events. Based on the results of Experiment 
7, it was predicted that depressed and non-depressed subjects 
would evidence or produce differences in both the amount and 
types of causal information they require to arrive at their 
causal explanations and attributions. 
8.3.1 METHOD 
Subjects. 20 undergraduates (10 depressed and 10 non-depressed 
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selected on the basis of their Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) were used as subjects in the 
present study. Subjects scoring more than 9 on the BDI 
were assigned to the depressed group, and those scoring 
less than 9 on the same scale were identified as non-
depressed and were assigned to the non-depressed group. 
The mean BDI of depressed was 12.70 and of non-depressed 
subjects 2.70. 
Information Measures. To ensure a reasonable assessment of 
information processing and utilisation, both quantitative 
and qualitative measures were employed. As a measure of 
the amount of information searched for and used by subjects 
to make judgements about causality, the number of questions 
(information requested) that subjects asked was counted. 
The second measure, concerning the types of information 
requested, was obtained by content-analysing the information 
needed by subjects for their causal explanations. 
Procedure. Following the administration of the BDI, both 
depressed and non-depressed subjects were provided with a 
brief description of an hypothetical event. The event 
described concerned a first-year Polytechnic student who 
failed his/her exams. Subjects were asked to list, on 
a sheet of paper, all the information they thought they 
would need to determine the cause of this first year 
student's failure. Before commencing the task, all subjects 
received the following instructions: 
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The present study is concerned with the way people process, 
organize, and utilise information when they try to understand 
important things that happen to them in life. Previous 
studies in this line of research revealed that before achieving 
a reasonable understanding of things that happen to them or 
to others, people search for and gather a certain amount of 
information. The present study attempts to determine 
whether people differ in the amount and types of information 
they seek and use when making judgements about the causes of 
important events. Your major task here consists of listing, 
on the sheet of paper provided, what information you would 
need to determine the major cause of a first-year student's 
failure at his/her exams. 
Following the information search task, all subjects were 
paid and thanked. 
8.3.2 RESULTS 
As predicted depressed and non-depressed subjects differed 
significantly in the amount (number of questions asked) of 
information they needed to make causal attributions about 
the occurrence of the negative event, F(l ,19) = 13.19 p<O.OOS. 
As Figure 8.1 indicates, non-depressed subjects requested 
significantly more information than their counterparts in 
the depressed group, M= 7.60 and 4.00 res~ectively. 
The second set of data (concerning the types of information 
requested) was subjected to content analysis using a set of 
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asked by depressed(D) and non-
depressed(ND) subjects. 
constructed categories and then to frequency counts. 
In the analysis six information categories were identified 
(including 'Uncodable') -This was achieved by categorising 
information according to whether it referred to (a) the 
actor's (student) characteristics (e .g., 'his/her basic 
ability before commencing the course'), (b) the actor's 
state (e.g., 'has the student any health problem?), 
(c) the actor's past exam. records (e.g., 'the student's 
performance at previous exams'), (d) the actor's preparation 
(e.g., 'amount of time spent attending lectures and 
revision'), or to circumstance/people/environment (e.g., 
'is the student living in a noisy student flat where it 
would be difficult to concentrate or even to decide that 
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he/she wanted to do some work'). As can be seen in Table 
8.1, depressed and non-depressed subjects differed in the 
types of information they needed to account for the student's 
failure at his/her exams. Depressed subjects tended to 
ask more questions (requested more information) about the 
actor's characteristics than did non-depressed subjects, 
t(l8) = 1.80, p<O.l0>0.05. This tendency of depressed 
subjects to favour the search for and use of personal 
characteristics information (e.g., the student's mental 
capacity') when making causal attributions was clearly 
reflected in the frequency counts data- As Table 8.1 in-
dicates, the number of questions they asked about the actor's 
characteristics accounted for 30% of the total number of the 
questions asked. Non-depressed subjects, in contrast, 
preferred information about the actor's preparation (e.g., 
'how much time and effort the student put into revision?'). 
The results revealed that non-depressed subjects requested 
I 
significantly more of this type of information (actor's 
preparation) than did depressed subjects, t(l8) = 3.56, 
p<O.Ol. 
Subsequent analyses also revealed that non-depressed subjects 
tended to search for more information about the actor's 
state (e.g., 'was anything particularly wrong on the day of 
the exam?') and about the environment/people (e.g., 'what 
kind of friends he/she had made and whether he/she had 
problems with housing') than did depressed subjects (see 
Table 8.1). 
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TABLE 8.1 -NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY DEPRESSED AND NON-
DEPRESSED SUBJECTS FOR EACH INFORMATION CATEGORY 
INFORMATION CATEGORY DEPRESSED NON-DEPRESSED 
Actor's cha racteri sti cs 12 (.30%) 6 (7.89%) 
Actor's state 5 (12.5%) 21 (27.63%) 
Actor's past exam. record 4 (10%) 6 (7.89%) 
Actor's preparation 7 (17.50%) 17 (22.36%) 
Environment/people 9 (22.50%) 18 (23.68%) 
Uncodable 3 (7.50%) 8 (10.52%) 
8.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The hypothesis that depressives and non-depressives differ in 
the amount and types of information they search for and use 
when making causal attributions was supported by the data from 
the present study. The results obtained showed that depressed 
and non-depressed subjects differed in the amount and to some 
extent in the types of information they seek when attempting 
to account for a negative event. This finding that subjects' 
information search was a function of their characteristic mood 
(depressed-non-depressed) suggests that depressives and non-
depressives attributional tendencies may be related to their 
characteristic ways of processing and utilizing information 
when making causal attributions. 
At present there appears to be no satisfactory theoretical 
explanation for this finding. One reason as to why depressed 
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subjects, in the present study, requested less information than 
did non-depressed ones, is that perhaps depressives, unlike 
non-depressives, possess a well-developed schema about failure 
(the hypothetical event in the present study) and therefore 
may need less information to account for the occurrence of 
such outcome. Another possibility is that depressives, 
relative to non-depressives, hold fewer causal hypotheses 
about the occurrence of the event, and therefore may require 
less information to evaluate them (hypotheses). Both explana-
tions are of course speculative, and should be treated as such 
until proved otherwise. 
The finding, of this study, that depressed subjects, relative 
to non-depressed ones, tended to request characterological 
information (information concerning the actor's characteristics) 
may account better for the depressives' maladaptive attributions 
(i.e., depressogenic attributions). Depressogenic or nega-
tive self-attributions may be the result of the tendency to 
relate personal misfortunes to one's character. However, 
what leads depressives to concentrate on personal information 
(as opposed to environmental types of information) for their 
causal inferences is not yet clear. There is a possibility 
that their biased search for and use of causal information is 
guided by their preconceptions or intuitive theories about 
causality. They may, as has been suggested in the previous 
discussion, search for information that confirm their implicit 
hypotheses about the occurrence of events. There is also 
the possibility that their biased use of information is related 
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to their need to maintain a stable self-conception (e.g., 
Heider, 1958). Regardless of what causes depressives to 
concentrate on (or use) certain types of information and neglect 
others, it is increasingly apparent that their typical attri-
butions may be promoted, if not caused, by their particular 
ways of using information. 
The present finding that depressogenic attributions may develop 
as a result of the tendency to use characterological infor-
mation has interesting implications for therapy. If, as 
suggested by Experiments 1 - 4, these kinds of attributions 
are important in the causation of depression, then therapy 
of depression could also be directed at them. The present 
results suggest that therapy aimed at correcting or loosening 
the grip of depressogenic attributions can do so by challen-
ging their informational basis. 
It should be pointed out that the results of the present 
study do not rule out motivational or affective_explanations 
of depressives' maladaptive attributions. Indeed, the 
results of Experiment 6 dictate that the role of affective 
processes in promoting and/or maintaining such attributions 
should not be ignored. 
In conclusion, depressed subjects were found to differ from 
non-depressed subjects in the amount and to some extent in the 
types of information they seek and utilise when making causal 
attributions about failure. These results were interpreted 
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as consistent with the informational hypothesis about the 
origin of depressogenic attributions. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the present study shares the limitations 
of the previous one. For instance, it was implicitly 
assumed that actors and observers operate in the same way 
with regard to seeking and utilising information in making 
causal attributions. And finally, since the present study 
used non-clinically depressed persons, its results would not 
necessarily hold for clinically depressed persons. 
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PART 3 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
213. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE AETIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE 
OF 
CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS 
214. 
The present research programme was inspired by the consistent 
finding, of human helplessness studies, that depressed college 
students, relative to non-depressed ones, make internal stable 
attributions for negative outcomes (e.g., failure) and tend to 
make external attributions for positive outcomes (e.g., 
success) (e.g., Barth~ and Hammen, 1981; Kuiper, 1978; 
Rizley, 1978; Seligman et al., 1979). The main goal of this 
research was to clarify the relationship between causal attri-
bution and depression. Within this field, the learned 
helplessness theory of depression (Abramson, Seligman, and 
Teasdale, 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979) offers a comprehen-
sive framework for examining such a relationshi~. As such, 
the learned helplessness model served as a frame of reference 
for most of the experimental and clinical work reported in 
previous chapters. 
Given the recent speculations about the importance of 
attributions in the genesis and development of depressive 
symptoms and disorders (e.g., Miller and Norman-, 1979; 
Seligman et al., 1979), a detailed investigation of the 
relationship between causal attribution and depression 
became warranted. Although there has been considerable 
research documenting the link between certain attributions 
and depression (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; Seligman 
et al., 1979), there is surprisingly little evidence 
bearing on the aetiological importance or significance of 
such attributions. Accordingly, a series of experiments, 
which addressed this issue and other related issues, were 
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carried out. These experiments have produced a number of 
findings concerning both the status of causal attributions 
and the nature of their relationship to depression. To 
some extent, the studies endorse the learned helplessness 
view that certain attributions assume an aetiological role 
in depression. 
Reasonably good evidence was found for the depressogenic 
effects of negative self-attributions (i.e., internal attri-
butions for bad outcome-s). Consistent with the recent 
theorising about the attributional basis of helplessness 
and depressive symptoms or deficits (e.g., loss of motivation, 
loss of self-esteem, self-blame, etc.) (e.g., Abramson et 
al., 1978; Seligman et al., 1979), the results of Experiments 
1 - 4 clearly showed that depression, as measured by the BDI 
and MAACL, was causally linked to the tendency to account for 
personal negative events in terms of personal shortcomings. 
Specifically, there was unambiguous experimental evidence 
that depression or rather its correlates (e.g.,_dysphoria, 
low psychomotor performance, reduced expectations of future 
success etc.) are induced by negative self-attributions. 
From these results, there is a clear indication that the 
attributional strategy that depressives tend to adopt when 
faced with uncontrollable or aversive situations (i.e., 
depressive attributional style for failure) is at the origin 
of their typical symptomatology and disturbances. 
More relevant perhaps to the issue concerning the aetiological 
significance of attributions in depression, are the results 
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from the clinical study (i.e., Experiment 4). The results 
revealed, as hypothesised by Seligman and his associates 
(1979), that there is a high degree of specificity in the 
relationship between the tendency to make internal attribu-
tions for personal negative events (i.e., negative self-
attributions) and depression of clinical proportions. This 
finding regarding the specificity of effect of negative self-
attributions lends credence to the claim by learned helpless-
ness theorists and-investigators (e.g., Miller and Norman, 
1979; Kuiper, 1978) that attribution processes operate in 
the genesis and development of depressive symptoms. More 
importantly, the finding provides strong evidence for the 
aetiological importance of negative self-attributions (in 
depression). 
There is, however, a theoretical ambiguity that remains re-
garding exactly how these kind of attributions (i.e., negative 
self-attributions) induce depression or its symptoms. The 
learned helplessness theorists (Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 
1978) speculated that the depressogenic effects of these 
attributions are mediated by expectancy. That is, attribu-
tions affect expectancy which in turn undermines motivation 
and hence helplessness, hopelessness, and other symptoms of 
depression. Another explanation, derived from Beck's cog-
nitive formulation of the aetiology of depressive phenomena 
(Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979), proposes that negative 
self-attributions produce depressive symptoms (e.g., loss of 
self-esteem, self-blame, hopelessness, loss of motivation, 
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etc.) by activating the latent negative attitudes towards the 
self, the environment, and the future (the so-called cognitive 
triad). Therefore an additional work for future research in 
this area should be to evaluate the relative strength of these 
competing explanations of the depressogenic effects of causal 
attributions. 
A good deal of recent research (e.g., Golin et al., 1981; 
Seligman et al., 1979) has assumed that the tendency to attri-
bute personal positive outcomes to external or situational 
causes, is as depressogenic in its effects as the tendency to 
assume responsibility for personal negative events (i.e., the 
tendency to make internal attributions for negative outcomes). 
The present work failed to provide any support for such an 
assumption. The results obtained seemed to suggest that, 
although external attributions for positive outcomes may be 
associated with depression, they are of little or no aetio-
logical significance to depression. At best, they could 
be described as symptomatic (as opposed to more-aetiological 
type of attributions). Of course, future studies that 
assess depressed patients' attributions of personal events 
both before and after treatment (i.e., longitudinal studies) 
will be methodologically more appropriate to clarify whether 
external attributions for positive outcomes are a consequence 
{symptomatic) or an antecedent of depression. Until further 
research has elaborated on this issue, the notion by Seligman 
and his associates (1979) that the tendency to externalise 
positive outcomes enjoys an aetiological status in depression 
217. 
should be treated with caution. 
With respect to the question of whether the depressives' 
tendency to make internal attributions for negative outcomes 
but not for positive outcomes reflect the influence of their 
characteristic mood (i.e., depressed mood), the results of 
Experiment 6 offered a relatively clear answer- depressives' 
typical attributions are promoted if not induced by their 
characteristic mood. The results obtained indicated 
that depressogenic attributions are closely related to de-
pressed mood. Specifically, the results showed that the 
experimental induction of depressed mood in non-depressives 
led them to display the type of attributions that are 
typical of depressives- that is, they tended to account 
more for failure than for success in terms of internal or 
personal causes (e.g., abi 1 ity attributions, effort 
attributions). 
This finding that inducing transient depressive mood state 
in non-depressives led them to exhibit depressogenic attribu-
tions may have profound implications for the theoretical 
understanding of both the relationship between causal attribu-
tion and depression and of the cognitive functioning of 
depressed persons. Whereas the recent attributional formul-
lations of helplessness and depressive phenomena (Abramson 
et al., 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979; Seligman et al., 
1979) treat depressive affect merely as an epiphenomenon of 
maladaptive or depressogenic attributions, the results from 
218. 
the present work suggest that depressive affect may be a 
critical variable in reinforcing or promoting such attribu-
tions and developing the depressive state. One possibility, 
already considered in chapter 7, is that there may be a 
reciprocal relationship between causal attribution and depres-
sion - that is, depressogenic attributions induce depressive 
affect which in turn generates and reinforces the types of 
attributions that are likely to mai~tain and/or develop the 
state of depression. A more interesting possibility is that 
the relationship between attribution and depression may take 
the form of a positive feedback model. Indeed, this view 
appears to be more congruent with the results that emerged 
from the present work (Experiments 1 - 6) and that of other 
investigators (e.g., Gol in et al., 1981). There was sugges-
tive evidence from these investigations that causal attribution 
and depression reinforce each other in a continuous manner. 
And in so doing they perpetuate the state of depression. 
To the extent that this interpretation of the results is 
correct, it requires that the Abramson-Seligman-Teasdale 
attributional formulation of helplessness and depression 
should be extended to capture this new but complex dimension 
of the relationship between attributionmd depression. 
Failure to incorporate affective variables in this model 
could undermine the value of its account of helplessness and 
depressive deficits. 
Another possible implication of the findings concerning the 
biasing effects of depressed mood on attributions is that the 
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influence of this mood state may not be limited to attribution 
processes. In fact, there is a possibility that the depressed 
persons' cognitive functioning as a whole may be coloured by 
their pathological mood state (i.e., depressed mood). 
Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty (1980) seemed to have reached a 
similar conclusion, in a study assessing the effects of ex-
perimentally induced elation and depression on retrieval of 
happy and.unhappy experiences. They reported results which 
suggested a strong effect of induced mood state on these 
types of .cognition. Specifically, they found that induced 
depressed mood facilitated the retrieval of unhappy but not 
happy memories. In contrast, the retrieval of happy experiences 
was found to occur more in the elated mood state than in the 
depressed mood state. The Teasdale et al.'s finding concern-
ing the biasing effect of mood state on retrieval processes 
further attests to the importance of affect in influencing 
cognitive activity or functioning in both its adaptive and 
maladaptive forms. 
Using a similar experimental paradigm, Alloy, Abramson, and 
Viscusi (1981) also reported ample evidence for the biasing 
influence of mood state on cognition. In a recent study 
assessing the effects of different mood states on judgement 
of contingency (i.e., response-outcome relationship), Alloy 
and her colleagues found that by making depressives elated 
(experimental induction of elated mood) and non-depres~ves 
depressed (depression induction) they reversed their typical 
ways of judging personal control and contingency. Their 
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data clearly showed that the depressives' tendency to accurately 
judge their personal control (see Alloy and Abramson, 1979, 
for a detailed account of this finding) was reversed (i.e., 
they showed an illusion of control) following the elation 
induction. Similarly, the non-depressives' tendency to show 
an illusion of control was 'corrected' following the depression 
induction- that is, they tended to give accurate judgements 
of contingency between their responses and outcomes. This 
finding is yet another indication that affective factors may 
exert a biasing influence on a number of cognitive processes. 
While further studies will be required to elaborate on this 
issue (e.g., specification of how mood affects cognition), 
the Alloy et al. results (1981) together with t~e results 
of the present work and those reported by Teasdale and Fogarty 
(1979) and Teasdale et al. (1980) and many others strongly 
suggest that affect may be at the basis of many cognitive 
biases that characterize both depressed and non-depressed 
persons. 
In summary: substantial evidence emerged from the present 
work that negative self-attributions have depressogenic 
effects- that is, they induce depressive symptoms. This 
was taken as a reasonable indication that these kind of 
cognitions have an aetiological status in depression (i.e., 
depressogenic attributions are important in the causation 
of depression). The results concerning the biasing 
influence of mood state on attributions was taken as an 
indication that causal attribution and depression entertain 
at least a reciprocal relationship. 
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So far the discussion has been concerned with theoretical 
status of attributions and the nature of the relationship 
they may entertain with depression. A further issue addres-
sed by the present research concerns how these so-called 
depressogenic attributions (i.e., internal attributions for 
bad outcomes) develop. In line with Kelley's theorizing 
about the informational basis of attributions (Kelley, 1967, 
1973), it was found that these type of attributions are 
formed as a result of selective use of information. The 
results of Experiment 8 showed that depressives, compared to 
non-depressives, favoured the use of personal or charactero-
logical information when making attributions about bad events. 
Thus, depressogenic attributions may develop as a result of 
the utilization of characterological information. An 
important question that should be asked at this point is what 
leads depressed people to favour the search for and the use 
of this type of information when they engage in attributional 
activities? Two important factors were delineated that 
may lead depressives to use characterological information and 
then display depressogenic attributions. The first factor 
concerns the frequency of exposure to aversive situations or 
events. The second factor concerns the person's ongoing 
self-esteem. 
There is an indication from recent work that repeated exposure 
to stressful life events often leads people to display maladap-
tive or depressogenc attributions for their difficulties. A 
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recent study by Peterson, Schwartz, and Seligman (1981) 
confirmed this. They found that the tendency to blame one's 
character (characterological self-blame) was positively 
associated with frequent experience with negative life 
events: suggesting that people who display characterological 
or depressogenic attributions may arrive at them by covariation 
analyses. While further research may be required to specify 
the cognitive operation involved in the making of these kind 
of attributions, the findings of Peterson and his colleagues 
(1981) do provide support for the possibility that these 
attributions (i.e., depressogenic attributions) may be caused 
by repeated exposure to life stressors. 
A further factor believed to determine whether characterologi-
cal information will be used and depressogenic attributions 
displayed concerns the person's ongoing self-esteem. There 
is suggestive evidence from recent studies that lowered self-
esteem may be an important antecedent of depressives' maladap-
tive attributions (e.g., Ickes and Layden, 1978). In a 
series of studies assessing the relationship between levels 
of self-esteem and attributional styles for failure experience, 
Ickes and Layden (1978) obtained data which clearly indicated 
that the tendency to make negative self-attributions (i.e., 
internal attributions for failure) was closely related to 
low self-esteem. While situational factors and other latent 
negative attitudes (i.e., Beck's cognitive triad) may also 
constitute a source of influence, lowered self-esteem appears 
to be the most important antecedent of these type of attributions. 
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In sum, there is emerging evidence that characterological 
information is used and then depressogenic attributions are 
made following repeated experience with stressful life events. 
Such frequent exposure to bad events is believed to lead the 
person to infer, on the basis of a covariation analysis (cf. 
Kelley, 1967, 1973), that something about himself caused the 
events. Similarly, the level of self-esteem is believed to 
be important in determining whether a person accounts for 
personal negative events in terms of personal causes. 
Evidence in support of this observation has been provided by 
a series of important studies carried out by !ekes and Layden 
(1978). They reported results which clearly suggested that low 
self-esteem may be at the origin of depressives' maladaptive 
attributions. Although other personality and situational 
factors may also influence when depressogenic attributions are 
made, lowered self-esteem and frequent experience with bad 
events emerge as the most important determinant of these 
type of attributions. 
In conclusion, the present research produced a number of 
findings concerning the theoretical status of negative self-
attributions, the nature of the relationship they entertain 
with depression, and their antecedent conditions. The 
results obtained endorse the learned helplessness claim that 
internal attributions for pe~onal negative outcomes are 
important in the aetiology and development of depressive and 
helplessness phenomena (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Seligman 
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et al., 1979). In particular, there was a clear indication 
that the attributional strategies that depressives tend to 
adopt when faced with bad outcomes may well be at the cause 
of their typical symptomatology and complaints. Overall, 
the present research showed that negative self-attributions 
elicit depressive symptoms, and these attributions are 
based on personal or characterological information made 
salient by such factors as low self-esteem, frequent experience 
with negative life events, and depressed mood. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 
226. 
In Figure 10 a proposed positive feedback model of the 
development of a depressive disorder is outlined. The 
model encapsulates results that emerged from the present 
research programme - it outlines the factors that have been 
shown to play a critical role in the genesis and development 
of depressive disorders. 
Like the reformulated learned helplessness model (Abramson, 
Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979), the 
present one emphasises the importance of attributions in 
generating and shaping depressive symptoms and disorders. In 
particular, the present model assumes that the types of attri-
butions displayed to account for personal negative outcomes 
are crucial in determining whether depression develops. 
However, unlike the learned helplessness model, the present 
one gives explicit attention to the factors that influence the 
sort of attributions people make for unpleasant experiences. 
In addition to specifying the determinants of depressogenic 
attributions, the model provides a basis for understanding 
how depressive symptoms unfold. This, according to the 
present attributional framework, occurs as a result of a 
continous interplay among the factors outlined in Figure 10. 
Complex though it is, this multifactorial view of the develop-
ment and maintenance of depression is more in keeping with the 
complex reality of the phenomenon of depression (e.g., Akiskal 
and McKinney, 1975). · 
But the central claim of the present model is that level of 
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self-esteem and prior experience with stressful life events 
(i.e., frequency of exposure to life stressors) are critical 
in determining whether depressogenic attributions will be dis-
played and whether depressive symptoms wi 11 be elicited. 
The evidence in support of this claim is briefly examined 
below. 
Determinants of depressogenic attributions. Perhaps a major 
weakness of the Abramson et al. reformulation of the learned 
helplessness model lies in its failure to specify the ante-
cedent conditions of attributions for failure or uncontroll-
ability. As Wortman and Dintzer (1978) pointed out, this 
problem could seriously undermine the predictive power of 
the model. The present research does not claim to resolve 
completely the issue, but it may offer a lead in that 
direction. 
As was discussed earlier, there is a possibility that depresso-
genic attributions are formulated as a result of repeated 
experience with life stressors. A recent study by Peterson, 
Schwartz, and Seligman (1981) reported data that confirmed 
this possibility. They found evidence that frequent exposure 
to negative life events often leads people to use charactero-
logical information and then display depressogenic attributions 
for personal negative events. Of course this notion that 
negative self-attributions may be based on prior experience 
with life stressors is not new. Indeed, learned helplessness 
theorists and investigators (e.g., Klein et al., 1976; Miller 
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Figure 10. Proposed positive feedback model of the development of a depressive disorder. 
and Norman, 1979) have argued that helplessness training 
can change one's attributions for uncontrollability or help-
lessness from external to internal or personal factors. In 
fact, such attributional shift is regarded as necessary for 
the generalization of helplessness and hopelessness. 
Similarly, the notion that low self-esteem may be an important 
antecedent of negative self-attributions is not new. 
Theorists of depression such as Beck (1967) and Bibring (1953) 
have for some time argued that low self-esteem provides a 
fertile soil for the manifestation of all sorts of depressive 
cognitions including causal cognitions. Empirical evidence 
for this notion has been provided by a series of studies 
recently carried out by Ickes and Layden (1978). There was 
a clear indication from their work that lowered self-esteem 
may be a contributory factor to the development and the formu-
lation of depressogenic attributions. 
Overall, there is emerging evidence that frequent experience 
with bad life events leads people to display negative self-
attributions. Empirical evidence that such attributions may 
also be related to low self-esteem is also accummulating. 
Negative self-attributions and depressive symptoms. Ample 
evidence was obtained from the present work that negative 
self-attributions have an aetiological status in depression -
that is, there was a clear indication from the evidence pre-
sented in earlier chapters that these type of attributions 
are important in the causation of depression. Consistent 
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with Seligman et al. (1979) attributional analysis of depressive 
symptoms, it was found that only negative self-attributions 
(i.e., the tendency to attribute failure internally- to one's 
character) elicited depressive correlates or symptoms. Extern~l 
attributions of failure, in contrast, appeared to exert a 
prophylactic effect. And as such they could be said to be 
inconsistent with depression. 
Further support for the aetiological importance of negative 
self-attributions has been provided by a recent correlational 
study. In an important study, Golin and his colleagues (1981) 
obtained data which clearly showed that these type of attri-
butions are closely associated with depression. More impor-
tantly, however, is their finding that these attributions 
predate depression. The Golin et al. finding that the typical 
symptomatology of depressives may be related to their exaggerated 
tendency to make negative self-attributions further attests 
to the aetiological relevance and importance of these attribu-
tions. In short, clear evidence emerged from both the present 
work and that of others that negative self-attributions have 
an aetiological status in depression, and these attributions 
may be at the basis of many symptoms and deficits that 
characterise depressed people. 
Overall then, the model presented here proposes evidence for 
the type of attributions that induce depressive symptoms, and 
the factors that lead people to display these kind of attribu-
tions. This model should be seen as a first step towards a 
231. 
conceptual framework for understanding how a depressive 
disorder develops. 
As noted earlier, this model represents more of a summary of 
what emerged from the present work about the relationship 
between causal attribution and depression, than a new theory 
about the genesis and development of depressive phenomena. 
Nevertheless, limited though it is the model could make a 
contribution to the literature on depression. Indeed, 
unlike the Abramson et al. attributional model, the present 
one is relatively precise about the antecedent conditons of 
depressogenic attributions. In doing so the present model 
allows a specific prediction: Given a typical helpless situa-
tion (i.e., uncontrollable situation), only a person with 
lowered self-esteem and/or with prior experience with life 
stressors will exhibit depressogenic attributions and thus 
develop depression. In contrast, a person enjoying a high 
level of self-esteem and/or a history of success or control 
will account for failure (loss of control) more in terms 
of external or behavioural causes than in terms of stable 
personal causes. 
In addition to providing a means for identifying people who 
are likely to make depressogenic attributions for their dif-
ficulties, the present model could have a role in structuring 
and explaining the results from the present research programme. 
Indeed, another benefit of the proposed model is that it can 
serve as a guide for analysing and explaining the results per-
232. 
taining to the relationship between causal attribution and 
depression. In addition to accounting for the results con-
cerning the depressogenic effects of attributions, the model 
may account for the biasing influence of depressed mood or 
affect on attributions of causality. 
Finally, the model could also explain why negative life events 
often lead to depression (e.g., Brown and Harris, 1978; Paykel, 
1974). The present model suggests that it is by inducing 
depressogenic attributions in people (i.e., changing attri-
butions from external causes to stable personal causes) that 
negative life events generate depressive disorders. Although 
personality or vulnerability factors may also mediate the 
effects of stressful events, causal cognitions appear to be 
the mechanism through which these types of events cause 
depression. 
In conclusion, the results that emerged from the present 
research suggest that the typical symptomatology of depressives 
could be understood in terms of the attributions they tend to 
make for their personal difficulties and deficiencies. This 
research supports the idea that negative self-attributions 
are important in the causation of depression. To some extent, 
the results endorse the Abramson et al.'s view that helplessness 
and depressive deficits are shaped by attributions. In 
particular there was a clear indication from the evidence 
presented in earlier chapters that depression develops in 
individuals who have an exaggerated tendency to make negative 
233. 
self-attributions. While future research will be required 
to elaborate and refine the ideas presented here, it is clear 
that the present work together with the model which summarises 
it provide a basis for a theoretical understanding of the 
genesis and development of depressive disorders. 
234. 
APPENDIX A 
ASSESSMENT SCALES 
Al. 
APPENDIX Al 
DEPRESSION SCALES 
1. BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY (BDI} 
2. Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL} 
Name 
B D I 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Age ........... . Se.x ....... . 
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of 
statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group which 
best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST ~JEEK, INCLUDING TODAY. 
Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements 
in the group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read 
all statements in each group before making your choice. 
1. 0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad. 
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
1 I fee 1 discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2 As I look on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a complete fai 1 ure as a person. 
4. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything any more. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
5. 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all the time. 
6. 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
8. 0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
A 3. 
9. 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10. 0 I don't cry any more than usual. 
l I cry more than I used to. 
· 2 I cry all the time now. 
3 I used to be ab 1 e to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to. 
11. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
2 I feel irritated all the time now. 
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
13. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3 I can't make decisions at all any more. 
14. 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
1 I am worried that I am lookin.g old or unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that 
make me look unattractive 
3 I believe that I look ugly. 
15. 0 I can work about as well as before. 
l It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can't do any work at all. 
16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
l I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get 
back to s 1 ee p . 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get 
back to sleep. 
0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 
3 I have no appetite at all any more. 
0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. Yes. . . . No .... 
20. 0 I am no more worried about mY health than us ua 1 . 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; 
or upset stomach; or constipation. 
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it 1 s hard to think 
of much else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems, that I can 1 t think 
about anything else, 
21. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
As. 
HAC CL 
INSTRUCTIONS 
On this sheet you wi11 find words which describe different kinds. 
of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the box beside the words which describe 
how you feel now - at this moment. Some of the words may sound alike, but 
we want you to check a11 the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
Active 
Adventurous 
Affectionate 
Afraid 
Agitated 
Ag~:eeable 
Aggressive 
Alive 
Alone 
Aminble 
Amused 
Annoyed 
Awful 
Bashful 
Bitter 
Blue 
Bored 
Calm 
Cautious 
Cheerful 
Clean 
Complaining 
Contented 
Contrary 
Cool 
2:1. 
28. 
29. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
3?. 
38. 
39. 
4o. 
41. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
so. 
51. 
. 52. 
r--• 
Cb-operative 
Critical 
Cross 
Cruel 
Daring 
Desperate 
Destroyed 
Devoted 
Di.Sagreenble 
Discontented 
Discouraged 
Disgusted 
Displeased 
Energetic 
Enraged 
Enthusiastic 
Fearful 
Fine 
Fit 
Forlorn 
Frank 
Free 
Friendly 
Frightened 
Furious 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
sa. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
6?. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
'73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
?8. 
Gentle 
Glad 
Gloomy 
Good 
Good-natured 
Grim 
Happy 
Healthy 
Hopeless 
HOstile 
lmpatient 
Incensed 
Indignant· 
Inspired 
Interested 
Irritated 
Jealous 
Joyful 
Kindly 
Lonely 
Lost 
Loving 
Low 
Lucky 
Mad 
Mean 
MACCL 
79- Meek 97. Rough 115. Tense 
80. Herry 98. Sad 116. Terrible 
81. Mild 99· Safe 117. Terrified 
82. 1-lisero.ble 100. Satisfied 118. Thoughtf'ul 
83. Nervous 101. Secure 119. Ti.rnid 
84. Obliging 102. Shaky 120. Tormented 
85. .Offended 103. Shy 121. Understandir. 
86. Outraged lo4. Soothed 122. Unhappy 
87. Pan:i..cky 105. Steady 123. Unsociable 
88. Patient 106. Stubborn 124. Upset 
89. Peacef'ul 107. Storc;y 125. Vexed 
90. Pleased lo8. Strong 126. Warm 
91. Pleas!lllt 109. Sui"fering 12?. Whole 
92o Polite 110. Sullen 128. Wild 
93. Powerf'ul lll. Sunk 129. 't.'ilf'ul 
94. Quiet 112.- Sympathetic 130. Wilted 
95. Reckless 113. Taoe 131. Worrying 
96. Rejected 114. Tender 132. Yo'ling 
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APPENDIX A2 
ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
l. ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE (SUCCESS CONDITION) 
2. ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE (FAILURE CONDITION) 
An 
/ 
ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
How a person does on tasks like the one you have just completed 
depends on a number of factors. 
On some occasions the task is an easy one. Even people who are 
not very skilful, or who don't try very hard, are successful. On 
hard~r tasks these people might not do so well. 
S~me people succeed mainly because they apply themselves to the task 
and try very hard. In this way they are sometimes able to make up for 
any lack of skill or for bad luck. Even if the task is difficult, such 
people may do well. Were they to lose interest and not try so hard, they 
would probably not do so well. 
Other people are successful because they are just lucky enough - they 
happen to hit upon the correct answers largely by chance. They therefore 
do well even if they are not particularly skilful, or don't try too hard. 
Some others succeed because they have skill and ability. These people 
don't really have to try very hard .even on fairly difficult tasks. 
And good luck isn't really involved for these people. Given another 
task they would probably do just as well because they have good ability. 
Consider the result that you have just obtained on the task, and indicate 
Ag. 
on the scale below: 
1. To what extent do you think your success was because you 
tried very hard (effort)? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
success 
L ____ J ___ J ___ J ___ ~----L--~----J----~----~· 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
success 
2. To what extent do you think your success was because the task 
was easy? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
success 
L ____ J ___ j ___ J ___ J ____ ~ __ _L ____ L ___ J ____ J 
12 3 4 56 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
success 
3. To what extent do you think your success was because you were 
1 ucky? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
success 
L ____ j ___ _L __ ~ ___ JL ___ L ___ L ____ L ___ J ____ J 
12 34 56 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
success 
4. To what extent do you think your success was because you have 
skill and ability? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
success 
L ____ J ____ L---L---L---L---L----L ___ J_ ___ J 
12 3 4 56 7 8 9 
AlO. 
definitely a 
cause of my 
success 
ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
How a person does in tasks like the one you have just completed depends 
on a number of factors. 
On some occasions the task is a difficult one. Even people who are very 
skilful, or who try very hard, are not successful -on easier tasks 
these people might do well. 
Some people fail mainly because they don't try very hard. Even if 
the task is easy, such people may not do well. But if they try very 
hard they-would probably do well. 
Often people are unsuccessful because they are just not lucky enough 
They therefore fail even if they are particularly skilful, or try too 
hard. 
Some often fail because they lack skill and ability. These people 
must try very hard even on easy tasks. And bad luck isn't involved 
for these people. Given another task they would probably not do well 
because they lack ability. 
Consider the result that you have just obtained on the task, and 
A 11. 
indicate on the scale below: 
1. To what extent do you think your failure was because you did 
not try very hard (lack of effort)? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
failure 
L----~-----J-----L----L---~----J ____ _L _____ ~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
failure 
2. To what extent do you think your failure was because the task 
was difficult? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
failure 
L-----L----~-----L----L----L ___ _L ____ L _____ J 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
failure 
3. To what extent do you think your failure was because you were 
unlucky? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
failure 
L-----L-----L----L----l----L----L----l-----~ 
12 3 4 56 7 8 9 
definitely a 
cause of my 
failure 
4. To what extent do you think your failure was because you lack 
skill and ability? 
definitely not 
a cause of my 
failure 
L-----~-----L----L----L----L----L----L--~--J 
12 3 4 56 7 8 9 
:Al2. 
definitely a 
cause of my 
failure 
APPENDIX A3 
ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Al3. 
ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that follow. 
If such a situation happened to you, what would you feel would have caused it? 
While events may have many causes, we want you to pick only one. 
The MAJOR CAUSE if this event happened to you. 
Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. 
Answer some questions about the cause. To summarize we want you to: 
1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you. 
2. Decide what you feel would be the major cause of the situation if 
it happened to you. 
3. Write one cause in the blank provided. 
4. Answer some questions about the cause. 
5. Go on to the next situation. 
YOU HAVE BEEN PROMOTED IN YOUR JOB 
1. Write down one major cause 
2. Is the cause of your promotion due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Totally due 
to me 
9 
3. In the future when promoted in your job, wi 11 this cause again be 
present? (Circle one number) 
Will never again Wi 11 always 
be present be present 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4. Is the cause something that just influences gaining promotion, or 
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one numbert 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 
Al5. 
5 6 7 8 
Influences 
all situations 
in my 1 ife 
9 
Extremely 
important 
9 
YOU GO OUT ON A DATE, AND IT GOES BADLY 
1. Write down one major cause ................................ . 
2. Is the cause of your unsuccessful date due to something about you 
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
2 3 4 
3. In the future when going out on 
present? (Circle one number) 
Wi 11 never again 
be present 
1 . 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
a date, will this cause again 
5 6 7 8 
Totally due 
to me 
9 
be 
Will always 
be present 
9 
4. Is the cause something that just influences going out on a date, or does 
it also influence other areas of your 1 ife? (Circle one number) 
Influences just Influences 
this particular situations 
situation my 1 i fe 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5. How important would this situation be if it happened to you? {Circle 
one number} 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 
Al6. 
5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
important 
9 
all 
in 
YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME 
1 . Write down one major cause ................................ . 
2. Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about you 
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 
3. In the future when looking 
(Circle one number) 
Will never again 
be present 
2 3 4 
5 6 7 
for a job, will this cause 
5 6 7 
8 
again 
8 
Totally due 
to me 
9 
be present? 
Will always 
be present 
9 
4. Is the cause something that just influences looking_ for a job, or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Influences 
all situations 
in my 1 ife 
9 
5. How important would this situation be if it happened to you? (Circle 
one number} 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE 
l. Write down one major cause 
2. Is the cause of this event due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 
3. In the future when meeting 
(Circle one numfler) 
Will never again 
be present 
2 3 4 
5 6 7 
friends, will this cause 
5 6 7 
8 
again 
8 
Totally due 
to me 
9 
be present? 
Will always 
be present 
9 
4. Is the cause something that just influences this event or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just Influences 
this particular situations 
situation my 1 "ife 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5. How important would this situation be if it happened to you? (Circle 
one number) 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 
~ , Q 
5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
important 
9 
all 
in 
APPENDIX B 
RAW DATA 
Al9. 
RAW DATA 
KEY 
BDI 
SOS 
= 
= 
MAACL = 
MAACL 
Dep. = 
MAACL 
Anx. 
MAACL 
Hos. 
IAS 
IAF 
EAS 
EAF 
so 
FO 
A 
E 
T 
L 
D 
NO 
Cs 
Cc 
Dt 
s 
F 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Beck Depression Inventory 
Self-rating Depression Scale 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List 
MAACL depression scale 
MAACL anxiety scale 
MAACL hostility scale 
Internal Attribution of Success 
Internal Attribution of Failure 
External Attribution of Success 
External Attribution .of Failure 
Success Only 
Failure Only 
Ability Attribution 
Effort Attribution 
Task Attribution 
Luck Attribution 
Depressed 
Nondepressed 
Consensus information 
Consistency information 
Distinctiveness information 
Success 
Failure 
A20. 
Vl 
c:( 
...... 
EXPERI~1ENT 1 
B D I 
8 
16 
13 
15 
10 
16 
12 
10 
6 
106 
11 
15 
16 
7 
9 
12 
Pre. 
Dep. 
13 
13 
13 
15 
20 
19 
5 
17 
16 
M A A C L 
Anx. 
4 
6 
6 
8 
8 
10 
4 
9 
9 
Hos. 
7 
12 
6 
10 
10 
7 
9 
8 
12 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
A 
4 
6 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
E 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
7 
6 
4 
7 
T L 
5 2 
2 2 
3 2 
4 3 
5 4 
6 
3 
4 
3 
3 5 
3 6 
Post. 
Dep. 
10 
10 
11 
8 
18 
14 
4 
15 
19 
1·1AACL 
Anx. 
5 
7 
7 
8 
8 
9 
4 
8 
9 
Hos. 
6 
11 
8 
ll 
9 
10 
9 
9 
11 
131 64 81 40 50 34 31 109 65 84 
13 9 7 5 5 7 2 12 7 9 
1 7 11 1 3 3 4 7 2 1.9 11 15 
18 14 13 3 5 5 5 18 8 12 
9 2 3 6 6 6 4 11 3 4 
10 9 6 3 5 5 1 12 8 5 
20 1 0 13 1 4 3 1 12 8 5 
Vl 14 21 9 10 2 5 3 2 19 7 10 
c:( 10 17 11 10 4 7 3 5 19 7 11 
l __ 1o _______ 8 ______ 3 ______ s_______ 6 ____ 2 ________ 1 ______ 7_____ 3 _______ 8 ___ 104 133 78 80 33 43 40 19 .129 62 79 
0 
Vl 
l 
12 
13 
16 
14 
8 
15 
7 
6 
8 
99 
17 4 8 4 3 4 2 16 4 7 
17 9 9 1 1 7 2 18 9 10 
18 8 12 5 5 4 3 18 8 11 
16 12 1 0 2 2 4 1 20 11 15 
20 10 9 3 6 4 6 20 8 10 
15 8 9 4 5 4 4 16 6 8 
14 9 11 5 6 3 2 15 9 10 
14 3 7 7 2 4 1 12 4 5 
18 8 7 4 7 1 2 18 7 4 
149 71 82 35 37 35 23 153 66 80 
A2l. 
-L.U 
l 
0 
L.L.. 
EXPERIMENT 1 (continued) 
B D I 
6 
14 
16 
13 
12 
12 
13 
6 
6 
98 
13 
9 
11 
14 
12 
11 
9 
10 
10 
99 
12 
13 
7 
10 
16 
11 
23 
9 
9 
110 
Pre. 
Dep. 
3 
13 
12 
14 
6 
14 
21 
16 
17 
116 
14 
12 
18 
18 
17 
13 
15 
8 
8 
123 
15 
7 
13 
14 
18 
17 
12 
11 
16 
123 
M A A C L 
Anx. 
3 
12 
9 
10 
4 
3 
12 
8 
9 
70 
10 
10 
4 
10 
11 
8 
8 
7 
5 
73 
11 
2 
9 
6 
10 
6 
7 
3 
9 
63 
Hos. 
5 
13 
10 
12 
3 
3 
12 
10 
9 
77 
7 
9 
7 
11 
10 
7 
6 
6 
3 
66 
9 
8 
6 
8 
12 
10 
8 
7 
9 
77 
A22. 
A TIRIBUTIONS 
A 
3 
7 
5 
4 
3 
2 
5 
3 
5 
37 
2 
4 
2 
6 
4 
4 
6 
2 
1 
31 
5 
7 
6 
2 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
45 
E 
3 
4 
4 
2 
6 
23 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
19 
5 
6 
2 
6 
5 
2 
6 
2 
2 
36 
T 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
L 
2 
1 
2 
1 
5 
5 
17 19 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
3 
42 
4 
6 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
5 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
22 
4 
4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
37 21 
Post. M A A CL 
Dep. 
7 
19 
15 
18 
14 
29 
27 
19 
17 
165 
12 
12 
16 
17 
19 
18 
11 
9 
8 
122 
18 
20 
14 
15 
21 
19 
23 
15 
17 
162 
Anx. 
5 
16 
7 
8 
9 
17 
14 . 
10 
10 
96 
7 
7 
7 
10 
10 
9 
8 
8 
6 
72 
8 
6 
7 
6 
13 
6 
9 
7 
8 
70 
Hos. 
5 
14 
10 
12 
11 
16 
12 
15 
9 
104 
8 
10 
11 
9 
12 
9 
6 
9 
5 
79 
11 
12 
7 
10 
12 
9 
13 
11 
9 
94 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Pre. M A A C L ATTRIBUTIONS Post. M A A C L ANAGRAMS 
S D S 
Anx. Hos. Dep. A E T L Anx. Hos. Dep. F S Lat. 
32 8 12 19 3 5 4 3 7 12 16 4 30.2 
36 11 11 16 7 4 3 6 10 12 16 1 23.75 
41 10 11 18 8 3 3 6 2 1 4 10.70 
44 8 11 12 6 5 7 5 7 9 14 0 5.00 
29 3 4 8 6 6 5 2 5 10 14 2 
28 7 9 16 4 5 3 7 5 9 14 2 33.5 
36 5 4 8 5 5 5 1 5 5 10 7 46.05 
21 12 11 14 6 2 3 1 7 10 15 5 38.45 
Vl 
c( 39 10 8 20 6 7 5 4 12 4 14 
35 11 9 16 5 7 4 3 10 11 15 2 8.50 
l 341 85 90 147 56 49 42 38 70 83 132 24 196.00 
35 8 10 15 5 8 9 8 8 15 13 70.90 
25 5 9 14 8 8 7 2 5 8 15 0 
42 12 12 18 5 3 3 8 7 11 16 2 23.70 
31 2 6 10 2 4 6 7 10 11 20 5 39.85 
37 4 4 6 2 7 4 6 4 2 4 
43 10 6 20 5 3 4 7 9 6 13 26.40 
Vl 31 6 6 14 5 4 2 4 5 6 11 5 38.95 
c( 38 5 6 18 5 3 4 7 7 8 17 6 49.80 
LLI 
24 7 10 14 8 6 6 1 9 8 16 6 45.15 
26 4 4 6 5 5 8 4 5 4 7 0 12.95 
332 63 73 135 50 51 45 55 69 72 134 39 307.70 
Note. Anx. =anxiety; Hos. = hostility; Dep. = depression; FS = failure to solve; 
Lat. = latency; A = ability attribution; E = effort attribution; T = task 
attribution; L = luck attribution. 
A 23. 
EXPERIMENT 2 (continued) 
Pre. M A A C L ATTRIBUTIONS Post. M.A A CL ANAGRAMS 
S D S 
Anx. Hos. Dep. A E T L Anx. Hos. Dep. F S Lat. 
25 2 4 2 5 3 7 5 5 9 11 3 28.90 
30 9 8 17 6 3 7 2 9 11 18 23.65 
27 7 8 18 8 3 1 8 10 19 0 15.85 
33 7 7 8 2 7 4 3 9 6 8 10 69.55 
31 6 6 15 3 3 6 6 9 17 7 47.35 
1.1.. 32 4 6 7 9 9 9 9 6 9 10 3 34.90 
<( 12 12 16 2 6 10 13 18 5 39.75 
..... 
29 9 10 11 3 3 3 6 8 9 20 9 65.55 
49 8 8 16 5 9 1 10 11 21 5 40.65 
28 10 10 20 9 10 11 23 10 61.80 
284 74 79 130 45 52 42 30 81 98 165 53 427.95 
26 4 9 15 5 6 8 4 4 10 15 3 21.90 
41 7 8 14 3 7 9 4 7 10 16 0 13.85 
32 5 5 4 7 3 8 3 9 7 8 26.05 
34 13 10 16 7 3 7 2 14 15 23 10 66.25 
44 9 8 17 2 2 4 1 10 10 17 0 5.45 
42 12 13 24 6 7 3 5 11 15 19 7 53.75 
33 5 4 7 7 5 3 1 9 11 7 2 16.30 
28 14 8 15 5 3 6 8 9 15 8 
1.1.. 25 9 10 17 9 2 9 1 9 11 15 2 22.50 
<( 
LLJ 26 5 15 8 3 2 3 6 9 14 9 56.85 
l 331 83 90 137 54 40 60 23 87 107 149 42 283.40 
Note. Anx. = anxiety; Hos. = hostility; Dep. = depression; FS = failure to solve; 
Lat. = latency; A= ability attribution; E =effort attribution; T = task 
attribution; L = luck attribution. 
A24. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
B D I Age MAACL 1 Int. Sta. Glo. MAACL 2 Exp. p s 
9 19 10 6 6 4 16 2 57 
10 21 11 3 5 6 12 4 51 
12 19 11 6 5 3 20 3 47 
9 18 10 8 
Cl 
8 3 17 3 54 
...... 13 18 24 9 9 9 24 43 I.J... 
<C 
..... 10 20 20 6 6 5 15 4 47 
11 19 10 6 6 4 13 3 48 
9 22 11 6 5 3 11 5 59 
83 156 107 50 50 37 128 25 406 
13 19 11 5 6 7 22 4 50 
15 20 11 4 4 7 10 6 52 
11 21 5 3 9 9 7 7 52 
11 24 22 7 7 6 17 1 44 
9 19 17 7 5 6 15 5 54 
15 19 26 3 3 6 19 5 43 
Cl 10 20 18 5 7 6 14 5 53 
...... 
I.J... 13 21 10 3 7 2 16 3 57 <C 
L.l.l 
l 97 163 120 37 48 49 120 36 405 
12 20 12 7 6 6 18 .5 50 
16 18 25 5 6 8 21 4 54 
9 18 16 8 8 4 19 5 49 
10 19 9 8 6 3 12 5 48 
10 20 12 7 7 7 15 5 61 
Cl 15 24 26 7 9 7 24 3 49 
....... 18 
0 
20 18 8 8 7 16 5 35 
1.1.; 11 20 14 8 5 8 17 2 43 
l 101 159 132 58 55 50 142 34 389 
Note. Int. = internality; Sta. = stability; Glo. = globality; PS = psychomotor 
speed; Exp. = expectation. 
A 25. 
EXPERIMENT 3 (continued) ( 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
B D I Age MAACL 1 Int. Sta. Glo. ~1AACL 2 Exp. p s 
6 18 18 8 8 1 24 43 
3 19 4 3 5 6 16 42 
2 18 10 7 6 5 24 4 53 
Cl 3 18 7 5 6 3 19 2 50 z 
........ 
LL.. 3 20 11 8 9 9 15 3 48 c( 
_. 
4 22 6 8 7 6 8 5 56 
6 21 11 5 4 3 14 5 51 
19 12 4 8 6 20 3 42 
28 155 79 48 53 39 140 24 385 
3 18 13 6 5 5 16 3 60 
5 19 7 3 6 2 14 5 60 
4 19 8 3 6 8 16 5 66 
5 28 4 1 9 6 8 5 61 
4 20 14 6 4 6 12 5 59 
Cl 7 29 14 6 6 6 14 6 60 z 
........ 19 LL. 4 7 3 7 8 13 4 49 c( 
UJ 
l 7 50 4 8 6 7 7 8 64 39 202 71 36 49 48 100 41 479 
0 21 3 6 8 6 3 4 49 
3 20 9 4 7 3 18 5 49 
8 18 2 6 8 7 2 4 52 
2 19 17 7 9 7 16 6 35 
5 28 8 3 2 1 11 6 48 
4 38 17 2 2 2 15 6 47 
Cl 
z 4 18 16 3 3 6 19 4 48 
........ 
0 
LL. 3 19 6 4 5 3 5 5 46 
l 29 181 78 35 44 35 89 40 374 
Note. Int. = internal i ty; Sta. =stability; Glo. = globality; PS = psychomotor 
speed; Exp. = expectation. 
A26. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
A T T R I B U T I 0 N S 
B D I Age p p I p p N I N 
Int. Ext. Int. Ext. Int. Ext. Int. Ext. 
r 
18 46 1 1 8 9 9 
28 38 5 5 4 4 3 4 9 4 
30 42 5 4 3 3 5 5 4 1 
"' 15 62 9 9 9 4 9 1 1 ...
c::: 
<11 18 45 2 2 2 8 9 9 
... 
10 18 22 5 7 2 2 4 4 4 4 0. 
Cl 20 31 6 5 6 5 7 5 4 5 
38 46 7 5 7 4 9 1 9 1 
16 30 7 5 7 5 7 5 1 9 
31 63 2 5 4 4 7 4 9 5 
32 22 9 6 5 5 6 2 4 
264 447 58 49 51 52 74 37 61 36 
6 21 7 4 7 5 2 5 5 
9 23 4 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 
13 45 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 
14 21 9 6 5 5 5 1 9 
"' 
4 31 5 3 7 5 5 5 9 
...
c::: 6 19 9 1 9 1 7 5 9 <11 
.... 
... 4 21 6 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 10 
0. 
Cl 6 29 4 5 7 5 7 5 2 5 
z: 
l 62 210 49 29 51 36 39 36 25 52 
Note. pp = Personal positive events; IP = Interpersonal positive events; 
PN = Personal negative events; IN = Interpersonal negative events; Int. = 
Internality; Ext. = Externality. 
A27. 
EXPERII4ENT 5 
M A A C L Negative events Positive events 
B D I Age Dep. Anx. p s Int. Sta. Gl o. Int. Sta. Glo. 
2 20 4 3 55 3.00 5.75 1.00 7.25 8.00 8.00 
2 19 20 12 45 5.50 6. 50 3.25 4.25 7.50 4.00 
4 33 19 7 49 6.25 4. 75 4.50 8:00 7.25 7.50 
10 38 25 11 51 6.25 5.50 6.25 5.00 5.00 5.00 
z: 21 8 5 46 7.25 7.25 5.50 8.75 8.50 4. 75 0 
...... 
V'l 8 19 10 8 61 4.00 3.25 3.50 7.25 6.25 6.25 V'l 
LLJ 
0::: 4 18 20 10 53 4.75 6.75 6.00 6.25 8.00 7.75 Cl.. 
LLJ 
0 8 28 20 8 37 5.50 5.25 3.75 6.33 7.67 5.33 
4 22 20 10 41 3.00 6.25 3.75 5.00 5.50 4.25 
4 31 11 6 55 5.50 5.50 5.50 7.50 7.25 7.00 
47 249 157 80 493 51.00 56.75 43.00 65.58 70.92 59.83 
5 21 6 6 64 4.00 6. 75 5.00 6.75 8.25 8.75 
8 18 13 8 50 6. 75 3.50 2.75 4.00 6.25 4.50 
5 20 12 8 50 4.50 6.00 3.50 7.75 7.00 4. 75 . 
8 21 8 3 48 4.25 . 5.00 6.50 9.00 7.50 8.25 
8 20 4 4 59 5.50 4.50 2.50 6.75 7.50 7.25 
z: 8 26 11 4 62 5.50 3.50 2.25 7.75 6.25 5.00 0 
...... 
1- 6 20 7 5 55 6.00 6.25 5.50 4._75 5.25 5.50 ~ 
-I 
LLJ 7 19 5 4 46. 2.25 3.00 2.50 6.50 6.75 5.50 
7 22 3 5 57 4.25 6. 75 5.50 6.25 6.75 6.00 
3 28 3 3 47 5.50 5.25 6.50 5.50 8.25 8.25 
65 215 72 50 538 48.50 50.50 42.50 65.00 63.75 63.75 
Note. Dep. = depression; Anx. = anxiety; Int. ·= internality; Sta. =stability; 
Glo. = globality; P S =psychomotor speed. 
A28. 
EXPERmENT 6 
M A A C L A T T R I B U T I 0 N S 
B D I p s 
Dep. Anx. A E T L 
0 13 7 55 7 8 6 
4 17 9 42 5 7 3 3 
24 14 60 3 4 3 1 
19 11 63 3 7 7 
z 5 13 8 45 6 7 7 6 0 
...... 
V) 3 15 12 42 3 7 6 2 V) 
LLJ 
c:: 5 20 6 51 3 3 7 c.. 
LLJ 
0 4 11 7 50 7 4 7 
"" V) 
l 23 132 74 408 37 47 46 16 
4 7 7 60 6 8 3 2 
4 7 4 48 5 5 4 3 
3 4 3 59 8 3 6 3 
1 7 8 65 7 7 7 6 
7 7 5 52 7 4 7 2 
2 5 3 68 7 6 5 6 
z 4 3 3 57 3 4 7 6 0 
...... 
1- 5 10 4 58 9 8 8 8 Cl: 
-I 
LLJ 
"" V) 
l 30 50 37 467 52 45 47 36 
Note. Dep. = depression; Anx. = anxiety; PS = psychomotor speed; A = ability 
attribution; E = effort attribution; T = task attribution; L = luck attribution. 
A 29. 
z 
0 
...... 
Vl 
Vl 
LLJ 
0:::: 
c... 
LLJ 
c 
~ 
l 
- l 
EXPERmENT 6 (continued) 
B D I 
6 
4 
.3 
4 
4 
6 
4 
7 
38 
6 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
25 
I MAACL 
Dep. Anx. 
16 
20 
13 
19 
25 
8 
24 
15 
140 
7 
10 
5 
9 
8 
2 
5 
9 
55 
8 
7 
12 
15 
11 
8 
10 
7 
78 
6 
3 
8 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
39 
p s 
60 
47 
45 
51 
47 
59 
53 
62 
424 
65 
52 
50 
55 
49 
59 
65 
46 
441 
~---- ---
A T T R I B U T I 0 N S 
A 
6 
7 
4 
7 
5 
7 
7 
8 
51 
6 
4 
1 
7 
2 
2 
2 
2 
26 
E 
6 
·7 
7 
2 
4 
3 
8 
5 
42 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
4 
19 
T 
6 
5 
3 
7 
8 
7 
3 
4 
43 
8 
4 
2 
8 
2 
8 
8 
7 
47 
L 
7 
6 
2 
4 
5 
4 
2 
7 
37 
5 
1 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
30 
Note: Dep. = depression; Anx. = anxiety; PS = psychomotor speed; A = ability 
attribution; E = effort'attribution; T = task attribution; L = luck attribution. 
A30. 
EXPERIMENT 7 
. 
Positive events Negative events 
B D I Age MAACL Cs Cc Dt Cs Cc Dt 
13 21 18 9 9 8 9 9 10 
9 21 10 10 8.5 6.5 10 10 10 
12 22 25 11 10.5 7.0 10.5 10 10 
19 26 22 7.5 5.5 9.0 9.5 9.5 5.5 
13 19 12 8 5 5 9 6.5 7 
19 20 19 7.5 6 7 9.5 9 9.5 
9 20 17 8.5 8 4 9 8.5 8 
Cl 10 25 18 8.5 6 6.5 5 4 1.5 I..LI 
Vl 
Vl 9 19 14 10 3.5 3.5 11 8 8.5 I..LI 
c:: 
c.. 22 24 26 7 4 4 7.5 9.5 8.5 I..LI 
Cl 
10 20 8 11 9 3.5 7.5 9 8 
14 22 22 5.5 9.5 8.5 7 5.5 7 
9 24 6 6 6 7 7.5 8 7.5 
13 21 16 8 8.5 7.5 9 9 7 
10 20 14 8.5 7 7 11 10 9.5 
191 324 247 126 106 94 127 121.5 117.5 
22 3 2 4.5 4.5 3 8.5 8 
4 18 8 8.5 8 10 10 8 7.5 
30 3 5.5 8.5 7 7.5 8.5 8 
3 20 9 5.5 6.5 6 4.5 10 9 
5 23 5 8.5 6 7.5 6 5.5 9.5 
30 7 3 6 5.5 4 6 6.5 
4 20 6 8.5 6.5 5 8 7.5 7 
6 19 14 4 4.5 4 3.5 4 4.5 
21 8 8.5 8 3.5 10.5 7 6.5 
Cl 
I..LI 6 21 4 8.5 9.5 4.5 10 3.5 4 Vl 
Vl 
I..LI 2 21 12 3.5 7.5 6 5.5 6 8 c:: 
c.. 
I..LI 6 21 12 8.5 8 7.5 10.5 10.5 8.5 Cl 
z 2 21 4 9 9 8 10 10 9 
l 2 19 16 8 9 3.5 9.5 8.5 4.5 6 19 8 9 7 3.5 7 9 6.5 SI 325 119 100.5 108.5 86 109.5 112.5 107 
Note. Cs = consensus~ Cc = consistency~ Dt = distinctiveness 
A31. 
EXPERIMENT 8 
0 E P R E S S E 0 N 0 N D E P R E S S E 0 
B 0 I Nb. of questions B 0 I Nb. of questions 
10 4 6 
14 3 4 
11 7 3 5 
14 5 4 6 
14 5 3 10 
17 3 4 9 
10 4 6 13 
14 2 7 
9 4 10 
14 3 3 6 
127 40 27 76 
A32. 
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